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MercExchange, L.L.C. instructs that patent law is not an island, but rather
is part of the broader law of equity and its remedies. Initially heeding that
instruction, the Federal Circuit in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson
& Co. unanimously decided to rehear en banc the issue of inequitable conduct
in light of its origins in equity and unclean hands. Regrettably, the majority
ultimately renounced the doctrine's heritage and reinvented the defense purely
on policy grounds. Although the majority still called cheating in obtaining a
patent monopoly inequitable conduct, there is little equity left.
The Therasense majority rewrote the rules of ancient equity without
resortingto history or guidinglegal theory. By revisitingthe equitabledoctrine
of unclean hands, this Article provides critical guidance in the future
adjudication of inequitable conduct. It evaluates what the defense couldand should-mean within the context of equity principles and patent remedy
policies. In doing so, it shows how patent law may meaningfully join equity
in substance and procedure in a manner also consonant with the legislature's
interests. The suggestions build upon theoreticaldevelopments in patent rights
and remedies. The analysis also unites a series of Supreme Court decisions on
unclean hands, remedies, and patent law. Examining inequitable conduct
from the perspective of equity jurisprudence as a whole exposes trends and
themes that a narrower lens might have omitted and traces critical lines that
have been ignored. While the literatureon inequitable conduct is extensive, no
one has examined inequitable conduct from its equitable tradition. Therefore,
this articlefills an essential gap in the scholarship on an issue of systemic
importance.
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Wen you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight,
you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to
get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame
him and make him a useful animal.

-Oliver

Wendell Holmes'

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently pulled
the patent dragon from its cave when it unanimously decided to
rehear en banc the issue of inequitable conduct in Therasense, Inc. v.
Becton, Dickinson & Co.' Consistent with the United States Supreme
Court's direction to interpret equitable issues in patent remedies
according to applicable equity principles,3 the Federal Circuit
announced that it would reexamine the parameters of inequitable
conduct and review its link to the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands.4 In its landmark decision after rehearing however, a majority
of the Federal Circuit surprisingly ignored tradition and permanently
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)
(discussing "why a rule of law has taken its particular shape").
2. 374 F. App'x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), grantingreh'g en banc to 649
F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
3. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (noting that
the principals of equity apply equally to disputes stemming from the Patent Act).
4. Therasense, 374 F. App'x at 35-36 (ordering the parties to brief several issues
for rehearing, including whether "inequitable conduct [should] be modified or
replaced"). The court continued, "Ifso, how? In particular, should the standard be
tied directly to fraud or unclean hands? If so, what is the appropriate standard for
fraud or unclean hands?" Id. (citations omitted).
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removed the defense from the equitable foundation laid by the
United States Supreme Court during the last century.5
The Therasense majority's rejection of the history of inequitable
conduct contravenes the last word of the Supreme Court on the
defense in patent law, contradicts its more recent precedent on
patent remedies, and departs from the Court's equitable defense
jurisprudence in other statutory contexts.
Consequently, the
majority's redefinition of inequitable conduct is at odds with not only
an entire series of Supreme Court decisions, but also with an equity
jurisprudence that has been settled for several hundred years.
While inequitable conduct has generated vigorous and continuous
dialogue unparalleled in intellectual property law, the debate has
centered on Federal Circuit precedent and policy.6 This Article
contributes to the inequitable-conduct discourse by moving beyond
its narrow focus on existing doctrine and returning to the defense's
broad history.' For the first time, this approach analyzes the defense
from the tradition of equity and the doctrine of unclean hands.8
Using the Therasense decision as a framing proposition, this article
suggests what the past (and present) means, or could mean, for the
future of inequitable conduct.
In particular, this Article advances the defense within an emerging
philosophy of patent law and its remedies. There is consensus in the
patent community that an absence of theory, not practice, has
inhibited progress.'
This analysis extends recent theoretical
5. See Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276.
6. See Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct
Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 736 (2011) ("[T]he doctrine has emerged from
obscurity over the past 30 years to become one of the most frequently raised
defenses-and most hotly debated topics-in contemporary patent law."); see also id.
at 736 n.2 (citing various literature discussing how often the inequitable-conduct
doctrine is used as a defense in patent cases).
7. To identify the relationship between inequitable conduct and unclean hands,
we evaluated historical materials on equity and unclean hands dating back to the
doctrine's origin and beyond. We also consulted scholarly literature in America
before and after its founding, as well as past and present English and other
Commonwealth equity materials. We additionally analyzed numerous state and
federal decisions involving unclean hands across the country. Our case examination
included every one of the estimated one hundred Supreme Court opinions raising
the issue of unclean hands. This study of American court practice identified the
defense's origins, definitional elements, rationale, and extent of its application.
8. See generally Cotter, supra note 6, at 752 (commenting that "a more
traditional view would locate the inequitable conduct doctrine in considerations
of ethics and-as the name of the doctrine implies-equity"); Katherine NolanStevaux, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combating the Plague, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 149 (2005) (indicating that inequitable conduct is generally
more broad than common law fraud).
9.

See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:

ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

23 (2005)

(discussing the
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developments in patent law."0 This study also introduces equity
scholarship" into the patent field and shares insights from remedies
experts. 12 In connecting inequitable conduct to its underpinnings in
equity, we additionally draw from our own work of providing a
theoretical
underpinning for unclean hands in the twenty-first
3
century.

The significance of this Article reaches past the patent field in
understanding the unclean-hands doctrine, general equitable
defenses, and remedies. Analyzing unclean hands in federal patent
law further defines the parameters of the defense and outlines its use
in a new context. The defense has been overlooked by legal scholars
despite its impact in the hundreds of commercial-relations cases
decided each year.14

absence of theoretical and empirical evidence and literature addressing the ideal
scope of patent rights).
10. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 18 (2009); Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Remedies and Practical
Reason, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 125 (2009); John M. Golden, Principlesfor Patent
Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505 (2010).
11. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4(2), at 68-72 (2d ed. 1993).
This Article will further expound the defense offered by Zechariah Chafee, a former
practitioner and Harvard Law School professor whose literature is the leading source
of research on unclean hands in this country and abroad. See generally Scattaretico v.
Puglisi, 799 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 n.13 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (referring to Professor
Chafee's writings as "indispensable"); DOUGLAS LAYcOCK, MODERN AMERICAN
REMEDIES 933 (1985) (describing Chafee's work as the "best treatment" of unclean
hands). The Thomas M. Cooley Lectures that Chafee delivered at the University of
Michigan Law School in 1949, and his subsequent publications in the Michigan Law
Review, analyzed American cases applying the defense in a variety of areas, including
patent law. See Zechariah Chafee,Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L.
REV. 877 (1949) [hereinafter Chafee I]; Zechariah Chafee,Jr., Coming into Equity with
Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1065 (1949) [hereinafter Chafee II]. Since the
Supreme Court established the main contours of inequitable conduct by 1950, see
generally Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806
(1945), Chafee's reflections during the same time period aid in understanding the
defense and its purposes as well as its relation to legislative goals. See Chafee II, supra,
at 1070. Notably, Chafee's seminal work was overlooked by counsel in Therasense and
accordingly not considered by the Federal Circuit.
12. See, e.g., DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL
REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT (2010); Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 53.
13. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of Unclean
Hands, 99 Ky. L.J. 63 (2011) [hereinafter Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies]; T. Leigh
Anenson, TreatingEquity Like Law: A Post-MergerJustification of Unclean Hands, 45 AM.
Bus. L.J. 455 (2008) [hereinafter Anenson, TreatingEquity Like Law].
14. See T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands,
47 AM. Bus. LJ. 509, 510 (2010) [hereinafter Anenson, Beyond Chafee] (noting the
applicability of the defense to tort and contract law, statutory disputes, and
international human rights); T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment
Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 47-51 (2005) [hereinafter Anenson, Role of
Equity] (describing the importance of the defense and explaining its use in business
situations).
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Moreover, this examination of unclean hands adds to the theory
and practice of general equitable defenses. While some defenses are
specific to a particular cause of action, the equitable doctrine of
unclean hands potentially applies in any dispute regardless of subject
matter and operates across claims to effectively cancel existing legal
rights.15 As the Federal Circuit is well aware, courts can alter the
value of rights by either liberally or restrictively interpreting the
defenses that negate liability.
Furthermore, because the doctrine of unclean hands is a remedial
defense, this Article informs the law of remedies. Equitable remedies
are "in the midst of an American revolution" after the Supreme
Court's recent patent decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 6
This Article addresses a remedial issue raised in eBay and important
jurisprudential query, providing a clearer conception of discretion in
judicial decision making. 17 The discretionary inquiry focuses on
ancient equity in the modern statutory context and the abstention
courts exercise under the unclean-hands doctrine.'
In summary, this Article offers a new focus (equity), proposes a
new approach (theory), and brings new sources to bear on the
problematic doctrine of inequitable conduct. With millions spent
15. See, e.g., RENDLEMAN, supra note 12, at 146; SARAH WORTHINGTON, EQUITY 34
(2d ed. 2006) (noting that "clean hands" is an equitable defense). Unclean hands is
a recognized defense to a number of federal statutory actions outside of patent law.
See, e.g., Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 792 (5th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that the "copyright misuse" doctrine "has its historical roots in the
unclean hands defense"); see also Craig M. Boise, Playing with "Monopoly Money":
Phony Profits, FraudPenaltiesand Equity, 90 MINN. L. REv. 144, 189-92 (2005) (applying
the unclean-hands defense to tax refund claims based on fraudulently inflated
earnings).
16. 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court's Accidental
Revolution? The Test for PermanentInjunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 203, 204-05 (2012)
(explaining that "the eBay opinion has had cataclysmic effect" and has become "the
test for whether a permanent injunction should issue, regardless of whether the
dispute in question centers on patent law, another form of intellectual property,
more conventional government regulation, constitutional law, or state tort or
contract law"); see also Tracy A. Thomas, eBay Rx, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 187,
189-90 (2008) (questioning whether the Supreme Court's right-remedy distinction
facilitated its decision to restrict the remedy). After eBay, Douglas Laycock advised
practitioners of the risk of not hiring a remedies expert. See Douglas Laycock,
Remedies: Justice and the Bottom Line, 27 REv. LMG. 1 (2007) (mentioning the different
issues involved in remedies and introducing multiple remedy experts).
17. Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of
Judgment, 64 U. MIAMi L. REv. 947, 950 (2010) (advising that discretion began
receiving scholarly attention in the late 1960s); Doug Rendleman, The TrialJudge's
Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REv. LITIG. 63, 64 & nn.2-7
(2007) (citing articles devoted to discretion in substance, procedure, and
jurisprudence).
18. See, e.g., James M. Fischer, Wat Hath eBay v. MercExhange Wrought?, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 555, 575 (2010) (concluding that the Supreme Court "remains
committed to a traditional approach" to equitable remedies in statutory actions).
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litigating infringement actions each year,19 the Supreme Court must
eventually decide on inequitable-conduct law. 20 By synthesizing
Supreme Court decisions on unclean hands across a variety of
statutory remedies, this Article aims to assist the Court in its analysis
of the defense within the patent field and contribute to an
understanding of equitable defenses in other federal legislation. It
may also aid the Federal Circuit in applying Therasense and facilitate
the district courts application of that precedent. Since Congress
recently marshaled the political will to address part of the problem,21
an appreciation of the historical basis of inequitable conduct may
likewise guide construction of new legislation and regulations.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of
unclean hands in federal court jurisprudence. It demonstrates that
the Supreme Court has relied on tradition as an important method of
interpretation in deciding patent and non-patent cases concerning
equity, unclean hands, and inequitable conduct. It then traces the
genesis of inequitable conduct doctrine across three Supreme Court
patent decisions to its most recent iteration in the Federal Circuit
opinion, Therasense.
Part II analyzes the new elements of the inequitable-conduct
defense, as outlined by the Federal Circuit majority, in light of its
origin in equity and unclean hands. Among other irregularities, this
Part finds that the majority abandoned the elements of unclean
hands and neglected key sources of normative and doctrinal
guidance. The majority likewise discounted the defense's critical
policy of court protection and, accordingly, misconceived the trilogy
of Supreme Court decisions deriving the doctrine of inequitable
19. See Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct To Improve Patent Quality:
Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 166 (2006) (listing patent
litigation costs at $650,000 to $4.5 million per party).
20. See Gregory A. Castanias et al., Survey Of the FederalCircuit's Patent Law Decisions
in 2006: A New Chapter in the OngoingDialogue with the Supreme Court, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
793, 798 (2007) (noting the "more aggressive Supreme Court review of the substance
of patent law and patent procedure and less deference to the Federal Circuit's views
of what the content of U.S. patent law should be"); ArthurJ. Gajarsa & Lawrence P.
Cogswell, III, The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 843
(2006) (remarking on the recent increase in the frequency of Supreme Court review
of Federal Circuit patent decisions).
21. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). Before 2011, legislative efforts to
reform the patent system had been futile. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 19, at 173-75
(outlining proposals for inequitable-conduct defense in the Patent Reform Act of
2005); Matthew M. Peters, The Equitable Inequitable: Adding Proportionality and
Predictability to Inequitable Conduct in the Patent Reform Act of 2008, 19 DEPAULJ. ART,
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 77 (2008) (examining the Patent Reform Act of 2008 and
arguing that the Act provides positive changes to the application of equitable
conduct).
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conduct. Part II also criticizes the majority for disregarding the
discretionary nature of unclean hands, and coincidentally,
inequitable conduct. Failure to account for the remedial discretion
of the district court is at odds with the Supreme Court's most recent
patent decision in eBay, along with decisions involving unclean hands
in other federal statutes. The Federal Circuit's reinvention of
inequitable conduct runs afoul of the Supreme Court's unclean
hands jurisprudence, including its patent cases, which was established
in accordance with the history of equity.
Part III evaluates whether the equitable nature of inequitable
conduct inspired the current concerns with the defense's use enough
to justify the majority's departure from tradition. It finds that the
absence, rather than presence, of equity in the Federal Circuit's
former decisions precipitated the need for reform. This Part also
establishes that reliance on the principle of unclean hands will
improve the practice of inequitable conduct and provide a more
functional and reliable restriction on patent infringement remedies.
This Article concludes that the Federal Circuit could have tamed
the patent dragon in Therasense pursuant to its origins in the
equitable defense of unclean hands. The majority avoided an (other)
opportunity to adhere to tradition and to provide a judicial, rather
than political, solution. It is unfortunate that "nearly every Federal
Circuit patent case to reach the Supreme Court in the past decade
has been reversed or vacated in some form."22 Therasense will likely be
another.
I.

EQUITY'S PILGRIMAGE IN PATENT LAw: FROM UNCLEAN HANDS TO
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

There is great "mischief' in seeking a patent.2" With billions of
dollars at stake in securing these federally-protected-monopoly
rights,24 failing to disclose information that may be detrimental to the
22. Gary M. Hoffman & Robert L. Kinder, Supreme Court Review of Federal Circuit
Patent Cases-Placingthe Recent Scrutiny in Context and Determiningif It Will Continue, 20
DEPAULJ. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 227 (2010); see BURK & LEMLEY, supra

note 10, at 18 ("In the early years of the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court

appeared to be accepting a somewhat larger number of patent cases, perhaps in
recognition of the growing importance of this area of law.").
23. See Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent
Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 37 (1993) (commenting on "the mismatched
resources of perennially over-taxed patent examiners confronted with 'the antlike
persistency of patent solicitors"' (quoting Lyon v. Boh, 1 F.2d 48, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)
(Hand,J.), rev'd, 10 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1925)).
24. See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888) (asserting that
granting a patent takes immense value from the public and gives it to the patentee);
see also Simon H. Rifkind, The Romance Discoverablein Patent Cases, 16 F.R.D. 253, 255
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patent is a real problem with serious repercussions to competitors,
the industry, and the economy at large.25 Moreover, catching fraud
or other forms of cheating in the patent process is unlikely given the
practical limits of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("Patent
Office") .26 For these reasons, the Supreme Court instituted the
doctrine of inequitable conduct to address fraud or other unethical
conduct in the patent process.27 In the three cases decided between
1933 and 1945,28 the Court established inequitable conduct as a
patent law remedy grounded in the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands.29
The unclean-hands doctrine was well-settled by the twentieth
century, when the Supreme Court introduced the defense into patent
law." The maxim "he [or she] who comes into equity must come
(1955) ("Patent suits are fought for money and for the power to make money ... and
the prize is sometimes very large indeed ....
").
25. See Mack, supra note 19, at 147 (contending that the "integrity of the patent
system and society suffer" due to inequitable conduct in the patent process because
"investors rely on 'bad' patents as enforceable economic devices, and the public
remunerates royalties to illegitimate patent holders"); see also Goldman, supra note
23, at 37 ("The value of what the public receives in return for this right is based in
large part upon the assumption that the inventor has dealt honestly with the Patent
and Trademark Office.").
26. MARTINJ. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 735 (1998)
(contending that examiners are not necessarily experts in their field and the
workload of the Patent Office is such that searches by patent examiners are often not
extensive); Brian J. Love, Interring the PioneerInvention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REv. 379,
427 n.213 (2012) (noting that at the end of 2009, only 6,000 patent examiners were
employed to purge a backlog of over 700,000 patent applications); Mack, supra note
19, at 148 (detailing the "[b]udgetary constraints, rapidly evolving fields of
technology, and information asymmetries between patent applicants and patent
examiners"); see also Lyon, 1 F.2d at 50. Disciplinary proceedings are available for
dishonesty, deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation but prove difficult to effectuate in
practice. See Mack, supra note 19, at 165 & nn.128-29 (citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.23(b) (4),
10.132, 10.149 (2005)). In 1988, the Patent Office ceased investigating and rejecting
applications for violations of the duty of disclosure. See id. at 174 (noting that the
Patent Office has had the power to reject applications for inequitable conduct or
fraud since 1982).
27. See Sean M. O'Connor, Defusing the "Atomic Bomb" of PatentLitigation: Avoiding
and Defending Against Allegations of Inequitable Conduct After McKesson et al., 9 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 330, 332-33, 338, 378-79 (2009) (explaining that the
1952 Patent Act increased the patent requirements and provided for a more robust,
if not ideal, Patent Office relative to the early twentieth century).
28. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806
(1945); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); Keystone
Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
29. See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 812 (Fed. Cir.
1990) ("Indeed, what we have termed 'inequitable conduct' is no more than the
unclean hands doctrine applied to particular conduct before the PTO."); Demaco
Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1394-95 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
30. See Precision,324 U.S. at 814 (explaining that the clean hands doctrine is "far
more than a mere banality"); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating the unclean-hands defense "has long been
settled"). The United States Supreme Court accepted the doctrine shortly after its
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with clean hands" developed to "protect the court against the odium
that would follow its interference to enable a party to profit by his
own wrong-doing."3 1 Because of its universal application to all
requests for equitable relief, renowned equity scholar John Norton
Pomeroy described the principle as "one of the elementary and
fundamental conceptions of equity jurisprudence. '"32
A.

Unclean Hands and the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court did not deviate from the remedial and
equitable character of unclean hands in preventing inequitable
conduct during patent prosecution. Consistent with its approach to
equitable remedies and unclean hands outside the patent field, the
Court resorted to history when analyzing the defense.
1. Equity decisions
The Supreme Court followed the historical approach across a
broad spectrum of federal-equity decisions. 3 In statutory cases, the
Supreme Court employed a rule of construction that presumes the
existence and exercise of federal-court power that is consistent with
its traditional equitable authority. 4 In its still widely cited opinion,
Hecht Co. v. Bowles,35 the Court explained that it must examine the
"requirements of equity practice with a background of several
recognition in the leading English case of Dering v. Winchelsea, (1787) 29 Eng. Rep.
1184. See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 5 (1950)
(noting the defense "is exactly as old as the U.S. Constitution"). The idea of unclean
hands originated in a treatise authored by Sir Richard Francis. See RICHARD FRANCIS,
MAXIMS OF EQUITY (London, Bernard Lintot 1728).

Scholars have traced its genesis

to Chinese customary law and Roman law before the time of Justinian. See RALPH A.
NEWMAN, EQUITYAND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 250 & n. 19 (1961).
31. HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 26 (2d ed.

1948).
32.

1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE § 398, at 92

(Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941). Harold Greville Hanbury said that "[t]here
is no clearer maxim of equity than '[h]e who comes to equity must come with clean
hands."'

HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY, MODERN EQUITY 4 (1935).

The quote

continues "this is true of equity at all periods." Id. Modern decisions similarly
describe unclean hands as a "cardinal maxim," Banks v. Rockwell Int'l N.A. Aircraft
Operations, 855 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1988), or an equitable tenet, McNeill Family
Trust v. Centura Bank, 60 P.3d 1277, 1284 (Wyo. 2003).
33. History has been a guide to ascertaining the existence, as well as the exercise,
of the Court's equity powers. See Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568
(1939) (indicating that federal courts have "authority to administer in equity suits
the principles of the system of judicial remedies" inherited from "the English Court
of Chancery at the time of the separation"). The Supreme Court has used history as
a mode of interpretation for ascertaining equity and equity-based theories in
deciding cases arising under the Constitution, legislation, and the common law. See
RENDLEMAN, supra note 12, at 146-60.

34. RENDLEMAN, supra note 12, at 152 (discussing statutory discretion).
35. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
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hundred years of history."36 The Supreme Court's decision in eBay,
which involved patent remedies, confirmed that history must be
37
considered in reaching a decision implicating equitable doctrines.
2.

Unclean-hands decisions
The Supreme Court has found evidence of the history of unclean
hands in court practice and corresponding theoretical materials. Its
opinions in both Pope Manufacturing Co. v. GormullyP8 and Haffner v.
Dobrinsk?9 discussed unclean hands as a condition of equitable
intervention and the discretion to refuse aid "from time
immemorial."4"
The Court's decisions also consider precedent
associated with unclean hands outside the field of law at issue in the
case. 41 Its unclean-hands cases similarly cited historical sources,
including the treatise authored by Sir Richard Francis credited with
the idea of the maxim;42 the original English case to recognize
unclean hands, Dering v. Winchelsea;4 and the seminal treatises on
44
equity jurisprudence written byJohn Pomeroy and Joseph Story.
3.

Inequitable-conductdecisions
The Supreme Court's patent law decisions that give rise to the
doctrine of inequitable conduct are especially illuminating for their
use of history in assessing equity and unclean hands. The Court's
opinion in Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.,45 attributed with
creating the doctrine of inequitable conduct, relied on Pomeroy and
Story.4 6 The Court's next decision, Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford36. Id. at 328-29 (adopting the clear-statement rule of construction during the
same time that it invoked the doctrine of unclean hands to prevent inequitable
conduct in procuring a patent).
37. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
38. 144 U.S. 224 (1892) (contract prohibiting the sale of other patented parts).
39. 215 U.S. 446 (1910).
40. Pope, 144 U.S. at 236-37.
41. Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228 (1848) (cited by Keystone Driller Co. v.
Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933); Kitchen v. Rayburn, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
254, 263 (1873)).
42. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Soutter, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 517, 523-24 (1871) ("'He that
hath committed iniquity shall not have equity."' (quoting Francis, supra note 41, at

7)).

43. (1787) 29 Eng. Rep. 1184.
44. See, e.g., Simmons v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids & N. Ry. Co., 159 U.S. 278, 291
(1895) (citing 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE § 816,
at 1136 (San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Co., 2d ed. 1892)) (justifying its decision
on the ground of unclean hands).
45. 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
46. Id. at 244-45 (quoting I JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 397 (4th ed. 1918); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 98 (W.H. Lyon Jr. ed., 14th ed. 1918) (explaining the relationship
between clean hands and standing in matters of equity).
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Empire Co.,4 7 declared that the case "demand[ed] the exercise of the
historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten
judgments." 4 In its last word on inequitable conduct, the Supreme
Court in Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Machinery Co.49 continued to depend on Pomeroy to
explain its decision.5"
The Court's early inequitable-conduct decisions did not confine
their search for doctrine to patent law." On the contrary, the Court
found authoritative opinions invoking unclean hands across a variety
of fields.52 Consequently, the Supreme Court located inequitable
conduct within a thick lay of equity and unclean hands. 3
But the Supreme Court has not addressed inequitable conduct
since 1945, and, without guidance, the Federal Circuit has struggled
with the remedy.5 4 Since its inception in 1982, the Federal Circuit
has paid little attention to the doctrine's equitable tradition. 5
Hence, while Supreme Court equity jurisprudence still uses tradition
47. 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
48. Id. at 245.
49. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
50. Id. at 814-15 (" [I]t does require that they shall have acted fairly and without
fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue." (citing 2 POMEROY, supra note 44,
§§ 397-399, at 90-100)); see also Chafee I, supra note 11, at 878 (stating that Precision
was one of four cases decided after Pearl Harbor where the maxim was a "bone of
bitter controversy" in the Supreme Court).
51. In an effort to balance absolute property rights with competition policy, the
Supreme Court initially applied unclean hands to defeat patent infringement
litigation where the patentee had misused the patent. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v.
Nat'l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957). The patent misuse defense dealt with a
patentee's conduct after acquiring the patent. Only later would the Court extend
the doctrine of unclean hands to conduct ex ante to the patent.
52. See, e.g., Precision, 324 U.S. at 814-15 (citing Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit
Co., 321 U.S. 383, 387 (1944), which concerned a proceeding for the return of the
liquors seized by state officials); Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229 (1934)
(proceeding for dower/alimony for land); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator
Co., 290 U.S. 240, 247 (1933) (citing cases as diverse as Deweese v. Reinhard, 165
U.S. 386, 390 (1897), which applied the general principle to a land claim; Carrington
v. Pratt, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 63 (1855), which applied the "admiralty rule" of contracts;
and Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228 (1848), which applied the general principle
in a contract case); see also Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 270 n.21 (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(relying on Creath's Adm'r. v. Sims, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 192 (1848), which applied
unclean hands in a contract case).
53. See Gypsum, 352 U.S. at 457 ("The rule is an extension of the equitable
doctrine of 'unclean hands' to the patent field.").
54. The Supreme Court decided two cases relating to the patent process after
Precision. SeeWalker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
175-76 (1965) (allowing a private cause of action under antitrust laws against
patentee who fraudulently procured a patent); Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318,
319-29 (1949) (per curiam) (regarding the disbarment of attorneys from Patent
Office practice who had helped fraudulently procure the patents at issue in HazelAtlas, in which the Court held the Patent Office, not the court, to be the exclusive
administrator of regulations and sanctions of attorneys).
55. See infraPart III.A.
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as a principle to interpret equitable remedies and defenses,5 6 the
equitable basis for inequitable conduct has been lost in translation.
B. Inequitable Conduct in the FederalCircuit
Prior to Therasense, inequitable-conduct involved a sliding-scale
analysis of two elements: intent and materiality. The accused patent
infringer had to show by clear and convincing evidence that "(1) an
individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent
application made an affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact,
failed to disclose material information, or submitted false material
information" to the Patent Office, and (2) "did so with the specific
intent to deceive" the Patent Office.5" The Federal Circuit originally
followed the duty of good faith and candor found in Patent Office
Rule 568 to determine whether information was material. 9 A
violation of Rule 56 did not require a showing that the patent would
not have been granted had the Patent Office been provided the
correct information. Rather, a reasonable examiner standard was
followed, under which information was only material if there was a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a
patent.6 The Federal Circuit precedent also accepted that even
inconsistent conduct could amount to a violation6 1 and that intent
56. There is a consistent line of precedent on federal equity power, ending in the
Supreme Court's recent opinion in Holland v. Florida, which requires that courts
resort to history when analyzing equitable issues in federal regulation. 130 S.Ct.
2549, 2563 (2010). The most recent Supreme Court case addressing the uncleanhands doctrine relied on the latest edition of Pomeroy in determining its scope
within the context of legislation. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513
U.S. 352, 360 (1995) (rejecting the doctrine of unclean hands, as defined by
Pomeroy, where Congress has authorized equitable relief to serve important national
policies).
57. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (citing Star Scientific, Inc. v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2008)); see also Larson Mfg. Co. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J., concurring) (defending the standard set in Star

Scientific).

58. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012).
59. See Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1368, 1371 (setting aside a ruling of inequitable
conduct where the accuser did not meet its burden of establishing an intent to
deceive); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (defining the good-faith standard as related to
materiality in disclosures).
60. This version was endorsed by the Federal Circuit in 1984 as "an appropriate
starting point," but the court also held that "[t]here is no reason.., to be bound by
any single standard" insofar as a finding of inequitable conduct requires a balancing
of materiality and intent. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d
1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984), abrogatedby Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
61. The current version of Rule 56 sets forth a duty of candor and good faith in
dealing with the Patent Office, "which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all
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was satisfied by conduct tantamount to mere negligence.62
Furthermore, some decisions also employed a sliding-scale approach:
a higher level of materiality required a lower level of intent, and vice
versa.

63

In addition to issuing multiple rulings on the elements of
inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit magnified the effect of the
doctrine. It held that a finding of inequitable conduct as to one
patent claim required the categorical denial of all patent claims.'
Unlike the early Supreme Court decisions, the Federal Circuit also
declared that a judgment of inequitable conduct was conclusive in
subsequent litigation with no opportunity to cure.6" The resulting
misuse and abuse of the inequitable-conduct defense has been
characterized as a "monster,"66 a "beast, "67 a "patent-killing virus,"' a
information known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this
section." 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a). Rule 56 also provides that information is material if it
is not cumulative and "(1) [i]t establishes, by itself or in combination with other
information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or (2) [i]t refutes, or is
inconsistent with, a petition the applicant takes in (i) [o] pposing an argument of
unpatentability relied on by the [Patent] Office or (ii) [a]sserting an argument of
patentability." Id. § 1.56(b).
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d
62. See, e.g.,
1226, 1239-40 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (employing a "should have known" standard); see also
Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (providing that intent was established by direct evidence or inferred from
indirect and circumstantial evidence); Stacy Lewis, et al., A Panaceafor Inequitable
Conduct Problems or Kingsdown Version 2.0? The Therasense Decision and a Look into the
Future of U.S. Patent Law Reform, 16 VA.J.L. & TECH. 373, 377 (2011) (detailing the
history of decisions from the 1990s 'whittl[ing] away" at the gross negligence
standard); Derek J. Brader, Comment, Distillinga Rule for Inferring Intent to Deceive the
Patent Office, 83 TEMP. L. REv. 529, 539 (2011) (tracing the retreat since the 1990s).
63. See, e.g., Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(employing the sliding-scale approach to allow an inference of deceptive intent in
part because of the "especially problematic" omission of sales data from
application to the Patent Office); Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1362 (endorsing the use
of sliding-scale analysis).
64. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (reaffirming a proposition fromJ.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex
Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984), that "when inequitable conduct
occurs in relation to one claim the entire claim is unenforceable"); see also Cotter,
supranote 6, at 738 (explaining that "a finding of inequitable conduct results in the
unenforceability of all of the claims of the patent at issue and sometimes even
related patents").
65. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287 (noting that cases of inequitable conduct
diverged from the doctrine of unclean hands by rendering entire patents
unenforceable rather than merely resulting in a dismissal of the lawsuit). For a
discussion of the America Invents Act of 2011 and its impact on the opportunity to
cure, see Gideon Mark & T. Leigh Anenson, Inequitable Conduct and Walker Process
Claims AfterTherasense and the American Invents Act, 15 U. PA.J. Bus. L. (forthcoming
2014).
66. See Alexis N. Simpson, Note, The Monster in the Closet: Declawing the Inequitable
Conduct Beast in the Attorney-Client PrivilegeArena, 25 GA.ST. U. L.REv. 735, 735 (2009)
(analyzing the inconsistent rulings on attorney-client privilege in inequitable-conduct
cases).
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"ubiquitous weed," 9 an "atomic bomb,"7" and a "plague."'" Before
the Federal Circuit agreed to rehear and decide inequitable conduct
en banc, this supposed "scourge "72 of patent law had judges,
practitioners, and academics alike calling for its reform.73
The Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Therasense was its second
attempt in twenty years to define the defense. Its initial attempt,
Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.,"4 was considered a
failure.7" After that decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
Federal Circuit for not considering the traditional conditions for an
equitable injunction.76 Therefore, in its order to rehear Therasense en
banc, the Federal Circuit requested research to re-establish an
67. Id.
68. "But For" Materiality Standard is Endorsed at Hearingon Disclosure Rules Revision,
38 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA),June 29, 1989, at 242, 243 (presenting the

statement of Donald W. Banner, on behalf of the Intellectual Property Owners Inc.,
regarding the Federal Circuit's interpretation of Rule 56).
69. Randall R. Rader, Always at the Margin: Inequitable Conduct in Flux, 59 AM. U.
L. REv. 777, 781 (2010) (explaining that inequitable conduct "grew from a tiny bush
on the patent landscape that inhibited gross fraud into a ubiquitous weed that infects
every prosecution and litigation involving patents").
70. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (characterizing the threat of inequitable conduct as
an 'atomic bomb' remedy of unenforceability").
71. See, e.g., Dickson Indus., Inc. v. Patent Enforcement Team, L.L.C., 333 F.
App'x 514, 519 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("This court has long recognized that 'the habit of
charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an
(quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418,
absoute pe."'
1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988))); McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med. Inc., 487 F.3d
897, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting) (referring to the unfortunate
"return[] to the 'plague"' of inequitable conduct).
72. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman,J., dissenting) ("The defense was so misused by alleged infringers that the
Federal Circuit once called this defense a 'scourge' on U.S. patent litigation."
(quoting Michael D. Kaminski, Effective Management of U.S. Patent Litigation, INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J.,Jan. 2006, at 13, 24)).

73.

See, e.g., Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the "Plague": Reforming the Doctrine

of Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1329, 1330 (2009) (advocating four

separate reforms to the doctrine of inequitable conduct); Rader, supra note 69, at
778 (exploring the history of the doctrine of inequitable conduct); Note, Can
Intellectual Property Law Regulate Behavior? A "Modest Proposal"for Weakening Unclean
Hands, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1503, 1505-06 (2000) (seeking to use the doctrine of
unclean hands to overturn ill-gotten copyrights).
74. 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc). Congress created the Federal
Circuit in 1982 to clarify and unify the law. See S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 21 (1981); Paul
R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: IncreasingPredictability in Federal CircuitJurisprudence
for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 1231, 1231 n.1 (1994).
75. See Rader, supra note 69, at 784 (lamenting that, although the decision tried
to narrowly define inequitable conduct, "Kingsdown may have retracted the margins
of the doctrine only temporarily, as many of the more recent cases have shown that it
did not achieve its objective" because those cases reopen the door for broad claims).
76. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) ("As this
Court has long recognized, 'a major departure from the long tradition of equity
practice should not be lightly implied."' (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982))).
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equitable foundation for inequitable conduct." Notwithstanding the
court's en banc order, the majority decision redirected the remedial
doctrine from its equitable roots.78

C. Therasense
Therasense, Inc. owned U.S. Patent No. 5,820,551 ("the '551
patent"), which "involve[d] disposable blood-glucose test strips for
diabetes management."79 Therasense prosecuted the original patent
application for more than thirteen years, beginning in 1984, during
which time it was repeatedly rejected over U.S. Patent No. 4,454,382
("the '382 patent"), also owned by Therasense. 0 The examiner
finally issued the '551 patent following amendment of the claim.8" In
March 2004, Therasense sued several defendants, including Becton,
82
Dickinson & Company, alleging infringement of the '551 patent.
After a bench trial, the federal district court held, inter alia, that the
'551 patent was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct because
Therasense did not disclose to the Patent Office allegedly
inconsistent statements that had previously been made to the
European Patent Office regarding the European counterpart to the
83
'382 patent.

Therasense appealed to the Federal Circuit, where a three-judge
panel affirmed the district court's holding of unenforceability.84
Therasense then successfully petitioned for rehearing en banc.8 5
Eleven judges participated in the en banc decision, with four
dissenting votes and one concurrence.8 6 The majority opinion
vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings,
specifically highlighting four key points.87

77. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 374 F. App'x 35, 35-36 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (per curiam), grantingreh'genbanc to649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
78. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 ("This court now tightens the standards for
finding both intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been
overused to the detriment of the public.").
79. Id. at 1282.
80. Id. at 1283.
81. The '511 patent finally overcame the prior art of the '382 patent and was
issued after new claims were presented to the examiner "based on a new sensor that
did not require a protective membrane for whole blood." Id.
82. Id. at 1284.
83. Id. at 1285.
84. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson, & Co., 593 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
vacated, 649 F.3d 1276.
85. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson, & Co., 374 F. App'x 35 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (per curiam), grantingreh'genbanc to 649 F.3d 1276.

86. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1282.
87. Id. at 1297.
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First, to prevail on its inequitable-conduct defense, an "accused
infringer must prove that the patentee acted with the specific intent
to deceive the [Patent Office]." ' The specific intent must be "the
single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the
evidence."8 The intent requirement is not satisfied by a finding that
a misrepresentation or omission constitutes negligence or even gross
negligence.9 ° Second, as a general rule, the materiality required to
establish inequitable conduct is "but-for" materiality.91 In a case
involving undisclosed prior art, but-for materiality exists only if the
Patent Office would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of
the undisclosed prior art.92 This but-for standard set a higher bar for
establishing materiality than the Patent Office's own definition under
Rule 56. Third, there is an exception to but-for materiality in cases
of affirmative, egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an
unmistakably false affidavit. 4 In these cases, the misconduct is
material regardless of the effect the misconduct had on the Patent
Office.95 Fourth, intent and materiality are distinct requirements,
and district courts should not use a sliding scale to determine the
existence of inequitable conduct.9 6 Instead, courts should assess the
evidence of materiality independent of their analysis of intent. 97
The majority claimed that its new definition of inequitable conduct
was consonant with the principle of equity and, further, that change
was necessary in practice.98 The remainder of this Article analyzes the
majority's reasons for reinterpreting inequitable conduct.
88. Id. at 1290.
89. Id. (quoting Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Aventis Pharma
S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming a finding of
intent to deceive using the "single most reasonable inference" standard).
90. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
91. Id. at 1291; accord AventisPharma,675 F.3d at 1334.
92. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.
93. Id. at 1294 ("This court declines to adopt the current version of Rule 56 in
defining inequitable conduct because reliance on this standard has resulted in the
very problems this court sought to address by taking this case en banc." (citing 37
C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992))).
94. Id. at 1292.
95. Id. at 1292-93 (construing behavior such as filing an "unmistakably false
affidavit," or intentionally omitting relevant relationships with investors as egregious
misconduct).
96. Id. at 1290; accord Aventis Pharma, 675 F.3d at 1334 (invoking Therasense's
rejection of the sliding-scale approach).
97. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
98. See id. at 1293-94. Invoking tradition while simultaneously instituting a major
course change is not unusual in federal jurisprudence. Gergen et al., supra note 16,
at 207 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); see Kristin A.
Collins, "AConsiderable Surgical Operation": Article III, Equity, andJudge-Made Law in the

1458

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

II.

[Vol. 62:1441

EQUITY'S REGRESS: THE PRINCIPLE OF UNCLEAN HANDS

To better understand Therasense and its radical departure from
Supreme Court jurisprudence and settled principles of equity, this
Section roots the defense in the ancient principle of unclean hands.
After discussing the discretionary definition of the doctrine of
unclean hands, it analyzes how the "unclean" conduct and
"connection to the litigation" components of the defense correspond
to the new intent and materiality elements of inequitable conduct, as
well as the defense's significance to patentjurisprudence.
A.

DiscretionaryDefinition

Contrary to the tradition of unclean hands, the Federal Circuit
removed district courts' discretion to define inequitable conduct by
restricting the two elements of the defense to deceptive intent and
patentability.99 The Therasense majority claimed that its factual
definition of inequitable conduct finds support in Supreme Court
decisions limiting the discretion of lower courts by establishing "rules
and tests" for equitable remedies and defenses. 0 0 In particular, the
majority relied on the equitable defense of laches to support the fact
that inequitable conduct should have strict elements. 01 The doctrine
of unclean hands has its own elements, which, not surprisingly,
correspond with inequitable-conduct law.10 2 As such, unlike the
majority opinion, the Supreme Court decisions on unclean hands
provide the trial court with authority to ascertain and apply the
elements of the defense.

03

Federal Courts, 60 DuKE L.J. 249, 338 (2010) (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945)).
99. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293.
100. Id.
101. Id. Laches is also a general equitable defense. Like unclean hands, the
Supreme Court was clear to keep the elements of laches open rather than closed
because equity "depends on flexibility," not "mechanical rules." Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).
Laches also depends in part on
"unreasonableness," rather than intent.
102. See infra Part II.B-C. The intent element of inequitable conduct corresponds
to the unclean conduct component of unclean hands. The materiality element of
inequitable conduct means that the unclean conduct has a connection to the
transaction.
103. State and federal courts share the view that there are no rules to measure
conduct constituting unclean hands. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. McKnight, 204 F. Supp.
159 (E.D. Tex. 1961) ("[C]onduct must be measured by standards exacting the
utmost fidelity between the parties .. "),afffd, 302 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1962) (per
curiam); Green v. Higgins, 535 P.2d 446, 449 (Kan. 1975) ("Like other doctrines of
equity, the clean hands maxim is not a binding rule, but is to be applied in the sound
discretion of the court.").
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The Supreme Court announced in Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit
Co0

4

that the doctrine of unclean hands "is not a rigid formula which

trammels the free and just exercise of discretion," but is applied
"upon consideration that make for the advancement of right and
justice."105 The Court's early unclean-hands decisions in patent law
followed this view. Its first inequitable-conduct opinion, Keystone,
warned against technical adherence to any formula." 6 The Court
declared that the judge is "'not bound by formula or restrained by
any limitation that tends to trammel the free and just exercise of
discretion.""'1 7 In Hazel-Atlas, the Court explained unclean hands as a
part of equitable relief that is "always characterized by flexibility
which enables it to meet new situations which demand equitable
intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary to correct the
particular injustices involved in these situations."1' 8 The last time the
Court addressed inequitable conduct, in Precision, it expounded that
unclean hands "necessarily gives wide range to the equity court's use
of discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant." ' 9 Accordingly,
contrary to the majority's reinterpretation of inequitable conduct, the
Supreme Court did not attempt a precise definition of unclean
hands. Rather, it left the elements of the defense flexible to accord
the lower courts discretion.110
A leading international treatise on equity explains, "the phrase
unclean hands will be of sufficiently imprecise import to permit
application of the maxim to be tailored in each case very much in
personam. '' 111 For this reason, courts often define the maxim in the
form of a tautology by equating unclean hands with equitable
104. 321 U.S. 383 (1944).
105. Id. at 387 (quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240,
244-46 (1933)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Keystone, 290 U.S. at 245; see also DeCecco v. Beach, 381 A.2d 543, 546 (Conn.
1977) (explaining that the clean hands maxim applies in the trial court's discretion
and "is not one of absolutes").
107. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815
(1945) (quoting Keystone, 290 U.S. at 246). Before the advent of the Federal Circuit,
lower courts followed the Supreme Court's lead and recognized the traditional
understandingof unclean hands. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456
F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 1972) (declaring that inequitable conduct in patent
infringement cases "admits to no fixed parameters and promulgates no specific
dogma"); see also O'Connor, supra note 27, at 333 (describing the original
inequitable-conduct cases as ad hoc decisions that defy any attempt to create uniform
standards).
108. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 (1944).
109. Precision, 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945).
110. See id. at 814-15 (describing the historical purpose of the maxim).
111. R.P. MEAGHER ET AL., MEAGHER, GUMMOW AND LEHANE'S EQUITY: DOcTRINEs
AND REMEDIES 451 (2002).
See generally Laycock, supra note 12 (asserting that
equitable defenses have no precise meaning).
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intervention." 2 The range of misbehaviors associated with the
harm," 4
of knowledge," 3
terms
vary widely in
defense
foreseeability," 5 admission of wrongdoing," 6 effectiveness of lesser
sanctions,' 7 nature of the relationship,"' role of the client as
opposed to counsel," 9 and public interests. 12
The discretionary

112. See Merck & Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Pharm. Co., C.A. No. 15443-NC,
1999 WL 669354, at *51 (Del Ch. Aug. 5, 1999) (defining the inquiry as whether the
party had "'transgressed equitable standards of conduct' in a way that might justify
application of the unclean hands doctrine" (quoting Precision,324 U.S. at 815), affd
mem., 746 A.2d 277 (Del. 2000), and affd, 766 A.2d 442 (Del. 2000); Bellware v.
Wolffis, 397 N.W.2d 861, 864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam) ("Any wilful act
regarding cause of action which transgresses equitable standards of conduct is
sufficient cause for the intervention of the clean hands doctrine.").
113. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Dunne, No. C.A. 89-3051, 1989 WL 1110258, at *3 (R.I.
Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 1989) ("Plaintiffs deception is willful and it strikes at the very
heart of the judiciary.").
114. See, e.g., Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873, 882 (3d Cir. 1959) ("The doctrine
[of unclean hands] is confessedly derived from the unwillingness of a court,
originally and still nominally one of conscience, to give its peculiar relief to a suitor
who in the very controversy has so conducted himself as to shock the moral
sensibilities of the judge. It has nothing to do with the rights or liabilities of the
parties; indeed the defendant who invokes it need not be damaged, and the court
may even raise it sua sponte." (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Art Metal Works v. Abraham & Straus, 70 F.2d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand, J.,
dissenting))).
115. See Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co., 719 N.W.2d 809, 821-22 (Mich. 2006)
(holding that a substantial likelihood of harm to the case is sufficient to invoke
unclean hands and dismiss case). A pattern of misbehavior by the litigant could also
help establish the requisite foreseeability of harm to the court system. See Pierce v.
Heritage Props., Inc., 688 So. 2d 1385, 1390 (Miss. 1997) (noting that the intentional
nature, as well as the pattern of the plaintiffs conduct, which included deliberately
providing false responses in three discovery mechanisms, should be considered in its
dismissal decision).
116. See, e.g., Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 124 F.R.D. 103, 107-08 (D. Md. 1989)
(describing plaintiffs admission of perjury).
117. See, e.g.,
Bartlett, 1989 WL 1110258, at *3 (noting the alternative sanction of
contempt available to address a party's unclean hands).
118. A breach of fiduciary duties, for example, can constitute unclean hands. See,
e.g., Ross v. Moyer, 286 A.D.2d 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001);Jackson Law Office, P.C. v.
Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
119. See Maldonado, 719 N.W.2d at 823 (considering the Supreme Court's
comment in Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991), that attorneys
are key participants in the justice system, and, therefore, the state can demand
adherence to the precepts of the system in regulating their conduct); Jonathan M.
Stern, Untangling a Tangled Web Without Trial: Using the Court's Inherent Powers and
Rules to Deny a Pejuring Litigant His Day in Court, 66 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1251, 1289
(2001) ("The courts are less willing to punish with default or dismissal when the
lawyers, not the client, are responsible for the misconduct."); see also Rose v. Nat'l
Auction Grp., Inc., 646 N.W.2d 455, 467 (Mich. 2002) (applying unclean hands
despite reliance on an expert since the conduct "violate [d] basic ethical norms").
120. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942)
("[C]ourts of equity[] may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is
using the right asserted contrary to the public interest."), abrogatedon other grounds by
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (concluding that a per se
presumption of illegality for tying arrangements of patented products was no longer
applicable given recent congressional amendments).
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1 21
nature of the decision recognizes these varied phenomena.
Moreover, when a patentee is seeking to enforce a right in equity
(rather than rescind it), courts give the doctrine of unclean hands its
fullest expression.'2 2
While equitable doctrines have never been cast in stone or made
off-limits to appellate correction, 23 their resolution requires a hard
look at past practices and principles.12 4 Because the majority in
Therasense omitted an equitable inquiry in its decision, the next
section examines the new elements of inequitable conduct from its
heritage in equity and unclean hands to aid its correct interpretation
and application.

B.

Conduct Component (Intent)

The Federal Circuit in Therasense departed from the history of
unclean hands by elevating inequitable conduct to require a specific
intent to deceive. 2 5 The alleged infringer must now prove that the
121. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Discretion andJudicialDecision: The Elusive Quest for
the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 359, 380 (1975) (discussing "[t]he
obvious inappropriateness of denying discretion when a decision maker must choose
among an almost infinite number of alternatives on bases that are complex and yield
uncertain conclusions"); Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court,
Viewed from Above, 22 SiACUSE L. REV. 635, 662 (1971) ("Many questions that arise in
litigation are not amenable to regulation by rule because they involve multifarious,
fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization .... ").
122. See2 POMEROY, supranote 32, § 400, at 100-02 (discussing unclean hands as a
condition of specific performance); see also EDMUND H. T. SNELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF
EQUITY 531 (H. Gibson Rivington & A. Clifford Fountaine, eds., 18th ed. 1920)
(listing conduct that is tricky or unfair even if no fraud or misrepresentation
sufficient to justify rescission as grounds to deny specific performance). Because a
patent grants the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or importing
the patented invention into the United States, the inventor in a patent-infringement
action typically seeks an injunction. The injunction, in effect, orders specific
See
performance since the performance due under the law is forbearance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357(2) (1981).
123. See generally Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of I11.Found., 402 U.S. 313
(1971) (abrogating the mutuality requirement of collateral estoppel).
124. See discussion supra Part I.A. Analyzing equitable theories of law that are
informed by past customary practices and principles, as well as future consequences
of the decision, provides an opportunity to explore the theory of judicial decision
making, especially when these different and incommensurable modes of reasoning
suggest alternative outcomes. See SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY, at xii (Edward D. Re
ed., 1955) (advising that no other subject "offers as rich an opportunity to delve into
problems ofjurisprudence and the philosophy of law as does equity"). See generally T.
Leigh Anenson, From Theory to Practice: Analyzing EquitableEstoppel Under a Pluralistic
Model of Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 633 (2007) [hereinafter Anenson, From Theory
to Practice] (analyzing tradition, precedent, and policy as methods of interpreting the
equitable defense of estoppel).
125. Compare Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc), abrogating Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir.
1984), with Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d
1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). The Federal Circuit's ruling on the element of intent was
unanimous.
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applicant "knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and made
a deliberate decision to withhold it." 126 The majority reasoned that
the "requirement of knowledge and deliberate action had its origins
in the trio of Supreme Court cases that set in motion the
development of the inequitable conduct doctrine."127
Like many cases, the Supreme Court's early patent decisions
demonstrate that one of the circumstances that may satisfy unclean
hands is a specific intent to deceive. 128 But the Court has never made
this a requirement. To the contrary, its inequitable-conduct decisions
twice referenced Pomeroy, who describes the doctrine of unclean
hands as "a universal rule guiding and regulating the action of equity
courts in their interposition on behalf of suitors for any and every
purpose, and in their administration of any and every species of
relief."129 Because historic equity acted on "conscience,"' the Court
apparently understood that unclean hands included all grounds for
equity jurisdiction, including innocent misrepresentation.13
The
13 2
Supreme Court's patent opinions took account of actions as well.
Therefore, the Court's articulation and application of unclean hands
fits the defense's traditional formulation.

126. Therasene, 649 F.3d at 1290 (stating that intent must be proven by "clear and
convincing evidence").
127. Id.
128. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806
(1945) ("[W]hile equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless
lives as to other matters, it does require that they shall have acted fairly and without
fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue." (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250
(1944) (vacating a patent to protect the public because it was obtained by fraud);
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-45 (1933) (holding
that equitable relief is unavailable to patent holders that acted fraudulently or not in
good faith).
129. 1 POMEROY, supra note 46, § 397, at 737; see Precision, 324 U.S. at 815; Keystone,
290 U.S. at 244-45.
130. Keystone, 290 U.S. at 245 ("A court of equity acts only when and as conscience
commands." (quoting Deweese v. Reinhard, 165 U.S. 386, 390 (1897))); MEAGHER ET
AL., supra note 111, at 451 (explaining that equity prevents the unconscientious use
of legal rights).
131. See L.A. SHERIDAN, FRAUD IN EQUITy 210 (1957) (explaining that innocent
misrepresentation as a ground of equitable intervention was introduced late in the
nineteenth century); SNELL, supra note 122, at 431-32; WORTHINGTON, supranote 15,
at 39-40; TIM YEO, CHOICE OF LAW FOR EQUITABLE DOCTRINES 96 (2004). Given
equity's recognition that bright lines cannot always be drawn among shadings of an
almost infinitely varied human experience, it is not remarkable that courts failed to
distinguish intentional from unintentional conduct in discerning unclean hands. See
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 33 (Spencer
W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1984) (observing that intent is "one of the most basic,
organizing concepts of legal thinking" as well as the "most often misunderstood").
132. See Precision, 324 U.S. at 815; Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 250; Keystone, 290 U.S. at
246-47.
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In particular, the Supreme Court's initial inequitable-conduct
decision, Keystone, described the acts as "wrongful conduct.

'13

It

emphasized the governing principle of equity, which is that courts are
unavailable to parties whose prior conduct "has violated conscience,
or good faith, or other equitable principle.' 1 34 Quoting an earlier
decision in Bein v. Heath,' the Supreme Court in Precision explained
"th [at] doctrine is rooted in the historical concept of court of equity
as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of
conscience and good faith."1

"closes the

36

Thus, the Court held that the defense

doors of a court of equity to one tainted with

inequitableness or bad faith."'

137

In line with its patent decisions, what is inequitable," 8
unconscionable, 139 or lacking in good faith' has been repeatedly
considered by the Supreme Court when applying the doctrine of
133. Keystone, 290 U.S. at 244.
134. The Court declared:
[W]henever a party who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in
motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or
other equitable principle, in his [or her] prior conduct, then the doors of
the court will be shut against him [or her] in limine, the court will refuse to
interfere on his [or her] behalf, to acknowledge his [or her] right, or to
award him [or her] any remedy.
Id. at 244-45 (quoting 1 POMEROY, supra note 46, § 397, at 738) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
135. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228 (1848).
136. Precision, 324 U.S. at 814 (quoting Bein, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 247); see also 2
POMEROY, supra note 32, § 397, at 91 ("[I]t is rather a universal rule guiding and
regulating the action of equity courts in their interposition on behalf of suitors for
any and every purpose ....
").
137. Precision,324 U.S. at 814.
138. "Inequitable conduct" is not a phrase unique to patent law. It was, and still is,
used in describing conduct constituting unclean hands in non-patent decisions. See,
e.g., Neeme Sys. Solutions Inc. v. Spectrum Aeronautical LLC, 250 P.3d 1206,
1212-13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Smith v. Neely, 380 P.2d 148, 149 (Ariz.
1963)); Fladeboe v. Am. IsuzuMotors, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 225, 235-36 (Ct. App.
2007); In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 551 (Tex. 2006); Heidbreder v. Carton, 645
N.W.2d 335, 371 (Minn. 2002); Cornish Coll. v. 1000 Va. Ltd., 242 P.3d 1, 13 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2010).
139. See Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331, 338 (1930)
("unconscientious" attitude); Clarke v. White, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 178, 193 (1838)
("unaffected conscience"); see also H. Coing, English Equity and the Denunciatio
Evangelica of the Canon Law, 71 L. Q. REV.223, 223 (1955) (" [T] he Court of Chancery
is addressed as 'Court of Conscience,' and the decisive question in most cases is
whether defendant could have acted in good conscience as he [or she] did.").
140. See ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 330 (1994) (Scalia &
O'Connor, JI., concurring) (finding "inequitableness or bad faith relative to the
matter in which he seeks relief' (quoting Precision, 324 U.S. at 814) (citing
MCCLINTOcK, supra note 31, § 26); Sample v. Barnes, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 70, 74 (1852)
(citing Creath's Adm'r v. Sims, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 192, 204 (1847)) ("[A] court of
equity ...will never interfere in opposition to conscience or good faith."). Likewise,
honesty and good faith typically negate unclean hands. Newton v. Consol. Gas Co. of
N.Y., 258 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1922) (implying good faith excludes unclean hands).
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unclean hands.14 1 While not necessarily inconsistent with the
imposition of a particular mental state, the Court has also found
conduct that is simply unfair 14 2 or unethical 43 to be unclean. Indeed,
in Precision, the Court justified the application of the doctrine of
unclean hands on the grounds that the petitioner's conduct did not
conform to "minimum ethical standards."' 44
The Supreme Court also mentioned in Precision that a "willful act"
is sufficient to invoke the doctrine of unclean hands,1 45 but it did not
limit the defense to this single condition. Nor did it cite any
authority for the reference. 146 Presumably, the reference came from
Story's formulation for willful conduct regarding any matter in
litigation. 147 Various modern decisions have retained the willfulness
141. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 392 (1944) ("We do
not find here any 'unconscientious or inequitable attitude' on the part of the
carrier." (quoting Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245 (1918))).
142. See Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247 (1848) (asserting that the courts
will never serve "one who has acted fraudulently, or who by deceit or unfair means
has gained an advantage").
143. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 2.4(2), at 68-69 (illegal or unethical); see also Int'l
News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245 (1918) (finding no unclean hands
because conduct comports with industry standard).
144. Precision, 324 U.S. at 816 (referring to that which is required by a party
attempting to assert and enforce "perjury-tainted" patents or contracts).
145. KEETON ET AL., supra note 131, § 31, at 169-70 (highlighting the meaning of
"willful" as the division between negligence and intentional conduct); see also id.
§ 34, at 212-14 (discussing the terms willful, wanton, and recklessness as "an
aggravated form of negligence"). Even by the 1980s, Prosser and Keeton advise that
there was still no clear consensus on the meaning of any of the requisite mental
states. See id. § 8, at 33-34 (explaining that state of mind definitions diverged in
authoritative treatises and in court opinions).
146. See Precision, 324 U.S. at 815 ("Any willful act concerning the cause of action
which rightfully can be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct is sufficient
cause for invocation of the maxim .. "). Before Precision, at least one Supreme
Court decision addressing unclean hands used the term "willful" to indicate an
absence of good faith. See Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1911) (indicating
that unclean hands did not apply when the trespass was not willful, but rather an
"honest assertion of rights"); see also Weiner v. Romley, 381 P.2d 581, 582-83 (Ariz.
1963) (en banc) (declaring that the invocation of unclean hands requires willful
misconduct as opposed to an honest mistake); Hartman v. Cohn, 38 A.2d 22, 25 (Pa.
1944) (holding that honest, as oppose to willful conduct, will not bar a party from
seeking equitable relief). Only a few other unclean-hands decisions (out of an
estimated one hundred decisions) by the Supreme Court even mention the term.
See, e.g., Worden v. Cal. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 530 (1903).
147. See 1 STORY, supra note 46, § 99, at 100 ("[A]ny wilful act in regard to the
matter in litigation, which would be condemned and pronounced wrongful by
honest and fair-minded men, will be sufficient to make the hands of the applicant
unclean."); see also JOSIAH W. SMITH, A MANUAL OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE FOR

§ 36, at 29 (J. Trustram ed., 14th ed. 1889) (describing
unclean hands in fraudulent transactions as "wilful misconduct"). Joseph Story, who
served on the Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845, also described unconscionable
conduct constituting unclean hands as "morally reprehensible as to known facts." 1
STORY, supra note 46, § 98, at 98; see also Danciger v. Stone, 187 F. 853, 858 (E.D.
Okla. 1909) (explaining that "free and deliberate action with knowledge of the facts"
is sufficient for unclean hands). Pomeroy does not mention a state of mind
PRACTITIONERS AND STUDENTS
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criterion. 48 Moreover, certain contemporary courts have elevated
the state of mind even further to include intent to deceive.' 49 Still,
there is no current consensus, and Supreme Court cases appear to be
15
expressly contrary. 1
Consistent with its history, the Supreme Court has declared that
the unclean conduct at issue need not be illegal to invoke the defense
and disqualify the remedy.' 5 ' The Supreme Court's oft-cited opinion
in Cathcart v. Robinson152 makes it clear that conduct constituting
unclean hands need not meet the criteria for fraud or
requirement in the text of the fourth edition of his treatise, but a case annotation
uses "wilful" in referring to the connection component of unclean hands. See 1
POMEROY, supra note 46, § 399, at 741 n.1 (quoting Lewis & Nelson's Appeal, 67 Pa.
153, 166 (1870)) (citing EDMUND H.T. SNELL, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 25 (London,
Stevens & Haynes, 1st ed. 1868)).
The willful reference in many American courts can be tracked to the original
edition of Snell's leading English treatise. See, e.g., Yale Gas-Store v. Wilcox, 29 A.
303, 311 (Conn. 1894) (citing SNELL, supra, at 122). Snell's reference to willful
misconduct was removed in later editions. Some courts espousing a willfulness
criterion have relied on Precision. See, e.g., Stachnik v. Winkel, 230 N.W.2d 529, 534
(Mich. 1975). Others have looked towards a passage from the CorpusJurisSecondum
from the mid-twentieth century. See, e.g., Seal v. Seal, 510 P.2d 167, 173 (Kan. 1973)
("willful conduct which is fraudulent, illegal, or unconscionable" (quoting 30 C.J.S.
Equity § 95(a) (1965))).
148. Compare Queiroz v. Harvey, 205 P.3d 1120, 1122 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc) ("In
Weiner, this Court held that when inequitable conduct was not 'willful,' unclean
hands would not apply." (citing Weiner v. Romley, 381 P.2d 581, 582-83 (1963))),
Broome v. Broome, 75 So. 3d 1132, 1140 n.15 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) ("'The clean
hands doctrine prevents a complaining party from obtaining equitable relief in court
when he is guilty of willful misconduct in the transaction at issue."' (quoting Bailey v.
Bailey, 724 So. 2d 335, 337 (Miss. 1998))), and Shapiro v. Shapiro, 204 A.2d 266, 268
(Pa. 1964) ("Application of the unclean hands doctrine is confined to willful
misconduct which concerns the particular matter in litigation."), with Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 383, 393-94 (D.N.J. 2005)
(rejecting willfulness as criterion and noting a number of decisions that allowed
"gross negligence," or "recklessness" to satisfy unclean hands).
149. See Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom Am. Inc., 287 F.3d 866, 870 (9th
Cir. 2002) ("Bad intent is the essence of the defense of unclean hands." (quoting
Dollar Sys., Inc. v. Avcar Leasing Sys., Inc., 890 F.2d 165, 173 (9th Cir. 1989)));
Locken v. Locken, 650 P.2d 803, 805 (Nev. 1982) ("[S]uch conduct, standing alone,
absent an intent to deceive, does not amount to unclean hands." (citing Xerox Corp.
v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 322 F. Supp. 963 (D.C.N.Y. 1971))). But there is no liability
standard requiring intentional misconduct in federal decisions concerning the
spoliation of evidence and other litigation misconduct often grounded in unclean
hands. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 12, at 689; Anenson, Beyond Chafee, supra note 14,
at 567 & n.268 (discussing fabrication, destruction, and suppression of evidence).
150. The majority in Therasense neither cited the contemporary decision in its
justification of the intent standard for inequitable conduct, nor specifically relied on
Precision's language of "willful" in elevating the intent standard of inequitable
conduct beyond negligence.
151. The Court explained in Precision that "one's misconduct need not necessarily
have been of such a nature as to be punishable as a crime or as to justify legal
proceedings of any character." 324 U.S. at 815; see also I STORY, supranote 46, § 99, at
100 (commenting that an unfair transactions can constitute unclean hands even if
the wrongdoing was "within the law").
152. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 264 (1831).
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Lower courts are in accord. 15 4 Moreover, Bein

expressly negates any requirement of a fraudulent intent.'5 5 In United
States v. Marshall Silver Mining Co.,' 56 the Court affirmed the dismissal
of a land-patent dispute for unclean hands because the party was not
free of fault, neglect, knowledge, or negligence in delaying the
57

proceedings.1

The fact that inequitable conduct was once referred to as "fraud on
the Patent Office" does not change its definition, nor does it validate
a specific intent to deceive. 58 Supreme Court opinions describe
unclean hands in patent law in the disjunctive as "fraud or any other
type of inequitable conduct."'5 9
Furthermore, the doctrine of
unclean hands is a species of equitable fraud that is broader than

153. See id. at 276 (noting unclean hands is broader than contract defenses
sufficient to justify rescission and denying a request for the specific performance of a
contract where the seller aided the buyer's mistake); see also 1 POMEROY, supra note
32, § 400, at 744 (advising that unclean hands includes concealment of important
facts even if not actually fraudulent).
154. See, e.g., Stachnik v. Winkel, 230 N.W.2d 529, 534 (Mich. 1975) (asserting that
all elements of fraud need not be present to invoke the clean hands maxim to bar
specific performance); see also 30A C.J.S. Equity § 112 (2007) (citing cases).
155. See Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247 (1848) ("fraud[] ... or any
unfair means" (emphasis added)). Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in Olmstead v.
United States declared that the principle of unclean hands "has long been settled" and
referenced various contract illegality cases that did not require scienter. 277 U.S.
438, 483-84 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The court's aid is denied only when
he who seeks it has violated the law in connection with the very transaction as to
which he seeks legal redress.").
156. 129 U.S. 579 (1889).
157. Id. at 589; cf United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888) (using
land patent cases as analogy to intellectual property patents). Similarly, in Simmons v.
Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern Railway. Co., the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the lower court and dismissed the cross bill in equity under the maxim of
unclean hands on the grounds that the lienholder had delayed in asserting his rights
after reorganization. 159 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1895). The Court stated, "Acquiescence
[which implies knowledge] is an important factor in determining equitable rights
and remedies in obedience to the [clean hands] maxims .. " Id. at 291 (quoting 2
POMEROY, supra note 44, § 816, at 1136); see alsoJohnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co.,
321 U.S. 383, 403 (1944) (Frankfurter & Roberts, JJ., dissenting) (pronouncing that
unclean hands was established to prevent a violation of the law even if the plaintiff
had no moral turpitude).
158. Rosalind Poll, Note, "He Who Comes into Equity Must Come with Clean Hands,"
32 B.U. L. REv. 66, 66 (1952) (explaining that the clean hands maxim embodies
several other principles, such as "[n]o action arises out of fraud and deceit").
159. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 221 (1933) (Stone,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added)). The courts have uniformly ruled that the
"unclean hands" of a patent applicant short of technical fraud will disentitle the
patent owner to equitable relief and render the patent unenforceable. For example,
in E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., ChiefJudge Markey of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation, wrote:
"This circuit has
recognized that inequitable conduct short of fraud can be a defense in a patent
infringement suit." 620 F.2d 1247, 1274 (8th Cir. 1980) (citing Pfizer, Inc., v. Int'l
Rectifier Corp., 583 F.2d 180, 185 (8th Cir. 1976)).
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common-law fraud.16 Fraud in equity does not require intent, only
acts inconsistent with fair dealing and good conscience. 6 1 Equitable
fraud has no exact definition in order to promote deterrence. 162 To
be sure, the Supreme Court explicitly held in its patent (and other)
decisions that the doctrine of unclean hands "assumes even wider
and more significant proportions," as when used properly, it "averts
an injury to the public." 6 '
160. See, e.g., San Ann Tobacco Co. v. Hamm, 217 So. 2d 803, 810 (Ala. 1968)
(finding that fraud or deceit that would amount to unclean hands need not be the
same conduct as would constitute fraud or deceit under the common law); DeRosa v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 262 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373 (Ct. App. 1989) ("The doctrine
does not require the party seeking relief to be guilty of fraud; it is sufficient if he
merely acted unconscientiously."); DuPont v. DuPont, 85 A.2d 724, 725-26 (Del.
1951). Professor James Eaton describes two kinds of fraud in equity: actual and
constructive.
Actual fraud arises from facts and circumstances of imposition, and may be
described as something said, done, or omitted by a person with the design of
perpetrating what he must have known to be a positive fraud. Constructive
fraud may be described as an act done or omitted, not with an actual design
to perpetrate positive fraud or injury upon other persons, but which,
nevertheless, amounts to positive fraud, or is construed as a fraud by the
court because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or
private confidence.
JAMES W. EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE § 122-123, at 287 (1901). From
the more general idea of fraud came more specific doctrines, such as contribution,
which was at issue in the English case that first recognized the principle of unclean
hands. See MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 111, at 450 (explaining that fraud is "one of
the three pillars which support the entire structure of equity jurisdiction, exclusive,
auxiliary and concurrent"); Lionel Smith, Fusion and Tradition, in EQUITY IN
COMMERCIAL LAw 19, 25 n.34 (James Edelman & Simone Degeling eds., 2005)
(noting that the phrase equitable fraud in some periods covered all grounds of
equitable intervention).
161. See 27AAM.JUR. 2D Equity § 5, at 552 (2013) ("[F]raud in equity has a much
broader connotation than at law and includes acts inconsistent with fair dealing and
good conscience .... "); JOHN GLOVER, EQUITY, RESTITUTION & FRAUD, § 1.6, at 8
(2004) ("Moral culpability.., need not be proven to justify equitable fraud-it has a
different role."); MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 111, at 445 (equitable fraud is not just
actual, intentional, premeditated fraud); 2 POMEROY, supra note 32, § 399, at 99 n.17)
("Fraud, in equity, often consists in the unconscientious use of a legal advantage
"); SHERIDAN, supranote 131, at 210 (fraud
originally gained with innocent intent ..
remains "the residuary legatee of what offends the conscience").
162. Story advised that "[b]y disarming the parties of all legal sanction and
protection for their acts, they suppress the temptations and encouragements which
1 JOSEPH STORY,
might otherwise be found too strong for their virtue."
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE § 258, at 265 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 13th
ed. 1886); see also Anenson, Beyond Chafee, supra note 14, at 518 (describing unclean
hands as equally concerned with preventative justice as well as remedial justice after
the wrong is committed).
163. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
815 (1945) (determining patent rights to be "'issues of great moment to the public"'
(quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944))).
Supreme Court non-patent decisions concerning equitable principles are in accord.
See, e.g., Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) ("Courts of
equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in
furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private
interests are involved."); see also discussion infraPart III.
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In light of the foregoing, the majority's constriction of inequitable
conduct to only those cases evidencing intent to deceive lacks
historical legitimacy. While it finds support from the three Supreme
Court cases' facts, it does not find support in their legal precedents or
the equitable tradition of unclean hands. The lesser mental state of
"willfulness" that is required in some lower courts and mentioned in
Precisionis at least defensible from a jurisprudential standpoint and
also most likely to satisfy the majority's policy preferences.
Nevertheless, given the totality of the Supreme Court decisions, it
seems that the requisite level of cognition and culpability necessary to
disqualify a patentee from suing for infringement was left to the
discretion of the district court.
C. Connection Component (Materiality)
The majority in Therasense also deviated from the legacy of
inequitable conduct in equity and unclean hands when it defined
materiality.16 4 The majority tightened the standard for judging the
Deterrence was the Supreme Court's primary concern when it refused to require a
particular state of mind in Pinter v. Dahl, in which it established the criteria for the
unclean-hands doctrine's kindred legal defense of in pari delicto and dismissed
statutory actions under the securities laws. 486 U.S. 622, 635 (1988). Like patent
infringement, the securities claim at issue was a strict liability offense, and the
plaintiff argued the defense was inappropriate. Id. at 628-29. The Court disagreed,
holding that the plaintiffs fault need neither be intentional nor willful in order to
establish ajudge-made defense to a private action under the securities statutes. Id. at
633-34. It explained that "[r]egardless of the degree of scienter, there may be
circumstances in which the statutory goal of deterring illegal conduct is served more
effectively by preclusion of suit rather than by recovery." Id. at 634. Likewise, the
goal of encouraging legitimate invention may be furthered in some cases by the
denial of an infringement action. The purpose of granting patent rights to facilitate
innovation has always been counterpoised against the goal of preventing inequitable
conduct so that patents are free of fraud and within their legitimate scope. See, e.g.,
Rader, supra note 69, at 780 n.13. Similar to Pinter, the Supreme Court's early
inequitable-conduct decisions appear to leave the state of mind necessary to trigger
inequitable conduct to the lower courts on a case-by-case basis to ensure the proper
balancing of statutory goals.
164. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1297-98
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (O'Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(criticizing both the majority's but-for test of materiality and the dissent's adoption
of Rule 56 as eschewing "flexibility in favor of rigidity" that is "contrary to the very
nature of equity and centuries of Supreme Court precedent"). Aside from its history
in equity, textual considerations cut against equating a defense associated with the
enforceability of the patent with its validity. Invalidity and unenforceability are listed
as separate defenses under the Act, but the defense of invalidity has no state of mind
requirement, and requires nothing more than a showing that the conditions of
patentability were not satisfied. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006 & Supp.
V 2011). From a practical perspective, "if the test for materiality requires proof of
invalidity, why litigate inequitable conduct, which requires the additional proof of
intent?" Goldman, supra note 23, at 96; see also Roscoe Pound, Common Law and
Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 387 (1908) (citing Blackstone's tenth rule of
statutory interpretation for the proposition "that interpretations which produce
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materiality of information underlying an inequitable-conduct defense
by replacing the "reasonable examiner" standard with a "but-for"
materiality test. 165 The "but-for" test defines material information as
any non-cumulative information that would have prevented the
patent from issuing had it been disclosed.'"
The materiality element of inequitable conduct conforms to the
connection condition of unclean hands that formed the basis of the
original English case of Dering.167 In Dering, the court emphasized
that inequitable conduct is not invoked merely by establishing a
"general depravity."'
It ruled that there must be an "immediate and
necessary" connection between the conduct said to make the
plaintiffs hands unclean and the right claimed. 6 9 The court
that "it must be a depravity in a legal as well as in a moral
explained
170
sense."
Early American cases reiterated Derines "immediate and necessary"
Supreme Court cases on the doctrine of unclean hands
language.'
continue to require a relationship between the wrong and the
remedy or right.172 In fact, the most recent case by the Court
addressing the defense reiterated Pomeroy's classic formulation that
the wrongdoing must be "in the course of the transaction at issue."175

collaterally absurd or mischievous consequences are to be avoided"). The different
burdens of proof (preponderance of the evidence in claim prosecution before the
Patent Office and in determining "materiality" for inequitable conduct and clear and
convincing proof of invalidity in federal court) do little to differentiate the defenses
and resolve the structural objection. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
649 F.3d 1276, 1291-92, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (acknowledging there will
be congruence between the defenses of invalidity and unenforceability).
165. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291 (replacing the broader "reasonable examiner"
test used in previous patent cases).
166. Id. at 1294.
167. (1787) 29 Eng. Rep. 1184, 1184-86 (recognizing the doctrine of unclean
hands but denying its application on the ground that the alleged unclean acts lacked
the requisite relation to the case).
168. Id. at 1184.
169. Id. at 1185.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Camors-McConnell Co. v. McConnell, 140 F. 412, 415 (S.D. Ala.
1905) ("direct or necessary operation of said contract"). For modem cases echoing
the "immediate and necessary" language, see, for example, Ne. Women's Ctr., Inc. v.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1354 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Keystone Driller Co. v.
Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245-46 (1933)).
172. See, e.g., ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 330 (1994) (Scalia
& O'Connor, J concurring).
173. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360 (1995) (citing
2 POMEROY, supra note 32, § 397, at 90-92). But see ROBERT MEGARRY & P.V. BAKER,
SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQuIY 33 (27th ed. 1973) (noting that the "limitation was not
recognised [in England] in the reign of Elizabeth I and her immediate successors
and.., has been lost sight of in some American jurisdictions").
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The Supreme Court also recognized this element and its
discretionary operation in patent law. In Keystone, the Court echoed
Derines "immediate and necessary" language, ruling that the
wrongful acts "affect the equitable relations between the parties ' in
74
respect of something brought before the court for adjudication."'
The Court explained in Precision that the defense "closes the doors of
a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith
relative to the matter in which he seeks relief. ' 175 Discussing the
condition in the nineteenth century, Justice Brandeis emphasized
that "[e]quity does not demand that its suitors shall have led
blameless lives."' 76 Discerning a "want of equity in the allegations and
corresponding proof' as opposed to "the bad conduct in life and
character of the complainant" is not exclusively factual, but
normative. 177 Cases from the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts further support a discretionary approach to the connection
component by regular use of the risk language of direct, rather than
collateral, remote,
or indirect, in assessing the connection
178
component.

In his iconic analysis of unclean hands, Zechariah Chafee likewise
posed the question regarding the closeness of the connection as
whether an illegal transaction is "central" or "collateral" to the
litigated claim. 79
He concluded that the answer cannot be
determined solely by the facts of the case; rather, the court should
use its judgment in analyzing the underlying values at stake. 80 Courts
174. Keystone, 290 U.S. at 245.
175. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814

(1945).
176. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229 (1934).
177. Clarke v. White, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 178, 193 (1838); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 63(e) (2011) ("Whether
particular misconduct is directly relevant or merely 'collateral' to the relief sought by
the claimant will depend on the court's sense of fitting punishment in the case at
hand.").
178. See Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1944)
(distinguishing collateral from direct violations of federal criminal law); Loughran,
292 U.S. at 228 (employing the language "collateral" and "indirect and remote" in
reference to violation of law); see also DOBBS, supra note 11, § 2.4(2)m, at 71 n.22
(citing Ne. Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1354 (3d Cir. 1989)).
179. Chafee I, supra note 11, at 896-98 (examining both law and equity suits
seeking to enforce illegal contracts). After asking whether the main transaction is
illegal, Chafee poses the next questions as whether the illegal transaction is "central
to the litigated claim" or collateral? Id. at 897-98.
180. Id. at 898. Chafee commented on the difficulty courts have in determining
the effect of unlawful acts that are completed. Id. at 897-98 (comparing relationship
requirement issue in the equity case of McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 654

(1899), in which a seller resisted specific performance of a land contract because the
buyer got the price as a bribe for political favors to a third person, with the law case
of Loughran, 292 U.S. at 228, in which the illegality was indirect to the relief sought).
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apply the doctrine for purposes of preventing a private advantage or
public harm. 8 ' Studying unclean hands in 1993, Dan Dobbs similarly
82
described the connection component as akin to a duty analysis.
Our recent research on the doctrine of unclean hands also defends
the idea of analyzing the relationship between the wrong and the
remedy under principles of proximity.'8 3 From this vantage, it is clear
that the Therasense majority's but-for materiality requirement removed
the discretion of the district court to determine foreseeability and
decide whether the failure to provide relevant information on
was so closely related that it was
patentability to the Patent Office
84
1
within the scope of the risk.

Contrary to traditional application of the unclean-hands doctrine,
the Therasense majority raised materiality in law to validity in fact.'85
The majority admitted that none of the Supreme Court's inequitableconduct decisions supported the new general rule of inequitable
conduct that information concealed in prosecuting the patent must,
in hindsight, invalidate it.'86 It provided three reasons for its
departure from settled precedent.'8 7 Each is critiqued below.

181. See, e.g., Anenson, TreatingEquity Like Law, supra note 13, at 461 (stating the
two fundamental purposes of the unclean-hands doctrine-protecting judicial
integrity and promoting justice); accord PETER W. YOUNG ET AL., ON EQUITY 180-84
(2009) (discussing Australian and English law on the doctrine of unclean hands).
182. Dan Dobbs is the Regents and Rosentiel Distinguished Professor Emeritus of
Law at the University of Arizona College of Law. See Douglas Laycock, How Remedies
Became a Field: A History, 27 REv. LITIG. 161, 261 (2008) (explaining that Dobbs
published the first treatise on remedies and commenting that "[n]o one did more to
institutionalize remedies as a field"). Dobbs theorized that the connection
component of unclean hands is congruent if the wrongdoing (1) is the same kind of
harm that the plaintiff intended or unreasonably risked, and (2) resulted in actual or
threatened harm to the defendant or group of person which the defendant is
identified with. DOBBS, supranote 11, § 2.4(2), at 71. Professor Rendleman describes
Dobbs' analysis as asking whether the plaintiffs misconduct is so closely related that
it is within the scope of the risk. RENDLEMAN,supra note 12, at 270.
183. See Anenson, Beyond Chafee, supra note 14, at 543.
184. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc). Dobbs also saw the case law as employing two different
standards depending on the circumstances. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 2.4(2), at 70. In
some cases, he found that courts used a narrow formula. See id. The courts
emphasize that "[w] hat is material is not that the plaintiffs hands are dirty, but that
he dirties them in acquiring the right he now asserts." Id. (quoting Republic
Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utils., 319 F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir. 1963)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In other cases, he concluded that courts used a broad
formula. See id. They simply ask whether the improper conduct "sufficiently affected
the equitable relations between the parties." Id. (quoting N. Pac. Lumber Co. v.
Oliver, 596 P.2d 931, 942 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.
186. See id. at 1293.
187. See id. at 1292, 1295.
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1.

Private advantage
Citing Keystone, the majority in Therasense reasoned that "the
patentee obtains no advantage from misconduct if the patent would
have issued anyway." '
Yet, the Supreme Court in Keystone did not
determine the validity of the patent; 89 it was enough that the
suppression made the patent "more certain."190
There are certainly cases of unclean hands where the plaintiff has
been unjustly enriched at the defendant's expense. 9 1 As such, the
extent of any unfair benefit can be considered in relation to the
defendant's harm.192 In Keystone, the Supreme Court framed the
potential advantage in seeking an injunction for infringement as
relative to the burden on the competitor. 93 "As the litigation was to

continue for years and the use of the devices in question was essential
to the ditching machinery, it is clear that the injunctions would have
been a burdensome detriment to defendants." '94 The Court further
stated that "[t]he amounts of the bonds required in lieu of
injunctions attest the importance of the advantage obtained by use of
the (Byers] decree." 95 Because the patentee failed to secure the
injunction using the dubious decree of validity, Keystone further
demonstrates that even an attempted advantage or harm warrants the
imposition of the unclean-hands doctrine under certain
circumstances.196

The plaintiff in Hazel-Atlas argued that the unclean-hands defense
could not be invoked because the inequitable conduct was not the
primary basis of the decision. 9 ' The Supreme Court conceded that
the inequitable behavior in manufacturing an article may not have
had a significant effect on the issuance of the patent, finding that it
188. Id.at 1292.
189. See Keystone v. Nw. Eng'g Corp., 294 U.S. 42, 44 n.2 (1935) (citing Keystone
Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933)).
190. See id. (citing Keystone, 290 U.S. 240) (noting that suppression rendered the
Downie patent "more certain").
191. See, e.g.,
R. H. Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1934).
192. See, e.g.,
Earle R. Hanson & Assocs. v. Farmers Coop. Creamery Co., 403 F.2d
65, 70 (8th Cir. 1968) ("The plaintiff may be denied relief where... the result
induced by his conduct will be unconscionable either in the benefit to himself or the
injury to others." (quotingJohnson v. Freberg, 228 N.W. 159, 160 (Minn. 1929))); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 63(a) (2011)
(discussing unclean hands as a defense to unjust enrichment).
193. See Keystone, 290 U.S. at 246-47.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 247.
196. The patentee in Keystone adjudicated the validity of the patent in prior
litigation without disclosure of the contract, keeping secret the potential prior use.
Id. at 242-43.
197. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246-47

(1944).

20131

INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IN RETROSPECTIVE

1473

was "wholly impossible accurately to appraise the influence" of the
article. 198 Nevertheless, the Court found it sufficient that the plaintiff
successfully secured the patent from the Patent Office and retained
the validity determination on appeal.199 Precision described the
patentee's obligations as an "uncompromising duty to report to [the
Patent Office] all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness
underlying the applications in issue."200
The Supreme Court's unclean-hands cases involving patent misuse
are in accord. In Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,2"' the Court declared
that the unclean-hands doctrine applies "regardless of whether the
particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent."2" 2
As a result, the Court's patent decisions demonstrate that an omission
or concealment can result in a finding of unclean hands, even
without harm to the defendant (because the patent would have
issued anyway) or gain to the plaintiff.
While the original English and American cases required proof of
harm to the defendant,20 3 most later decisions did not. 20 4 The
prevailing view is that the doctrine of unclean hands applies even
though the plaintiff has not injured anyone, including the
defendant.0 5 One example is the Delaware Court of Chancery

198. Id. at 247.
199. See id. (indicating that the plaintiff was in no position to dispute the
effectiveness of the article after securing the patent and retaining the patent's
validity).
200. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818
(1945) (emphasis added).
201. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
202. Id. at 494 (affirming the trial court's dismissal of a patent infringement
complaint for want of equity under the unclean-hands doctrine), abrogatedby Ill. Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
203. Chafee I, supra note 11, at 881 & n.10 (explaining that the early cases
referenced by Francis were situations where the applicant harmed the respondent
and that "[t]he inquiry must be done to the defendant himself' (citing FRANCIS, supra
note 30)). Some cases still require injury to the defendant in order to satisfy the
unclean-hands doctrine. See, e.g., Kostelnik v. Roberts, 680 S.W.2d 532, 535-36 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1984) (indicating that there was no connection between the claimant's
unclean hands and the asserted claim because the wrongful conduct complained of
"must have been done to the defendant himself and not to some third party"); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 63(f) (2011)
(asserting that the Kostelnik case "fundamentally misstates the law")).
204. See, e.g., Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873, 882 (3d Cir. 1959) (stating that
defendant need not be damaged to invoke unclean-hands doctrine (citing Art Metal
Works v. Abraham & Straus, 70 F.2d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand,J., dissenting)));
Green v. Higgins, 535 P.2d 446, 450 (Kan. 1975) (holding that the unclean-hands
doctrine applies even if the plaintiffs misconduct does not injure anyone).
205. See Green, 535 P.2d at 450 (citing MCCLINTOCK, supra note 31, § 26); see also
Yeiser v. Rogers, 108 A.2d 877, 878-79 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954) (declaring
that it is not the wrong accomplished, but the wrong planned, that matters when
invoking the unclean-hands doctrine).
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Citing the
decision in Nakahara v. NS 1991 American Trust.2 6
Supreme Court decision in Deweese, the Chancellor rejected the idea

of "no harm, no foul" and explained that "[e]quity does not reward
those who act inequitably, even if it can be said that no tangible
As a result, courts have held that
injury resulted. ' 2 7

misrepresentation and concealment of important facts, even though
non-material, constitute unclean hands.0 8
Chafee advised that the progression of the unclean-hands doctrine
to include third-party protection occurred in the late nineteenth
century. 2 9 Dobbs instructed that the extension of unclean hands to
protect the public interest had taken hold by the early twentieth

century.2 10
Therefore, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's
inequitable-conduct decisions, courts had carved out an exception to
the injury requirement by the time the Supreme Court introduced
the doctrine of unclean hands to patent law.2 1'
2.

Publicprotection

In further rationalizing why material means invalid, the Therasense
majority opinion emphasized that the "enforcement of an otherwise
valid patent does not injure the public merely because of misconduct,
lurking somewhere in the patent prosecution, that was immaterial to
the patent's issuance."212 The majority's conclusion as to the absence
of public harm is faulty for several reasons.
a. False monopolies
Importantly, the reasoning of the Therasense majority contradicts
the Supreme Court's inequitable-conduct decisions. The Supreme
Court invoked the doctrine of unclean hands in its patent decisions
206. 739 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1998).
207. Id. at 794 n.123 (citing Deweese v. Reinhard, 165 U.S. 386, 390 (1897))
(denying litigation expenses for unclean hands even though contractual
prerequisites satisfied).
208. See Turchi v. Salaman Media Partners, Ltd., No. 11,268, 1990 WL 27531, at
*8-9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 14, 1990) (quoting 2 POMEROY, supranote 32, § 400, at 100-01),
affd sub nom., Media Partners, Ltd. v. Turchi, 597 A.2d 354 (Del. 1991); see also
Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int'l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43, 81 n.206 (Del. Ch. 2008) ("Harm... is
not strictly required for the doctrine of unclean hands to bar relief." (citing
Nakahara,739 A.2d at 794)).
209. Chafee I, supra note 11, at 892 (citing Kelly v. Cent. Pac. R.R., 16 P. 386 (Cal.
1888); Curran v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 116 Mass. 90 (1874)).
210. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 2.4(2), at 70 (criticizing cases of unclean hands for
improper conduct not causing injury to the defendant).
211. For cases in Australia not requiring harm to the defendant due to the
paramount public interest in intellectual property, see YOUNG ET AL., supra note 181,
at 183.
212. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc).

2013]

INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IN RETROSPECTVE

1475

in the public interest.2 13 It did not require the unclean conduct to
harm the defendant, and correspondingly the public, by rendering
214
the patent invalid and possibly resulting in a false monopoly.
Similar to the concern of a possible private advantage, Supreme
Court jurisprudence establishes that prevention of public harm is an
important consideration.2 15
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that "[ilt is the public
interest which is dominant in the patent system. ''216 In American Bell,
the Court explained that the government has "taken from the public
' 21 7
rights of immense value and bestowed them upon the patentee.
Inequitable conduct practiced upon the officers of the government

"perpetrate [s] a grievous wrong upon the general public, upon the

United States, and upon its representatives. 2 8 Indeed, in dismissing
statutory infringement actions for unclean hands, the Precision Court
underscored the maxim's "vital significance" in lawsuits involving
219
patents affecting the public interest.
Because patent rights are "'issues of great moment to the
public,' ' 221 the Supreme Court in Precision found that mere

knowledge of the possibility of perjury in the patent application of
another precluded a claim for patent infringement by the company

213. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
816 (1945) (noting that the important social and economic consequences inherent
in patents give the public an interest in ensuring that patent monopolies do not
result from inequitable conduct).
214. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942) ("It is the
adverse effect upon the public interest of a successful infringement suit, in
conjunction with the patentee's course of conduct, which disqualifies him to
maintain the suit .. "); see also Precision, 324 U.S. at 816 ("A patent by its very nature
is affected with a public interest." (emphasis added)).
215. See T. Leigh Anenson & Donald 0. Mayer, "Clean Hands" and the CEO: Equity
as an Antidote for Excessive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 947, 976-79 (2010)
(discussing how public protection from fraud and other nefarious commercial
practices began in equity and only later became the primary domain of legislation
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); see also discussion infra
Part II.C.2.b-c.
216. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944), overruled
on other grounds Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 213 (1980); see
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 344 (1971) ("The
patent is a privilege. But it is a privilege which is conditioned by a public purpose."
(quoting Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 666)).
217. United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888).
218. Seeid. at 357.
219. Precision, 324 U.S. at 815 (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314
U.S. 488, 492 (1942)); see B. Zorina Khan, Innovations in Law and Technology, in 2 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 483, 528 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher
Tomlins eds., 2008) (discussing how private inventors were considered public
benefactors).
220. Precision, 324 U.S. at 815 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire
Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944)).
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who later acquired the patent. 22' The Supreme Court announced
that the "[p]ublic interest demands that all facts relevant to such
matters be submitted formally or informally to the Patent Office,
which can then pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence. "222 The
Court found that "[o] nly in this way can that agency act to safeguard
the public in the first instance against fraudulent patent
monopolies." 221 In fact, the Court's decision in Hazel-Atlas instructs
that doubt as to patentability is resolved against the patentee.224
The Court has been equally sensitive to the public interest in other
areas of federal law. 225 In S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United States,226 the
Supreme Court endorsed the application of unclean hands in
government contracting. 227 It proclaimed that "[c] ontracts with the
United States-like patents-are matters concerning far more than
22
the interest of the adverse parties; they entail the public interest. 1
Quoting Precision,the Court declared:
[W] here a suit in equity concerns the public interest as well as the
private interests of the litigants this doctrine assumes even wider
and more significant proportions. For if an equity court properly
uses the maxim to withhold its assistance in such a case it not only
the fruits of his transgression
prevents a wrongdoer from enjoying
229
but averts an injury to the public.
Lower courts have embraced the public interest under the doctrine
of unclean hands as well.23 0 In deterring violations of the law, they
have refused to require private harm in dismissing non-patent
statutory actions. 231 Private-law cases where the unclean conduct
221. Seeid. at815-20.
222. Id. at 818.
223. Id.; see also A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11, 18 (2d Cir.
1968) (stating a court would "be warranted in not condoning behavior by an
inventor who is invested with a public trust and whose oath, which is by statute an
essential part of every patent application, is heavily relied on by the authorities in the
Patent Office" (footnote omitted)).
224. See Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246 (refusing to consider any benefit to the
defendant asserting unclean hands due to the public interest in patents).
225. See, e.g., Bevans v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 56, 62 (1871) (citing
United States v. Prescott, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 578, 588 (1845)) (affirming a finding of
unclean hands because public policy requires strict accountability for receivers of
public money).
226. 406 U.S. 1 (1972).
227. See id. at 15 (stating that contracts based on patents obtained with unclean
hands are not enforceable).

228. Id.
229. Id. (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806, 815 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
230. See generally 30A C.J.S. Equity § 116 (2007) (citing cases involving protection of
the public interest).
231. See, e.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 75-76 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1980)
(applying New York state law and holding that no injury is needed if there is harm to
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involved potential statutory violations additionally establish that
23 2
possible public injury is sufficient grounds for unclean hands.
Chafee explained that courts were using the defense of unclean
hands as an indirect method to deter serious violations that were
otherwise hard to obtain. 233 For this reason, private, or even public,
harm is not a condition of dismissal if the conduct has the potential
to encourage future violations.23 4
These decisions also depict the discretionary nature of the
connection component of the unclean-hands doctrine and
demonstrate why elevating the materiality element of inequitable
conduct to a single criterion of invalidity by reference to public harm
is erroneous.
In his seminal work on unclean hands, Chafee
discussed the Supreme Court's early inequitable-conduct decisions in
patent law in relation to the illegality doctrine.235 Unclean hands in
situations involving illegality may be applied short of a violation of
the law, which is incompatible with the Therasense majority's rule
requiring invalidity. 236 Rather than one decisive factor, courts in
illegality and unclean-hands cases weigh a number of factors, such as
the extent of interference with the statute or other policy, the
seriousness of the wrongdoing, and the connection to the
public policy); Thompson v. Orcutt, 777 A.2d 670, 679-80 (Conn. 2001) (describing
an exception to private harm requirement of the unclean-hands doctrine if the
application of the doctrine furthers a public interest).
232. See, e.g., Metro Motors v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 339 F.3d 746, 750-51
(8th Cir. 2003) ("Well-accepted general principles of equity support Metro's
contention that a statutory violation gives a party unclean hands.").
233. Chafee I, supranote 11, at 901-03 (citing Thompson v. Williams, 58 N.H. 248
(1878); Coules v. Pharris, 250 N.W. 404 (Wis. 1933)) (describing unclean hands
category of illegality decisions).
234. For example, in Carrington,which was cited in Keystone, the Court found that
invoking the unclean-hands defense promoted the deterrence function.
See
Carrington v. Pratt, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 63, 67-68 (1855) (noting that the party acting
in bad faith "would risk nothing" if the security was held valid to the extent of the
loan).
235. See Chafee I, supra note 11, at 896-906 (discussing unclean hands category of
illegal contract suits as well as tort suits by persons charged with a crime). See
generally WORTHINGTON, supra note 15, at 39-40 (identifying the parallels between

illegality under the common law and unclean hands). Chafee concluded that
application of the doctrine of unclean hands in patent cases shows that the doctrine
is part of patent law and part of illegality. Chafee II, supra note 11, at 1071.
236. RENDLEMAN, supra note 12, at 269 (noting the similarity of unclean hands and
illegality in that a positive law violation is unnecessary to implicate either doctrine).
The cases primarily dealt with a prohibition, not the permission of a right, so they
are not coextensive. The violation of an administrative rule, such as Rule 56's duty of
disclosure, would amount to illegality and unclean hands. See Boise, supranote 15, at
191 (noting violation of an administrative rule constitutes unclean hands); see also
Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 508 (1851) ("It is a good moral and
legal principle, that a man must come into a court of justice with clean hands, and
that the law will not lend its aid to a person setting up a violation of law on the face
of his claim." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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agreement. 2 7 Ultimately, courts weigh the value of extra statutory
pressure to induce obedience with important laws against its costs.
This cost-benefit analysis occurs at the trial-court level on a case-bycase basis. 238
Notwithstanding the fierce incentives to omit relevant information
to secure a federally protected patent privilege,239 the majority in
Therasense equated materiality with patent invalidity, converting the
24
long-standing discretionary standard of unclean hands into a rule. 1
Therefore, the majority's new rule that materiality means invalidity is
not supported by reference to the public interest.
b. Government decision making
Also problematic is the Therasense majority's failure to acknowledge
that the public interest protected by unclean hands includes
safeguarding judicial and administrative processes.24'
One
commentator explained that, by 1907, "the courts were moving away
from the earlier theory that the plaintiffs harmful conduct had to be
directed toward the defendant and applying the maxim for the
protection of the court."24 2 Judge Learned Hand's dissent in Art
Metal Works v. Abraham & Straus243 represents this phenomenon.

There, he asserted that unclean hands "has nothing to do with the
rights or liabilities of the parties; indeed the defendant who invokes it

237. See JANE P. MALLOR ET AL., BUSINESS LAW:
COMMERCE ENVIRONMENT 393 (14th ed. 2010).

THE ETHICAL, GLOBAL, AND

E-

238. British scholars studying the uncertainty and rigidity of illegality in practice
also espouse leaving the policy balancing to the lowest level decision maker. See, e.g.,
R.A. BUCKLEY, ILLEGALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (2d ed. 2009) ("One approach to
reform which commands widespread, but not universal, support is that conferring a
statutory discretion on the court, enabling it to balance sharply conflicting interests
in an infinite variety of different situations, is an appropriate way forward.").
239. In Precision,for instance, it was unlikely, as a practical matter, that a civil suit
for conspiracy or a criminal prosecution would uncover the underlying fraud. See
Brief for Respondent at 4-5, Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945) (No. 377). The Supreme Court held that the patentee had
a duty to disclose the wrongdoing despite the fact there was insufficient evidence to
prove it. Precision, 324 U.S. at 818 (citing Crites, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
322 U.S. 408, 415 (1944)).
240. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1293 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (creating a test that requires inequitable conduct to be a "butfor" reason for the patent's issuance).
241. See Goldman, supra note 23, at 69-70 (explaining how the Federal Circuit
previously identified ethical imperatives of honesty before the Patent Office as a
private interest as opposed to the public interest in patent monopolies (citing Rohm
& Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). See generally
30A C.J.S. Equity § 116 (2007) (citing unclean-hands cases involving protection of
government interests).
242. Poll, supranote 158, at 67 (citing Coleman v. Coleman, 61 P.2d 441 (1936)).
243. 70 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1934).
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need not be damaged. ' 24 4 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit relied on Hand's dissent in Gaudiosi v. Mellon245 and decreed
that "courts are concerned primarily with their own integrity in the
application of the clean hands maxim. Courts in such situations act
for their own protection and not as a matter of 'defense' to the
defendant.

246

This concern for the court as an institution was expressed not only
in the Supreme Court's inequitable-conduct decisions,24 7 but also in
recent research on the doctrine of unclean hands, which
demonstrates that courts' integrity has been the core motivator in
advancing the doctrine in modern jurisprudence.248 Joseph Story
reminds us that the original basis for equitable intervention was, in
fact, founded on abuse of process.249
The application of the unclean-hands doctrine pursuant to the
court-protection purpose defends the judicial process because it
protects judicial integrity. The maxim of unclean hands "derives
from the unwillingness of a court of equity, as a court of conscience,
to lend the aid of its extraordinary powers to a plaintiff who himself is
guilty of reprehensible conduct in the controversy and thereby to
endorse such behavior." 250 Our recent survey of the doctrine of
unclean hands suggests that the social interest in judicial integrity is
both actual and symbolic. 251 There are also related instrumental

244. Id. at 646 (Hand ,J., dissenting).
245. 269 F.2d 873 (3d Cir. 1959).
246. Id. at 882.
247. See Goldman, supra note 23, at 46 (asserting that the Supreme Court was
concerned with the ramifications of fraud on the judicial process in its three
inequitable-conduct cases).
248. See Anenson, Beyond Chafee, supra note 14, at 527-42. In fact, the Supreme
Court's inequitable-conduct decision in Precisionis frequently cited for the expansion
of unclean hands for procedural protection. See id. at 530-31.
249. See 1 STORY, supra note 162, § 48, at 45 (describing abuse of process as one of
the original grounds of equity jurisdiction). The protective purpose of unclean
hands perhaps explains why courts rarely raise the issue of their own power to deny a
statutory right or remedy. See Anenson, Beyond Chafee, supra note 14; Amy Coney
Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 816, 879-88 (2008)
(conceptualizing the federal courts' inherent power under a procedural
common law).
250. Union Pac. R.R. v. Chi. & Nw. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 410 (N.D. Ill. 1964)
(citing CHAFEE, supra note 30, at 1). Courts consistently raise the clean-hands
doctrine sua sponte. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 38 F. Supp. 896, 921 (W.D. Mo.
1940) ("A court of equity is so jealous in guarding itself against such misuse that it
will, sua sponte, apply the maxim whenever it discovers the unconscionable
conduct."), affd sub nom., Am. Ins. Co. v. Scheufler, 129 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1942).
251. See generally Anenson, Beyond Chafee, supra note 14, at 542-73 (developing a
decision-making framework for the application of the unclean-hands doctrine across
a four-part continuum of process-based protection and testing this theory with state
and federal unclean-hands decisions).
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concerns for the deterrence of future deviance.25 2 Therefore, courts
invoke the doctrine when misconduct interferes (or even has the
potential to interfere) with the process of decision making. 23 As
Justice Roberts pronounced in Hazel-Atla- "No fraud is more odious
than an attempt to subvert the administration ofjustice."2 54
The Supreme Court's patent decisions show the same concern for
other quasi-judicial proceedings, such as the prosecution of a patent
before the Patent Office. 255 Both Keystone and Precisionrelied on the
Court's earlier decision in Bein, in which the Court justified dismissal
because acquiring a right contrary to statutory policy places the Court
in the position of being "'the abetter of iniquity. '256 The ruling in
Hazel-Atlas emphasized the same fundamental purpose of the
doctrine by refusing to aid a litigant who had perpetrated "a
deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud not
only the Patent Office but the Circuit Court of Appeals. '2 7 It further
explained that " [t]ampering with the administration ofjustice... is a
wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the
public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated
consistently with the good order of society. '251 Precision cited HazelAtlas in concluding that the application of unclean hands was
appropriate because "[o] nly in that way can the Patent Office and the
public escape from being classed among the 'mute and helpless
259
victims of deception and fraud."

252. Id. at 538-39.
253. See id. at 542-73 (detailing the Supreme Court's inequitable-conduct
opinions).
254. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 251 (1944)
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
255. See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 363 (1888) (commenting
that the patentee procures the patent in a quasi-judicial proceeding).
256. Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247 (1848)); see Precision Instrument
Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945) (quoting Bein, 47 U.S.
(6 How.) at 247); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245
(1933) (quoting Bein, 47 U.S. (16 How.) at 247). The intermediate court of appeals
in Keystone framed the patentee's duty in relation to the Court. See Gen. Excavator
Co. v. Keystone Driller Co., 62 F.2d 48, 50 (6th Cir. 1932), affd, 290 U.S. 240. It
reasoned that while there may have been no duty to disclose a potential prior use to
the Patent Office, the patentee had a duty not to buy the silence of a potential
witness for the opposition. See id.
257. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245-46 (emphasizing that the fraud affected more
than the litigants themselves).
258. Id. at 246.
259. Precision, 324 U.S. at 818 (quoting Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246); see also Reply
Brief for Petitioners at 22, Precision, 324 U.S. 806 (No. 377) (arguing that the
unclean-hands doctrine should be forum law because "nothing could be more
directly related to the law of the forum than the chancellor's concept of what
conduct will bar a litigant from the court").
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The Supreme Court has depended on its inequitable-conduct
decisions in protecting other government decision-making processes.
For example, S&E Contractorsrelied on both Hazel-Atlas and Precision
when it pronounced that "fraud on an administrative agency or on
the court enforcing the agency action is grounds for setting aside the
26
judgment.""
Another recent Supreme Court decision, ABF Freight
System, Inc. v. NLRB26' described wrongdoing during an administrative
hearing that amounted to unclean hands as "a 'flagrant affront' to
'
the truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings."262
While the
Court affirmed the agency decision to deny unclean hands under an
abuse-of-discretion standard, the Court protested the agency decision
to tolerate perjury because of potential procedural problems that
might arise from claims relying on credibility as collateral.26 Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion endorsed Precision's application of the
unclean-hands doctrine to protect administrative processes by
"clos[ing] the door of a court of equity to one tainted with
inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks
relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the
defendant."2 4 He added: "The principle that a perjurer should not
be rewarded with a judgment-even a judgment otherwise
deserved-where there is discretion to deny it, has a long and
265
sensible tradition in the common law."

c.

Administrative Rule 56

An additional example of the Therasense majority's failure to
account for the public interest in patent procurement is its rejection
of the disclosure standard set forth by the Patent Office. 266 The
260. S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (citing Precision,
324 U.S. at 815; Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. 245).
261. 510 U.S. 317 (1994).
262. Id. at 323 ("False testimony in a formal proceeding is intolerable."); see also id.
at 326-27 (Scalia & O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (discussing how inequitable conduct
during an administrative process inevitably affects the courts). See generally Ford v.
Douglas, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 143, 150-53 (1847) (discussing judicial abhorrence of
judgments obtained by fraud).
263. See ABFFreight, 510 U.S. at 323.
264. Id. at 329-30 (Scalia & O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (quoting Precision, 324
U.S. at 814).
265. Id. at 329; see also Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 743, 749 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[I]t is an equitable rationale for refusing a
plaintiff relief where principles of fairness dictate that the plaintiff should not
recover, regardless of the merits of his claim.").
266. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1293-94
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (stating that it "does not adopt the definition of
materiality in PTO Rule 56" and that it "declines to adopt the current version of Rule
56 in defining inequitable conduct because reliance on this standard has resulted in
the very problems this court sought to address by taking this case en banc").
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majority overruled its long-standing former practice that looked to
the definition of materiality found in Rule 56 of the Patent Office as
the starting point for determining the materiality element of
inequitable conduct.267
Rule 56's duty to disclose material
information, which the Therasense majority rejected, did not mandate
proof of unpatentability. 268
Rather, "[a] prima facie case of
unpatentability is established when the information compels a
conclusion that a claim is unpatentable."2 69 Rule 56 also defines
materiality as any information that "refutes, or is inconsistent with,"
270
any position taken by the applicant regarding patentability.
While the Federal Circuit need not adopt Rule 56 as the sole
determinant of materiality, its failure to allow the district court to
even consider the compliance standard is contrary to Supreme Court
patent and non-patent precedent showing deference
to
administrative-agency rulings in the application of the unclean-hands
doctrine. 27 1 Significantly, the Supreme Court in Precision imposed a
legal duty to disclose even before such a rule was promulgated by the
Patent Office.

27 2

267. See id.; O'Connor, supra note 27, at 350-57 (detailing the symbiotic
relationship between the Patent Office and Federal Circuit and calling it an "'echo
chamber' phenomenon").
268. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012). Two months after the Federal Circuit issued its
en banc decision in Therasense, the Patent Office issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking with respect to Rule 56. See Revision of the Materiality to Patentability
Standard for the Duty To Disclose Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg.
43,631, 43,631-34 (July 21, 2011). The proposed amended rule would modify the
duty of disclosure by limiting the scope of materiality in a manner consistent with
Therasense. Id. at 43,631. The rule would provide that information is material to
patentability under the standard set forth in Therasense if "(1) [t]he [Patent] Office
would not allow a claim if it were aware of the information, applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard and giving the claim its broadest reasonable
construction; or (2) the applicant engages in affirmative egregious misconduct
before the Office as to the information." Id. at 43,633.
269. 37C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2).
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). The
Court in ABF Freight also left the choice of remedies to the lowest level decision
maker in an unclean hands-like scenario involving employment. SeeABF Freight Sys.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 325 (1994). The issue was whether an employee would
forfeit back pay and reinstatement after testifying falsely during an administrative
hearing under the Labor Act. See id. at 322 n.8. The National Labor Relations Board
awarded both remedies and the Court ultimately upheld that decision. See id. at 335.
While it cautioned that perjury in a formal proceeding, whether judicial or
administrative, is "intolerable," the Court found that the statute left the Board broad
remedial authority and discretion to effectuate the statutory policies. Id. at 323-24;
see also id. at 330 (Scalia & O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (expressly determining the
case under the doctrine of unclean hands). Scholars have criticized the Federal
Circuit for its lack of deference to Patent Office rulings. See, e.g., David Orozco,
AdministrativePatent Levers, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 1, 38-44 (2012).
272. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
818 (1945). The Patent Office created its Rules of Practice in 1949. O'Connor, supra
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The Court's decisions on illegality, often associated with the
doctrine of unclean hands, also demonstrate its willingness to give
legal effect to procedural rules meant to prevent public harm. 27 3 In
Weil v. Neary,274 for instance, a bankruptcy rule forbade an attorney to
be counsel for both creditors and trustees without the approval of the
bankruptcy court.271 Ina unanimous decision, the Court reversed the
enforcement of the contract and fee recovery, declaring the contract
void as a "violation of public policy and professional ethics," even
though there was no actual fraud and the results benefitted the
estate.276 The Court explained that "[w] hat is struck at in the refusal
to enforce contracts of this kind is not only actual evil results but
It emphasized that
their tendency to evil in other cases." 277
"[e]nforcement of such contracts when actual evil does not follow
would destroy the safeguards of the law and lessen the prevention of
abuses. '278 Moreover, similar to Hazel-Atlas, in which the Supreme
Court resolved any doubt regarding patent validity due to
the Court in Weil found that
nondisclosure against the patentee,
because the party had violated a rule requiring disclosure, it would
not consider whether the bankruptcy court would have allowed the
joint representation. 20" Resembling its rulings on unclean hands, the
Supreme Court made clear in Weil that the public interest extends to
protect procedure despite an absence of private harm.28 '
Consequently, whether assessing the potential private benefit of
the unclean conduct or its corresponding public injury, courts
considering equitable principles never ruled that the ends justify the
means until Therasense.282 The Therasense majority's new "no harm, no
foul" maxim of materiality is contrary to precedent and misconceives
the equitable nature of inequitable conduct.

note 27, at 338. The rules were revised in 1977, recodified in 1992, and amended
again in 2000. See id. at 345 (detailing the history of Rule 56).
273. See discussion infta Part II.C.1-2.a.
274. 278 U.S. 160 (1929).
275. See id. at 168.
276. Id. at 173-74.
277. Id. at 173. ("The contract is contrary to public policy-plainly so.").
278. See id. at 173-74.
279. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hart-Ford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246-57
(1944) (estopping the patentee from arguing that the spurious article did not affect
the appellate decision on patentability because it was the patentee's fault in
preventing the Court from hearing the complete truth).
280. Weil, 278 U.S. at 171.
281. See id. at 171, 173.
282. See, e.g, ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1994)
(concluding that equitable principles preclude the allowance of tainted means to
determine remedy).
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3.

Common-law fraud
The Therasense majority further justified its decision that the
conduct must affect the Patent Office decision to grant the patent
because "[c]ommon law fraud requires proof of reliance, which is
equivalent to the but-for test for materiality set forth in this
opinion." 28" Tort principles may provide instruction on whether
materiality mandates patentability, 284 but common-law fraud is an
inappropriate analogy.
As discussed above, unclean-hands decisions are clear that the
defense is broader than just fraud. 5 Moreover, "equitable," rather
than common-law, fraud is a more appropriate analog. It should be
highlighted that the doctrine of unclean hands is considered part of
the broader notion of equitable fraud that first provided a basis for
equitable intervention. 286 Traditionally, fraud in equity included
agreements that violated rules furthering the administration of
justice, like Patent Office Rule 56, or rules otherwise affecting public
relations by interfering with legislative, executive, or judicial
proceedings. 287 Equitable fraud did not require detrimental reliance,
just as it did not require a specific intent to deceive.28 8
4.

Affirmative acts exception
The majority decision in Therasense requiring proof of invalidity to
trigger inequitable conduct is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
inequitable-conduct decisions. The majority acknowledged that none
of those cases required proof of invalidity to satisfy the defense.289
283. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1295 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc).
284. See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text.
285. See discussion supra Part II.B.
286. See discussion supra Part II.B. Story advised:
It is not easy to give a definition of Fraud in the extensive signification in
which that term is used in Court of Equity; and it has been said that these
court have, very wisely never laid down as a general proposition what shall
constitute fraud, or any general rule beyond which they will not go upon the
ground of fraud, lest other means of avoiding the equity for the courts
should be found out.
1 STORY, supra note 162, § 186, at 200 (footnote omitted).
287. Seel POMEROY, supra note 46, § 400, at 742-45; SNELL, supra note 122, at 441.
288. In contrast to positive fraud, which required an intent to deceive and
reliance, Story explained that constructive fraud in equity included situations
involving confidential relations, imbalances of power, and agreements against public
policy (including abuses of judicial processes). See 1 STORY, supra note 162, §§ 258-259,
at 265-66. An imbalance of power and fiduciary-type relationship is arguably
associated with the patentee's dealings with the Patent Office. See infra note 481 and
accompanying text.
289. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc); see also James J. Schneider, Therasense-Less: How The Federal
Circuit Let Policy Overtake PrecedentIn Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 53
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Therefore, in order to distinguish those decisions, the Therasense
majority attempted to tether the trio of Supreme Court cases to their
facts.29 The majority held that a litigant could avoid showing that the
hidden information would have invalidated the patent if there was
evidence of "affirmative egregious misconduct." 9 1 Citing Keystone,
Hazel-Atlas, and Precision, the Therasense majority further explained
that materiality would include an "unmistakably false affidavit" or a
"deliberately planned and executed scheme" to defraud the Patent
Office and the courts.292
The majority's exception to materiality conflates the two traditional
elements of unclean hands. To reiterate, courts considering the
potential uncleanliness of the litigant's hands examine all the
circumstances, including both state of mind and action. 293 Anything
less than a "pure conscience" and "pure hands" may disqualify the
litigant seeking the aid of equity under the clean-hands doctrine.294
Besides, inequitable conduct in any form is the metric.
Distinguishing what was done from what was omitted, as the
Therasense majority opinion suggests, will likely prove problematic in
practice. 95 In applying the unclean-hands doctrine, the Supreme
B.C. L. REV. E-Supp. 223, 233-34 (2012) (criticizing the court for failing to follow
Supreme Court precedent).
290. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293. Whatever may become of this exception in
the district courts, the majority's approach also contravenes the actual facts in
Precision. For instance, in Precision, despite there being "no active concealment[] or
misrepresentation," Brief for Respondent, supra note 239, at 3 (quoting Auto. Maint.
Mach. Co. v. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 143 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1944), rev d,
324 U.S. 806 1381 (1945)), the Supreme Court found a duty to report the known
fraud to the Patent Office. Precision, 324 U.S. at 818.
291. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292.
292. See id. at 1292-93 (quoting Hazel-Atias Glass Co. v. Hart-Ford-Empire Co., 322
U.S. 238, 245 (1944)) (asserting that all three of these cases "dealt with egregious
misconduct").
293. See discussion supraPart II.A.
294. Manhattan Med. Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 227 (1883) (describing unclean
hands in a trademark intellectual property case as "pure hands and a pure
conscience" (citation omitted)); Buchannon v. Upshaw, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 56, 82
(1843) (detailing the argument of counsel espousing "clean hands and a pure
heart"); United States v. Schooner Betsey & Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 443, 445
(1808) (same).
295. See Lee F. Johnston, The Therasense Decision: Just What the Doctor Ordered or
Will the Inequitable Conduct Plague Mutate and Survive?, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Sept.
2011, at 14, 17 ("[T] here are concerns the majority may have created a new strain of
litigation by distinguishing inequitable conduct from the unclean hands
doctrine .... "). To add to the confusion, the majority also cited to acts and
omissions. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292. Compare Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal
Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[T]here is no room to argue that
submission of false affidavits is not material."), with Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev.
Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding the intentional omission of
declarant's employment with inventor's company rendered the affidavit false and
that "[a] ffidavits are inherently material").
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Court has never distinguished between misconduct involving nondisclosure,296 concealment,2 97 and fraudulent misrepresentation. 8
Modern courts also treat active concealment and nondisclosure as
misrepresentation depending on the circumstances.29 9
Such
distinctions are reminiscent of the archaic common law that
engendered equitable intervention.0 ° It bears repeating that the
doctrine of unclean hands is a principle of equitable fraud. Whether
the inequity is "done or omitted" in determining fraud was a
distinction without a difference."0 ' The inequitable method is only
relevant to the quality and quantum of proof.
Accordingly, neither the fact-based Therasense general rule
requiring invalidity, nor its equally formalistic exception, accounts for
the discretionary nature of the connection component of inequitable
conduct.3 2 The closeness of the connection is based on both facts
and values. As announced in the original Dering decision, the
application of the unclean-hands doctrine is a "legal," not a strictly
moral (or factual), judgment303

296. See, e.g.,
Galloway v. Finley, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 264 (1838); Cathcart v.
Robinson, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 264 (1831).
297. Crosby v, Buchanan. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 420, 457 (1874).
298. See, e.g.,
Kitchen v. Rayburn, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 254 (1873); Bein v. Heath, 47
U.S. (6 How.) 228 (1848).
299. See, e.g.,
Jay Dad Assocs. v. C&G Mgmt. Corp., No. A-6190-06T2, 2009 WL
17940, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 2, 2009) (per curiam) (citing Baron v.
Buermann, 142 A. 248 (N.J. Ch. 1928)) (finding nondisclosure and fraudulent
misrepresentation as unclean hands); see also MALLOR ET AL., supra note 237, at
361-62 (discussing the duty to disclose for purposes of rendering a contract
unenforceable). For other decisions finding silence as unclean hands, see, for
example, Cal-Wool Mktg. Ass'n v. O'Connor Livestock Co., 184 F. Supp. 157 (D. Or.
1960) (silence constitutes unclean hands); Keller v. Linsemyer, 139 A. 33 (N.J. Ch.
1927) (artful silence gets an advantage); and Everett v. Bodwell, 38 S.E.2d 319 (Va.
1946) (wrongful concealment of important facts).
300. See, e.g.,
Walter Wheeler Cook, Equity, in 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 580, 582-88 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1931) (discussing
the substantive and doctrinal shortcomings in the common law and rigidity of the
common law courts' writ system); see also Crosby, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) at 454 (dismissing
a claim of unclean hands and ruling that "[i]n a court of conscience deliberate
concealment is equivalent to deliberate falsehood").
301. Both actual and constructive fraud in equity includes what is "done or
omitted." EATON, supra note 160, § 122, at 287. The difference between them is the
state of mind. See id §§ 122-123, at 287. Actual fraud is the design to perpetrate
fraud or to injure others, while constructive fraud is considered a fraud to protect
the public interest. Id. § 122, at 287.
302. See generallyJohn R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV.
771 (2003) (discussing the Federal Circuit's tendency toward adjudicative formalism
in patentjurisprudence over two decades).
303. See Dering v. Winchelsea, (1787) 29 Eng. Rep. 1184, 1185.
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D. Sliding Scale
In addition to changing the elements of inequitable conduct
contrary to the tradition of the unclean-hands doctrine, the
Therasensemajority also removed them from the sliding scale.0 4 After
Therasense, trial courts no longer have discretion to consider intent
and materiality in tandem.0 5 Again, an analysis of Supreme Court
cases and other decisions on unclean hands indicates that the court
erred in overruling its own sliding-scale approach to inequitable
conduct.
In considering unclean hands, courts employ stricter rules of
relatedness for inadvertence and allow a more liberal connection for
increasing levels of cognition. Put differently, similar to liability in
tort,30 6 courts tend to impose greater responsibility upon those who

intended to do harm than upon those who possessed a lesser state of
mind.30 7 In articulating the unclean-hands doctrine in trademark
litigation, the Supreme Court held that if there is a willful false
statement, it need not necessarily be misleading for the lower court to
find a violation of the unclean-hands doctrine.0 8 Concomitantly,
court opinions finding unclean hands for innocent misrepresentation
generally show that the statement induced someone to act to his or
her detriment.3 09 It was therefore a mistake for the Therasense
304. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290-93
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
305. See id. at 1290.
306. See KEETON ETAL., sup'ra note 131, § 8, at 37 (noting that courts have worked
out a sliding scale, under which a defendant who acts intentionally is subject to more
extensive liability). The doctrine of unclean hands has been described as tortious,
applying to conduct that is fraudulent, willful, and negligent. See LAYCOCK, supra
note 12, at 70 (describing unclean hands as illegal or tortious conduct); Paul Finn,
Unconscionable Conduct, 8J. CONT. L. 37, 42 (1994) (considering equitable theories as
developing a new breed of tort); see also Thompson v. Orcutt, 777 A.2d 670, 674
(Conn. 2001) (suggesting unclean hands includes fraud as well as intentional,
negligent, and innocent misrepresentation). Patent infringement is also considered
the tortious taking of property. See Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp.,
283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (considering infringement of a patentee's rights, whether
direct or contributory, as essentially a tort).; Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow
Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915) (explaining the patent infringement as a tortious
taking of property with the normal damages being the value of what was taken).
307. See generally Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F.2d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 1951)
(pronouncing that it is not so much the effect of conduct, as the intent with which it
is performed); Quieroz v. Harvey, 205 P.3d 1120, 1122 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc)
(declaring that it is the moral intent of the party, and not the actual injury inflicted,
that is controlling in determining unclean hands).
308. See Worden v. Cal. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 531 (1903) (relying on
English precedent cited with approval in Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S.
218, 225 (1883)).
309. See, e.g., Kackley v. Webber, 220 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949). A
finding that the patent claim is unenforceable for inequitable conduct premised on
an innocent misrepresentation would be substantially equivalent to the invalidity
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majority to detach the components of the unclean-hands doctrine
and deny the district court discretion to collectively discern them.
The majority's decision illustrates another historical anomaly in
equating materiality and patent validity-raising the state of mind to
intent to deceive should permit a lower level of materiality.
In summary, the majority in Therasense eschewed the history of
inequitable conduct by removing the district court's discretion. The
en banc decision recalibrated the defense and made the conditions
of its application depend on evidentiary inquiries considered in
isolation. Rather than heeding the Supreme Court's instruction that
the doctrine of unclean hands is "not bound by formula,"3 1 the
majority delineated precise factual formulas and reasoning
requirements that permanently weighted the balance against the
defense. In defining the intent component, the majority limited the
Supreme Court's inequitable-conduct decisions to their facts. For the
materiality component, the majority contravened them. The majority
admitted that its newly created elements are more restrictive than the
inequitable conduct doctrine originally announced by the Supreme
Court. In fact, the majority turned these cases on their heads and
relegated them to an unworkable exception.
The majority's
redefinition of inequitable conduct is also inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's other non-patent decisions on the unclean-hands
doctrine that track equity jurisprudence. As a result, the majority in
Therasensedisregarded the elements of the unclean-hands doctrine, as
well as the district court's discretion to determine them. The next
section critiques its justification for changing inequitable conduct in
practice.
III. EQUITY'S PROGRESS: THE PRACTICE OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

Like the majority's opinion in Therasense, a good deal of thinking in
mainstream patent law today concentrates on the practical
consequences of an inequitable-conduct defense to the exclusion of
its origins in equity.311 Given that tradition is a necessary starting
point under Supreme Court precedent, this Article adds a valuable,
retrospective account of inequitable conduct in light of its history in
defense and suggests that something beyond simple mistake would be appropriate
for dismissal. See discussion supra notes 131, 164 (discussing the invalidity defense).
310. Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245-46 (1933).
311. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 6, at 752 ("Although a more traditional view would
locate the inequitable conduct doctrine in considerations of ethics and-as the name
of the doctrine implies-equity, from an economic perspective the doctrine can be
thought of as a tool for encouraging patent applicants and their agents to disclose
information to the USPTO.").
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the doctrine of unclean hands and its modern use in federal
decisions. But consequences are still important.3 2 Equity has never
been merely a matter of theory, but an affair of experience.
Examining policy-oriented outcomes is especially significant for
doctrines of equity, including the doctrine of unclean hands, that
13
developed to ensure the law achieved its purposes.
While scholars of private law typically support equitable defenses
because their relative obscurity permits fairness-based adjudication4
3 1
without sacrificing the conduct values of the particular legal claim,
the application of equitable defenses in public law may be well
known. 15 Perhaps because an equitable injunction is the most
valuable remedy available to the patent holder,3 16 the interpretation
and application of inequitable conduct regulates behavior and 1 7any
3
theory, traditional or otherwise, must account for that possibility.
The following discussion explains how the absence of equity in the
former decisions of the Federal Circuit contributed to the expansion
312. See

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

65 (1921)

("[W]hen the social needs demand one settlement rather than another, there are
times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in the
pursuit of other and larger ends."); Smith, supra note 160, at 20 n.9 (noting that even
Oliver Wendell Holmes, one of the Supreme Court's most accomplished legal
historians, never countenanced the blind adherence to history for history's sake but
approached it with a balanced view).
313. Courts decline to apply unclean hands if it is contrary to legislative intent, see,
e.g., Gardner v. Gardner, 110 S.E.2d 495, 502 (W. Va. 1959), or if its application
would frustrate the purpose of the statute, see, e.g., Messick v. Smith, 69 A.2d 478, 481
(Md. 1949). Because much of equity developed as an incomplete system of law,
courts applying equitable principles had to consider their effect on the law. See
MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 111, at 451 (explaining that while equitable principles
originated in ethical concepts or "in conscience," "not all morality is to be
encompassed by equity jurisdiction; the selection of what offends conscience is,
ultimately, a matter ofjudicial policy").
314. See Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REV.
253, 308 (1991) (concluding that public ignorance allows courts to use the equitable
defense of fairness to achieve justice without sacrificing the pursuit of stability in
contract law); see also Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630-34 (1984) (advancing a
condition of "acoustic separation" that assumes that a rule of conduct and a standard
of decision, such as the equitable doctrine of "clean hands," can operate in tandem
and fulfill the policy functions of both precepts so long as the public is at least
partially unaware that the rigid rule is actually more lenient in application).
315. See Anenson & Mayer, supra note 215, at 979-82 (considering the concept of
acoustic separation in relation to the assertion of the unclean-hands doctrine against
those seeking to enforce executive pay contracts).
316. See Bryan E. Webster & Steven Walmley, Unclean Hands and Preliminary
Injunctions: The Effects ofDelay in BringingPatentInfringement Cases, 84J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'y 291, 291 (2002).
317. See, e.g., Note, supra note 73, at 1504 (discussing the issue of when is it
desirable for one government function to aid the legitimate purposes of another).
Equitable remedies have a deterrence function. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321, 329 (1944) ("The historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to
punish.").
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of inequitable conduct, its abuse pre-Therasense, and how the
presence of equity may appropriately constrain the defense in the
future.
A.

FormerFederalCircuitDecisions

While the majority in Therasense defended overruling its former
precedent in an effort to eliminate the negative impact of inequitable
conduct in practice, it mistakenly attributed the criticisms of the
The chief complaints associated with
defense to equity.3 18
inequitable-conduct law leading up to the Therasense decision were
that it had become so unclear, inconsistent, and broad as to cause
litigation abuse.3 19 Yet it was not the tradition of inequitable conduct,
but the Federal Circuit's failure to follow it, that resulted in problems
with the defense.
Clarity and consistency
A concern with the Federal Circuit's pre-Therasense rulings on
inequitable conduct was that the law was neither clear nor
consistent.32 ° The Therasense majority explained that the Federal
Circuit embraced the reduced standards to foster full disclosure to
the Patent Office, but that the expansion had unintended
consequences.3 2' The majority justified restricting the defense by
suggesting that it was the equitable nature of the rule itself that was
causing the confusion by offering Lord Seldon's historic criticism
that equity changes according to the length of the chancellor's
foot. 2 It appears, however, that the Federal Circuit was the cobbler
changing inequitable conduct's shoe size.323
1.

318. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289, 1293
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
319. See id. at 1290 ("While honesty at the PTO is essential, low standards for
intent and materiality have inadvertently led to many unintended consequences,
among them, increased adjudication cost and complexity, reduced likelihood of
settlement, burdened courts, strained PTO resources, increased PTO backlog, and
impaired patent quality."); see also Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745
F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (indicating that the inequitable-conduct tactic has
been overplayed and has cluttered the patent system).
320. See Goldman, supra note 23, at 74-75 (surveying the Federal Circuit's
inconsistent application of its inequitable-conduct precedents).
321. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 ("[I]nequitable conduct has become a
significant litigation strategy.").
322. See id. at 1293 (concluding that equitable rules serve important purposes,
including reducing uncertainty, and that the "alternative would be as arbitrary and
uncertain as measuring distance by the length of each chancellor's foot" (quoting
Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
323. See generally id. at 1287 (discussing the evolution of the doctrine of
inequitable conduct and its divergence from the unclean-hands doctrine); Goldman,
supra note 23, at 74-75 (noting that Federal Circuit inequitable-conduct decisions
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The Therasense majority admitted that "the standards for intent to
deceive and materiality have fluctuated over time. ' 32 4

Indeed, the

Federal Circuit has been to extremes in its interpretation and
application of inequitable conduct. It began liberalizing the doctrine
25
in a series of cases before abruptly changing course in Therasense1
While expansion and contraction is characteristic of any judge-made
doctrine over time,326 change typically occurs at a gradual pace. 27
Justice Benjamin Cardozo used the metaphor of a glacier to describe
the incremental modification process of judge-made laws whose
"effects must be measured by decades and even centuries."3

2

"Thus

measured," Cardozo explained, "they are seen to have behind them
the power and the pressure of the moving glacier. 3 29

Rather than

being the deep and steady foundation of a glacier, Federal Circuit
precedent has been shallow and unstable, which contributed to the
unsettled and unsatisfactory law of inequitable conduct. A related
complication was the recognition of multiple standards that added
unnecessary complexity to the inequitable-conduct inquiry.3 ° Rather
than repeated re-interpretation, an equitable approach would have
provided the district court discretion in application.3 1
had inconsistent results similar to the regional courts before it).
324. Therasense,649 F.3d at 1287.
325. Id. at 1288; see e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d
1350, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (implementing a "sliding scale" of inequitableconduct analysis that reduced the required showings of intent and materiality and
held patents unenforceable where one of the two factors was strongly established),
abrogatedby Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288-90.
326. See generally Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy,
and Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 307 (2003) ("The law evolves from rules to standards
and back again in an unending cycle of assimilation and accommodation.").
327. See generally Peter Birks, Three Kinds of Objection to DiscretionaryRemedialism, 26
U.W. AUSTL. L. REv. 1, 13 (1996) ("Interpretative change depends on continuity. It
cannot ignore the intervening centuries.").
328. CARDOZO, supra note 312, at 25.
329. Id.
330. See Goldman, supra note 23, at 53-55 (summarizing Federal Circuit decisions
as providing three tests of materiality and two tests of intent); Kate McElhone,
Inequitable Conduct: Shifting Standardsfor PatentApplicants, Prosecutors,and Litigators,17
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 385, 393 (2009) ("Despite the PTO's adoption of [a] single,
objective standard for materiality, subsequent Federal Circuit opinions referred to as
many as five different tests .. "). In American Hoist, the Federal Circuit declared
that courts have used at least other three materiality standards: "(1) an objective
'but-for' standard, (2) a subjective 'but-for' standard, and[] (3) a 'but it may have'
standard," under which courts asked whether the involved facts might reasonably
have impacted the examiner's decision regarding patentability. 725 F.2d at 1362.
The Federal Circuit described the third standard as "strikingly similar" to Rule 56.
Id.
331. See infra Part III.C.2 for jurisdictions that disfavor unclean hands. The
Supreme Court has also instructed that trial court discretion in determining unclean
hands should be exercised carefully when denying statutory rights that fulfill
important public policies.
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Equally problematic has been the court's approach to appellate
review. Cardozo said that a system of appeals assures that "[t]he tide
rises and falls, but the sands of error crumble. 33 2 Not so with the
Federal Circuit.
Practitioners commenting on the inequitableconduct defense have raised concerns that the problem of clarity and
consistency lies at the appellate, rather than the trial, level. 33 It is
axiomatic that if there are discretionary standards involved in
decision making, an appellate court must accept the exercise of
discretion and be deferential to the trialjudge.3 34 Otherwise, the law
will be changed. 35 Without the foundation of the unclean-hands
doctrine and the discretion to discern the doctrine within the context
of each case, Federal Circuit decisions on inequitable conduct have
lacked the stability and consistency valued in adjudication. 36
Inequitable conduct has been a "roguish thing" in the Federal
Circuit 33 7- Therasensesimply represents the latest iteration.
2.

Containment

Another concern pre-Therasense was that inequitable-conduct law
had become so broad that the dominant strategy had been to flood
the Patent Office with extraneous references in order to bury the
relevant ones. 3 8 The breadth of the doctrine also encouraged
332. CARDOZO, supra note 312, at 177.
333. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 23, at 86-87 (positing that the problem with
inequitable conduct is not simply the conflicting standards set by the Federal Circuit
but also the inconsistency in its application and appellate review); Laurence H.
Pretty, Inequitable Conduct in the PTO-Is the "Plague"Entering Remission?, 71 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 46, 46 (1989) ("If the defense has reached the stage of a
plague, the Federal Circuit itself has been to some extent its carrier by the
inconsistency of its decisions in recent years."). Not until Kingsdown did the Federal
Circuit move to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review for inequitable conduct
that was consistent with its equitable roots and solved the practical problem of
limiting appeals. Goldman, supra note 23, at 86-87 (citing Kingsdown Med.
Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
334. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876 (holding that the determination of inequitable
conduct is left to the trial court and is only reviewable under a standard of abuse of
discretion); Cravens, supra note 17, at 958.
335. Cravens, supra note 17, at 958. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Slouching
Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1561, 1563 (2003) ("The standard of
review, of course, is an important measure of discretion in the trial court).
336. See Goldman, supra note 23, at 97 (commenting on the lack of uniformity in
the court's decisions and citing other commentators who had made similar
observations).
337. See TABLE TALK OFJOHN SELDEN 43 (Frederick Pollock ed., 1927) ("Equity is A
Roguish Thing, for Law wee have a measure know what to trust too. Equity is
according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or
narrower soe is equity. Tis all one as if they should make the Standard for the
measure wee call A foot, to be the Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure
would this be; One Chancellor has a long foot another A short foot a third an
indifferent foot; tis the same thing in the Chancellor's Conscience.").
338. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed.
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alleged infringers to raise the defense even in unmeritorious cases. 39
The Therasense majority explained that the defense "cast[s] the
shadow of a hangman's noose" in rendering the entire patent
unenforceable.3 4' As a result, the majority decided to curtail the
defense because its "far-reaching consequences" had caused it to
become an overly-employed litigation tactic.34 '
Again, it appears to be the decisions of the Federal Circuit, rather
than the equitable nature of inequitable conduct, that have resulted
in the doctrine's broad scope and corresponding abuse. The court's
rulings had raised the litigation stakes so high as to incentivize the
over-pleading of the defense and the over-disclosure of references in
the judicial and administrative processes. Unlike the more limited
nature of the Supreme Court rulings, if there is inequitable conduct
as to one patent claim, the Federal Circuit has directed district courts
to dismiss all patent claims in all future cases.
a. All cases
Federal Circuit precedent establishes that an adverse ruling on
inequitable conduct forever forecloses litigation of that issue in the
future. In Therasense, the majority reiterated that its rulings on
inequitable conduct had "diverged from the doctrine of unclean
hands by adopting a different and more potent remedyunenforceability of the entire patent rather than mere dismissal of
the instant

suit.

" 42

An explanation for the court's deviance from the tradition of
equity as announced by the Supreme Court can be traced to General
Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp.343 Perhaps as a preview to
Therasense, the Federal Circuit found that Supreme Court precedent
subjecting patent-invalidity determinations to collateral estoppel
applied equally to unenforceability adjudications involving
inequitable conduct.344 Equating unenforceability with patentability
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing a "tidal wave of disclosure" that complicates the
identification of relevant prior art).
339. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (commenting that assertions of inequitable conduct have been "cluttering
up the patent system").
340. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289.
341. See id. at 1289.
342. Id. at 1287.
343. 19 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
344. See id. at 1413 ("The principle of Blonder-Tongue... respecting collateral
estoppel also applies to unenforceability." (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ.
of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971))). The Court in Blonder-Tongue recognized that
defensive non-mutual collateral estoppel precludes recovery by a patentee in the
second action. 402 U.S. at 210-21. The Federal Circuit reaffirmed its holding in
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in ascertaining collateral estoppel is reminiscent of the court's vision
of a patent as an absolute property right.345 This rationale is
inconsistent with the role of inequitable conduct as a remedial
defense and, accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision in eBay, 4
Similar to unclean hands, collateral estoppel is an equitable
doctrine subject to trial-court discretion.3 4 ' Even if the conditions are
present for its application,3 4 s collateral estoppel will not apply if
unfairness or manifest injustice would result. 349 Circumstances that
justify an opportunity to re-litigate an issue include the potential
adverse impact on the public interest35 and whether the prior
determination was affected by relationships among the parties to the
first action that are not present in the second action. 5 1
Pharmacia& Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
and proclaimed that "[a]n unrelated accused infringer may likewise take advantage
of an unenforceability decision under the collateral estoppel doctrine." Id. at 1379.
345. BuRK& LEMLEY, supra note 10, at 68-69, 137 (explaining the Federal Circuit's
decision in eBay on the ground that patents are absolute property rights and
discussing theories of patent law and the extent of integration with property).
346. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). Recall that the
Supreme Court in eBay held that there is no automatic grant of a permanent
injunction any time infringement and validity is adjudged. Id. at 394. Instead,
according to settled principles of equity, the district court was given discretion to
decide whether the four-factor test of irreparable injury, inadequacy of remedies at
law, balance of hardships favoring the party seeking the injunction, and the public
interest was satisfied. Id. at 391. The Court distinguished right from remedy in
reaching its decision. Id.; accord Fischer, supra note 18, at 559-60 (noting how eBay
changed the theory of injunctive relief for intellectual property rights violations that
rested on the view that the patent was a property right). It ruled that the patent
holder's exclusive statutory right to exclude others from using or selling the
invention does not render a permanent injunction appropriate any time a patent is
infringed. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394. An extension of the Supreme Court's reasoning in
eBay suggests that a theory of property should neither supply the baseline for
separating equitable from inequitable conduct nor determine its consequences in
subsequent litigation.
347. In Blonder-Tongue, a unanimous Supreme Court declared: "[A]s so often is
the case, no one set of facts, no one collection of words or phrases, will provide an
automatic formula for proper rulings on estoppel pleas. In the end, decision will
necessarily rest on the trial courts' sense ofjustice and equity." 402 U.S. at 333-34.
348. The application of collateral estoppel generally requires an identity of issue
and a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior decision. Abbott Labs. v. Andrx
Pharms., Inc., 473 F.3d 1196, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2007). If these requirements are met,
collateral estoppel may prevent a party from relitigating an issue, which has
previously been decided.
See id. at 1202-03 (explaining that Blonder-Tongue
permitted the defensive use of collateral estoppel and noting that general principles
of collateral estoppel, such as finality of judgment, are not within the court's
exclusive jurisdiction).
349. See, e.g., S & S Auto. v. Checker Taxi Co., 520 N.E.2d 929, 935 (Ill. Ct. App.
1988) (citing principles of equity and fairness in declining to apply collateral
estoppel).
350. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28(5), cmt. g (1982) (providing the
rationale for section five that "the policy supporting issue preclusion is not so
unyielding that is must invariably be applied, even in the face of strong competing
considerations").
351. Id. § 29(5), cmt. g (citing a case where the prior judgment involved
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In determining the unclean-hands doctrine, courts consider the
availability of other incentives for compliance and, correspondingly,
the potential unfairness of a double penalty in the event of a
dismissal. 52 Also important is that the unclean-hands calculus could
As the Ninth Circuit explained:
be correlative.
The court must weigh the substance of the right asserted by
plaintiff against the transgression which, it is contended, serves to
foreclose that right. The relative extent of each party's wrong
upon the other and upon the public should be taken into account,
and an equitable balance struck. 54
Given the relational nature of the inquiry, a district court
considering the unclean hands of a patentee may apply inequitable
conduct in a case involving innocent infringement, while another
court may appropriately decline to dismiss for the same inequitable
conduct on the basis of collateral estoppel in a subsequent case of
willful infringement. Thus, while unclean hands may provide the
basis for collateral estoppel, determining the preclusive effect of an
inequitable-conduct ruling requires considering the reason for the
former decision and public policy.

55

assessment of comparative fault).
352. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Klein, 129 A.2d 250, 251 (Del. Ch. 1956) (ruling that a
"repentant sinner, especially where he has been duly punished, is not unwelcome in
equity"). In Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., a majority of the Supreme Court
determined that the clean-hands doctrine should not apply despite the potential
violation of federal law because there were other ways to enforce the law and to deter
future violations. See 321 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1944). Similarly, in A.C. Frost & Co. v.
Coeurd'Alene Mines Corp., the Supreme Court reversed the state courtjudgment at law
to dismiss a contract action to recover attorney fees despite the violation of the
securities law. See 312 U.S. 38, 39, 45 (1941). The Court reasoned that there were
already criminal and other penalties against the corporation so it would not go
further and make the deal void. See id. at 42-43. Likewise, in ABFFreight Sys., Inc. v.
NLRB, the Court deferred to an administrative ruling that denied the dismissal of the
case for perjury in part by noting there were other incentives for compliance. See 510
U.S. 317, 322-25 (1994).
353. Dunlop-McCullen v. Local 1-S, AFL-CIO-CLC, 149 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1998)
(declaring that the "doctrine of unclean hands also may be relaxed if [the]
defendant has been guilty of misconduct that is more unconscionable than that
committed by [the] plaintiff' (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Chafee I,
supra note 11, at 904-05 (commenting that parties seem to fare better against the
unclean-hands defense when bringing tort rather than contract claims).
354. Republic Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utils., 319 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.
1963); see also Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472, 480 (4th Cir. 1953) (finding the balance
of equities tipped in favor of plaintiffs); Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
191 F.2d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 1951) (balancing the comparative guilt of the parties with
the harm to the public interest and the penalty to plaintiff if denied relief).
355. The policies underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel include relieving
parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserving judicial resources,
and preventing inconsistent decisions, which, in turn, encourages reliance on
Yet the primary
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
adjudication.
consideration in administering the rule of preclusion is fairness, not consistency or
the economy of foreclosing retrial of the issue. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v.
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Rather than building on equitable principles, Federal Circuit
precedent automatically ascribes binding effect to inequitableconduct adjudications and eliminates the discretionary nature of
both collateral-estoppel and unclean-hands considerations. Without
accounting for the district court's authority to refuse preclusive effect
under certain circumstances, patentees incur the increased hazard
that a finding of inequitable conduct will prevent future enforcement
of the patent.
b. All claims
The Federal Circuit also requires the district court to dismiss all
patent claims, even those unrelated to the inequitable conduct 56
Patent applicants have multiple opportunities to define their
invention in patent claims, which may be dependent or independent
of each other.3 57 As such, inequitable conduct tainting one claim may
not necessarily taint another. Prior to the creation of the Federal
Circuit, some appellate courts considered the enforceability of one or
more patent claims to be part of the district court's equitable
discretion.18
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit in Kingsdown
reaffirmed, without discussion,3 59 the rule fromJ.P. Stevens & Co., Inc.
v. Lex Tex Ltd., 66 under which inequitable conduct is an "all or
'
nothing proposition."3 61
Neither decision considered inequitable
Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971).
356. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc) (attributing the litigation abuse in part to the fact that a finding of
inequitable conduct as to any single claim renders the entire claim unenforceable).
Several articles criticize the all or nothing penalty and call for reform. See, e.g., David
McGowan, Inequitable Conduct, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 945, 979-80 (2010); Melissa
Feeney Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 18

(2008).

357. In the anatomy of a patent, the heart of the patent application is found in the
claims. See BuRK & LEMLEY, supra note 10, at 11-12 (noting that patentees only owns
what they claim, not what they build or describe). To calibrate the scope of a patent,
patent claims can be independent or dependent. See id. at 12.
358. Compare Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Lambert Bros., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 933, 943
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[W]e cannot think of any cases where a patentee partially escaped
the consequences of his wrongful acts by arguing that he only committed acts of
omission or commission with respect to a limited number of claims. It is an all or
nothing proposition." (citation omitted)), with In re Multidistrict Litig. Involving
Frost Patent, 540 F.2d 601, 611 (3d Cir. 1976) (asserting the discretion of the court
to deny patent enforcement in part or in whole and partly declining to enforce the
Frost patent at issue).
359. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (en banc). Unlike the extensive development of materiality and intent,
the rulings that inequitable conduct extends to all patent claims, even those
unrelated to such conduct have not been examined, and consequently, would do the
least damage to the principle of stare decisis.
360. 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
361. Id. at 1561; see Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 877.
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conduct's equitable nature or its heritage in the doctrine of unclean
hands. As a result, if a district court determines that one patent claim
is tainted with inequitable conduct, the rule requires it to find all
patent claims unenforceable.3 62
Because the parties involved in Keystone, Hazel-Atlas, and Precision
did not distinguish one patent claim from another, the Supreme
Court never addressed this issue.3 63
However, a claim-by-claim
approach appears consistent with the Court's careful examination of
the connection between the inequitable conduct and the patents in
Keystone.3" The Keystone litigation focused on whether to dismiss one
or more of the five patents. 365 In a prior lawsuit against the Byers
Machine Company, the plaintiff from Keystone had suppressed
evidence of a potential prior use as to one of three patents. 366 The
plaintiff then used that decree of validity in seeking temporary
injunctions pendente lite for its lawsuits against General Excavator
Company and Osgood Company, which
involved the same three
36 7
patents as well as two related patents.
Although the inequitable conduct occurred with regard to only
one patent, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of all five
patents for practical and procedural reasons.3 6 Ultimately, the Court
362. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 877; see Cotter, supra note 6, at 748 ("Even after
Therasense,a finding of inequitable conduct renders the entire patent and sometimes
even related patents unenforceable.... At least in this respect, the inequitable
conduct doctrine remains.., the 'atomic bomb' of patent litigation.").
363. In Keystone, the Petitioner conceded that its unclean conduct would preclude
all patent claims. Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 259, at 2.
364. See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245-47 (1933)
(highlighting that the requirement of unclean hands must be related to an act with
"immediate and necessary' relation to the equity sought and determining that the
connection between the patents and plaintiffs use of the Byers decree met this
requirement).
365. See id. at 241-42, 244.
366. See id. at 242-44.
367. See id. at 242-43, 246.
368. See id. at 246-47. As a procedural matter, the Court found that the judgment
involving the fraudulent patent and two others from the first Byers lawsuit were "in
support, if not indeed the basis.., of its applications" in this lawsuit. Id. at 246; see
also Brief For Respondents at 28-33, Keystone, 290 U.S. 240 (Nos. 34, 35, 36, 37)
(arguing that the evidence concerning the patents were comingled and filed
conjointly as part of the same machine). The Court also discussed how Byers got the
decree as part of a plan to use it in subsequent suits. See Keystone, 290 U.S. at 247
(specifying that this finding was sufficient to show that the plaintiff did not come to
the action with clean hands). As a practical matter, the Court considered the
business advantage and found that all of the patents were "important, if not essential,
parts of the same machine." Id. at 246. Examining the machine itself, the Court
further found "its claims warrant the inference that each supplement the others." Id.
The fraudulent patent improved the design of the hoe or mattock arrangement of a
ditching machine covered by one of the litigated patents. Id. at 242. The other
patents at issue also improved the design by eliminating blind spots and allowing for
the use of different size scoops and for detachable rake teeth for a scoop. Id. at 246.
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concluded that "[t]he relation between the device covered by the
[fraudulent] patent and those covered by the other patents, taken in
connection with the use to which plaintiff put the Byers decree, is
amply sufficient to bring these cases within the maxim. " "'
The fact that one of the previously-adjudicated patents was deemed
valid without consideration of a potential prior use did not
automatically render all related patents unenforceable."' 0
Also
indicative of a nuanced patent-by-patent (and correspondingly, claimby-claim) approach in the exercise of discretion was the Supreme
Court's reasoning that if the fraud had been discovered in the first
Byers lawsuit involving the possibly fraudulent patent and two other
patents, such conduct would have been sufficient for the district
court to dismiss the cause of action only against the fraudulent
371
patent.
The Court cited Conard v. Nicol 72 to illustrate the link between the
patents.37 3 In Conard, the Court explained that "if the particular act
sought to be avoided be not shown to be tainted with fraud, it cannot
be affected by those other frauds, unless in some way or other it be
connected with or form a part of them." 374 The Court in Keystone
further relied on Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 375 in

analyzing whether the unclean conduct was connected to the patents
involved in the litigation. 376 The Supreme Court in Leeds dealt with
the separability of patent claims for invalidity and infringement.3 77 It
stated:
Claims are independent inventions. One may be infringed, others
not, and the redress of the patentee is limited to the injury he
Thus, the Court determined that the "devices covered by the patents w[ere]
'essential' to the ditching machinery." Id.
369. Keystone, 290 U.S. at 246-47 ("Neither the plaintiffs corruption of Clutter in
respect of the first Downie patent nor its use in these cases of the Byers decree can
fairly be deemed to be unconnected with causes of action based on the other

patents.").
370. The intermediate appellate court observed that the unclean-hands doctrine
may have been inapplicable if Keystone had not sought to use the previous decree or
if it had based its lawsuit only on the other patents. See Gen. Excavator Co. v.
Keystone Driller Co., 62 F.2d 48, 50 (6th Cir. 1932), affd, 290 U.S. 240.
371. Keystone, 290 U.S. at 246.
372. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 291 (1830).
373. See Keystone, 290 U.S. at 246 (citing Conard,290 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 297).
374. Conard, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 297; see also Samasko v. Davis, 64 A.2d 682, 685

(Conn. 1949) ("Where a plaintiffs [equitable] claim 'grows out of, or depends on, or
is inseparably connected with, his own prior fraud, a court of equity will, in general,
deny him any relief, and will leave him to whatever remedies and defenses at law he
may have."' (quoting Gest v. Gest, 167 A. 909, 912 (Conn. 1933))).
375. 213 U.S. 301 (1909).
376. See Keystone, 290 U.S. at 246-47.
377. SeeLeeds, 213 U.S. 301.
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suffers, not by the abstract rights which have been granted him in
other claims.... But what is good remains and is unaffected by its
illegal associates. In such cases, the patent does not stand or fall as
a unity.

378

Given Keystone's analysis, the choice to dismiss certain claims and
patents for inequitable conduct is not conceptually different from the
discretion exercised in determining the connection component of
Indeed, Pomeroy discussed the doctrine as
unclean hands.3 79
refusing "all" relief, but qualified the explanation "with reference to
the subject-matter or transaction in question."380 The connection
component of unclean hands has been the method by which courts
typically constrain the defense. 8
In reference to litigation claims, the Supreme Court declared in
Manufacturers'FinanceCo. v. McKey 8 2 that unclean hands denies relief
in toto.18 '

However, the decision preceded the promulgation of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide for the liberal
joinder of claims. 84 Since that time, lower federal courts have limited
"the reach of the doctrine to only some of the [litigation] claims. '385
Furthermore, under the related doctrine of fraud on the court,
stemming from the Supreme Court's patent decision in Hazel-Atlas,
courts regularly parcel the pleadings. 6
The automatic dismissal of all patent claims is also inconsistent
with the remedial character of the unclean-hands doctrine,
378. Id.at 319.
379. See discussion supra at Part II.C.
380. 2 POMEROY, supra note 32, § 397, at 91.
381. See Anenson, Beyond Chafee, supranote 14, at 516 ("While not universal, many
courts also mandate that the unclean conduct have a connection to the case.").
382. 294 U.S. 442 (1935).
383. See id. at 451 (declaring that "the maxim, if applicable, required the district
court to halt petitioner at the threshold and refuse it any relief whatsoever"). The
Supreme Court alternatively held that no inequitable conduct was involved in the
case. See id.
384. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19-20. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 joined
law and equity processes in the federal system. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135
U. PA. L. REv. 909, 973-74 (1987).
385. New Valley Corp. v. Corporate Prop. Assocs. 2 & 3 (In re New Valley Corp.),
181 F.3d 517, 525 (B.A.P. 3d Cir. 1999) ("As an equitable doctrine, application of
unclean hands rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.... [T]he court
has discretion to limit the reach of the doctrine to only some of the claims."); see also
J.L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor Sec. Co., 113 P.2d 845, 853-54 (Wash. 1941) ("Even
proof of misconduct as to one part of a transaction will not necessarily deprive a
party of equitable relief as to another part thereof.").
386. See Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies in
Litigation with a Spotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines of Judicial
Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel, Quasi-Estoppel, CollateralEstoppel, "Mend The Hold," "Fraudon
the Court" and Judicial and Evidentiary Admissions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 589, 707 (1998);
Stern, supra note 119, at 1254.
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inequitable conduct, and the Supreme Court's decision in eBay.3 87
MercExchange sued eBay for infringing its patent and requested a
permanent injunction. 8
The trial court refused the injunction
because MercExchange did not practice its patent, but rather,
licensed it to others. 89 As a result, the district court held there was
no irreparable injury sufficient to warrant the injunction.9 0 The
Federal Circuit reversed.9 ' It ruled that a patent owner qualifies for
92
an injunction once it shows that the patent is valid and infringed.1
The appellate court allowed the districtjudge to refuse an injunction
only under "exceptional circumstances" such as the necessary
protection of public health or safety. 3
The Supreme Court reversed, finding a middle ground. 94 It relied
on ancient equitable principles to reject both the district court's per
se rule to deny an injunction when the patent owner licensed rather
than practiced the invention as well as the Federal Circuit's near
automatic rule to grant an injunction upon infringement: 9' The
Supreme Court held that equitable remedies in patent law, like those
outside it, must be decided on a case-by-case basis. 96 It declared that
"[t] he decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act
of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for
abuse of discretion. 397
It follows that the decision to render an entire patent family
unenforceable for inequitable conduct "is a matter of equitable
discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of
course." 398 As a remedial defense, inequitable conduct is part of the
387. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
Besides the
tradition of equity, the denial of enforcement on an individualized patent claim-byclaim basis is consistent with the text and intent underlying the statute. Section 288
of the Patent Act of 1952 was enacted to require invalidity determinations by claim
and overrule judge-made law that if the patent was invalid-in-part, then the
entire patent was nullified. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 161, 208-09 (1993); see 35 U.S.C. § 288 (2006)
(allowing the patentee to sue on a patent claim even if others were invalid unless
there was deceptive intent).
388. eBay, 547 U.S. at 390-91.
389. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va.
2003), affd in part, rev'd inpart, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388.
390. Id.
391. See eBay, 401 F.3d at 1340.

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

See id. at 1338.
Id. at 1338-39.
See eBay 547 U.S. at 394.
See id. at 393-94.
Id. at 394.
Id.at 391.

398. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008); Weinberger
v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) ("[A] federal judge sitting as chancellor
is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law.").
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district court's discretion mandated by the Supreme Court in eBay.399
Therefore, principles of equity would not demand that the remedial
defense apply automatically to all patent claims. Rather, the district
court should dismiss only those claims that are related to the
inequitable conduct within the meaning of unclean hands.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that "breadth and
flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies."0 0
Quoting the
Supreme Court, the majority in Therasense seemed to recognize the
defense's discretionary character in stating that "[t]he remedy
imposed by a court of equity should be commensurate with the
violation."4 ' In fact, it was the injustice of striking down an entire
patent that led the majority to elevate the elements of inequitable
conduct beyond their traditional standards.4 2 However, rather than
correcting the original historical error that required the dismissal of
all patent claims and raised the stakes of infringement litigation,4" 3

399. Two hundred years of Supreme Court decisions on unclean hands
demonstrate its use across a variety of equitable remedies. See, e.g., California v. Am.
Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295 (1990) (equating statutory divestiture to equitable
rescission); Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 421-23 (1972)
(bankruptcy); United States v. N. Pac. Ry., 311 U.S. 317, 333, 357-58 (1940)
(accounting); Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331, 338 (1930) (affirming
the district court's denial of an interlocutory injunction); Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc.
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1918) (issuing a permanent injunction); United States ex rel
Turner v. Fisher, 222 U.S. 204, 209 (1911) (mandamus); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully,
144 U.S. 224, 237-39 (1892) (granting specific performance); Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S.
(6 How.) 228, 239, 247-48 (1848) (injunction and rescission). The Supreme Court's
patent cases applying unclean hands/inequitable conduct did not deviate from its
remedial quality. See, e.g., Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 229-35 (1943))
(holding that the application of unclean hands/inequitable conduct in patent law
was part of a more extensive doctrine, under which a court may withhold equitable
relief in furtherance of a recognized public policy).
400. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburd Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); see also
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) ("Flexibility rather than rigidity
distinguishes it."). In Pope, the Court explained that its refusal to provide equitable
relief "rests entirely on judicial discretion, exercised.., according to the settled
principles of equity, and not arbitrarily or capriciously, and always with reference to
the facts of the particular case." 144 U.S. at 237 (affirming the dismissal of a bill in
equity seeking an accounting and injunction of a licensing contract involving various
patents).
401. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc) (quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465
(1979)). The dissenting opinion by Judge O'Malley relied on the same language to
determine that, "in the exercise of its discretion, a district court may choose to
render fewer than all claims unenforceable." Id. at 1299 (O'Malley, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (calling to overrule Federal Circuit precedent to the
contrary).
402. See id. at 1289 (majority opinion).
403. See O'Connor, supra note 27, at 396 (characterizing inequitable conduct as a
"massive trap" for the patentee); Nicole M. Murphy, Note, Inequitable-ConductDoctrine
Reform: Is The Death Penalty for Patents Still Appropriate?, 93 MiNN. L. REv. 2274, 2274
(2009) (calling inequitable conduct the "death penalty" for patents).
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the majority compounded it.4°4 Just as it is "inequitable to strike
down an entire patent where the patentee committed only minor
missteps or acted with minimal culpability, '4°5 it is equally inequitable
to bar all patent claims when there are some unrelated to the
inequitable behavior. Put simply, the theory of inequitable conduct
determines what conduct is clean or unclean and prescribes the
appropriate remedial response. Abolishing the discretion of the
district court to tailor the relief is inappropriate and irreconcilable
with the tradition of unclean hands.
The foregoing analysis makes clear that while Therasense changed
the rules, the Federal Circuit did not deviate from its attitude toward
equity in the narrowing or outright elimination of district-court
discretion.4" 6 Its prior decisions disregarded the history of the
unclean-hands doctrine, furthering the instability of inequitable
conduct and its associated problems. The next section explains why a
historically consistent theory of the defense may better avoid them.
B. Method of Equity
The Federal Circuit has been objectifying inequitable-conduct law
in order to solve moral and political problems much like inventors
use technology to solve physical problems. Rather than synthesizing
science and sociology by resorting to equitable principles, the
majority in Therasense cemented their separation. The following
discussion establishes that tying inequitable conduct to the tradition
of equity and its modern iteration in Supreme Court patent and nonpatent precedents yields a more sustainable solution to the danger of
fraud or other inequitable conduct in patent procurement.
Taking a traditional approach to the doctrine of unclean hands,
courts apply the unclean conduct and connection components of the
defense according to its purposes of private (party) and public
(including court) protection, as well as the purposes of the claim.40 7
The determination of the defense in the first instance is left to the
district court's sound discretion and is only overturned on appeal for
404.

See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 ("This court now tightens the standards for

finding both intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been

overused to the detriment of the public.").
405. Id. at 1292 (quoting Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537
F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
406. See Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339,
351-53 (1905) (advising that decisional rules will not change until the picture of the
law also changes in the minds ofjudges).

407. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,

815-16 (1945); Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies, supra note 13, at 64 (commenting

that judges have invoked unclean hands for reasons of court and party protection).
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its abuse.4 °8 As a result, judicial discretion is regulated by the
principle of unclean hands.4 9
Our recent survey examining the judicial practice of unclean hands
in patent and other federally-protected rights and remedies supports
limiting the unclean-hands doctrine through a dual-purpose
analysis." 0 Theoretical developments in equitable defenses and
remedies also support such an approach. One equity judge and
scholar explains how the private purpose of unclean hands assists in
the maxim's application: "One way of testing for the application of
the maxim is to consider whether the right the claimant seeks is one
which, if protected, would allow the claimant to take advantage of
their own wrong."411 In analyzing the purpose of court protection,
the scholarship demonstrates that courts can consider the defense
along a four-part continuum to aid in its application.412
Scholars also agree that unclean hands should be analyzed in light
of the purposes and policies of the areas of law to which it
intervenes.4 13 In considering unclean hands in statutory actions,
Dobbs suggested that courts should consider the public policy of the
legislation.41 4 To aid analysis, Chafee advised courts assessing unclean
hands to be more concerned with the subject and its policies than
with morality and ethics.415 Citing "patent infringement" as one

408. See, e.g., Precision, 324 U.S. at 819-20 (affirming the trial court's finding of
unclean hands); see also Rude v. Buchhalter, 286 U.S. 451 (1932) (affirming the
district court's decision not to dismiss for unclean hands).
409. See Anenson, TreatingEquity like Law, supra note 13, at 508 (commenting that
the defense has "served as a significant safety valve in equity cases for more than two
hundred years" and arguing that the rule of relatedness provides a reasonable
prescription for the application of the defense); see also Recent Case Comment,
Iniquity of One PlaintiffBars A11 48 W. VA. L.Q. 172, 173 (1942) (discussing unclean
hands as a factor to be considered in the exercise ofjudicial discretion).
410. See Anenson, Beyond Chafee, supra note 14, at 543 (directing courts to be
sensitive to whether the application of the defense is consistent with its purposes and
does not otherwise defeat the purposes of the asserted claim).
411. YOUNGETAL., supra note 181, at 182.
412. See Anenson, Beyond Chafee, supra note 14, at 542-57 (outlining the four-part
continuum). While the paradigm was directed to courts considering the fusion of
unclean hands in cases seeking legal relief, the construct is instructive in ascertaining
the connection component as well. See id.
413. Professor (now judge) Finn reached the same conclusion examining
equitable doctrines and rules in the private law of contract and tort. See Finn, supra
note 306, at 41, 44. See generally Birks, supra note 327, at 3 (explaining that Judge
Finn, along with Australian Justices Meagher, Gummow, and Lehane, are "widely
acknowledged to be among the greatest masters of equity in the modem world").
414. SeeDOBBS, supra note 11, § 2.4(2), at 72.
415. See Chafee I, supra note 11, at 887 ("[D]ecisions have to be shaped by the
special requirements of the subject and not merely by ethics."); see also id. at 892
(advising of the great advantage of inducing a more critical exam of the various
policies, ethical or otherwise, which ought to govern the case).
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example, Chafee concluded that unclean hands should be shaped by
the subject matter of the litigation.416
Chafee's advice that the unclean-hands doctrine should operate
within the parameters and goals of the right asserted is consistent
with Story's instruction that equity, as a method of statutory
construction, requires courts to discern the meaning of the statutes in
light of their purposes.4 17 Indeed, the Supreme Court regards
unclean hands and other equitable maxims as "rules of construction"
that facilitate their fusion in legislation.4 1
It follows that courts
applying a theory of equitable origin, like the doctrine of unclean
hands, within a statutory framework should also consider legislative
aims.419 The most recent Supreme Court decisions applying the
42 °
doctrine of unclean hands in federal statutes support this view.
Hence, be it private-law adjudication or public-law regulation, courts
apply the unclean-hands doctrine in light of its own objectives as well
as the objectives of the claim or right at issue.
The twin-prong analysis to direct judicial discretion makes sense
from a jurisprudential perspective as well. Scholars advise that theory
416. See id. at 887, 905. In a later era, Douglas Laycock reached the same
conclusion. See LAYCOCK, supra note 11, at 933 (unclean hands is part of patent law).
Examining several intellectual property cases, Chafee found decisions that
overemphasized ethics to the exclusion of other policies yielded absurd results. See
Chafee II, supra note 11, at 1068-69.
417. See 1 STORY, supra note 162, §§ 6-8, at 193-97; see also Pound, supra note 164,
at 383-84 (urging for a liberal construction of statutes in light of their policies to give
effect to legislative intent and further legislative power and its superiority over judgemade law in contrast to strict construction viewed asjudicial usurpation of power).
418. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 287-89 (1956); see also
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 31, § 24 (indicating that maxims of equity are "memory
aids" because principles to exercise discretion); YOUNG ET AL., supra note 181, at 158
(describing equitable maxims as "broad statements of policy and principle, rather
than anything in the nature of fixed rules").
419. See, e.g., Thomas Geu, et al., To Be or Not To Be Exclusive: Statutory Construction
of the Charging Order in the Single Member LLC, 9 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 83, 94
(2010) (codifying a charging order derived from equity and justified by equitable
interpretation according to the policies of the statute). Blackstone described equity
as the "soul" of the law. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 222 (4th ed. 1876) ("Equity, in its true and genuine meaning, is the soul
and spirit of all law; positive law is construed, and rational law is made, by it."). This
comports with Maitland's justification of equitable intervention on the grounds that
equity came not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it. See, e.g., EATON, supra note 160, at
47 ("Where legal rights are considered in a court of equity, the general rules and
policy of the law must be obeyed."). Another ancient maxim that "equity follows the
law" reminds us that law without equity may have been "barbarous, unjust, absurd,"
Laycock, supra note note 182, at 67, but equity without the law would have been a
"castle in the air." 1 FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 19 (2d ed. 1936).
420. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361 (1995); see
also 30A C.J.S. Equity § 99 (1965) (citing state and federal cases evidencing that courts
applying equitable principles take notice of public policy and conform to it);
DONALDJ. WOLFEJR. & MICHAEL A. P1TITENGER, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE
IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 11.07 [d] (2013) (listing cases).
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development in law must pay attention to both the particular
contexts of specific doctrinal questions and the motivating principles
and policies underlying its resolution.4 21 Allowing for a "law of lawful
discretion" by framing the inquiry for the district court is not
inconsistent with the rule of law.4 22 On the contrary, the two-tiered
analysis is a way of harmonizing the law.4 23 It is perhaps what
professor Stephen Burbank meant when he reflected on the
interdependence of law and equity and recommended that courts
adopt a balanced approach to tradition. 24 The remarkable duality
found in equitable principles ensures they are grounded in the past,
while simultaneously looking to the future.
1. Proceduralbounds
The very act of reason-giving in reaching a discretionary judgment
can also help clarify the law and foster consistency in decision
making.4 25 As such, accounting for the defense's traditional elements
and purposes, as well as the purposes of the claim, provides
procedural bounds.426

421. Hanoch Dagan, Just and Unjust Enrichments 17 n.53 (Tel Aviv Univ. Law
Faculty
Papers,
Paper
No.
87,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssr.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1146425.
422.

Id. at 24 (citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmONS: DECIDING

(1960)) (articulating a "Law of Lawful Discretion"); Greenawalt, supra note
121, at 361 (endorsing discretion and finding bounds discernible and effective).
423. Law and equity have been borrowing from each other for centuries. See, e.g.,
Keith Mason, Fusion: Fallacy, Future or Finished?, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra

APPEALS

note 160, at 41 (noting how statutory enactments are subject to the judicial method).
424. Professor Burbank is the David Berger Professor for the Administration of
Justice at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. His expertise includes civil
procedure, complex litigation, and judicial administration. He explained:
We have been fortunate that our system has included, most of the time and
in most American jurisdictions, both law and equity, each of which requires
the other and both of which, in combination, have helped us over more than
two hundred years to make social and economic progress. That progress has
often not come easily, and there is much of it still to be made.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on
FederalJudicialPower-A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1291, 1346 (2000).
425. See Cravens, supra note 17, at 955 (advocating for clear discretionary
standards across substantive areas and for a workable meaning of its abuse given the
importance of discretion in judicial decision making and the definition of the
judicial role); see also WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 63 (2002)
("The disclosure of the true reasons for a decision performs a valuable function: the
state premises of the law will over time be empirically tested."); Frederick Schauer, Do
Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 883, 889-90 (2006) (discussing how the
reasons for rules announced in decisions may have normative weight and constrain
future decisions).
426. Cravens, supra note 17, at 955-56 (discussing the benefits of such procedural
bounds in the law of remedies).
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The idea of procedural bounds for decision making is neither new,
nor unique. 27 The Supreme Court's equity jurisprudence has
fluctuated over time,4 28 but one of its earliest decisions on unclean
hands cautioned against an "unlimited and undefined discretion to
dismiss. 4 29 During the Founding Era, ChiefJustice Marshall declared
that discretion is not left to a court's "inclination, but to its judgment;
and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles. '4 ° The
Court has expressed the same sentiment in more modern
decisions.4"' In fact, the Supreme Court's patent and non-patent
decisions involving equitable remedies reinforce the boundaries of
judgment for the district court, rather than removing them
altogether.43 2 The Court has acknowledged the exercise of equitable
discretion, albeit within a more structured framework of legal
analysis.433 The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit in eBay
for failing to provide the district court with the historic discretion
that accompanies decisions involving equitable remedies.4"4
Nevertheless, the majority in Therasense actually cited eBay in
support of its newly defined elements of inequitable conduct,
presumably because the Supreme Court consolidated precedents and

427. Id. at 981 (candor regarding discretion is important for a positive public view
of the judiciary); accord RIcHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM

204-07 (1985) (discussing the value of candor in the judicial process).
428. John R. Kro ger, upeme Court Equity, 1789--1835, and the History of American
Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REv. 1425, 1438 (1998) (concluding there were conflicting views
to equity
a theoretical
of equity
for stating
era and
that an guide
American
judge
Blackstone
Kamestheorfounding
looking to during
lawyeradjudication
or
adjudication would find no single, clear approach.).

"Instead, he would find two

contradictory conceptions-opposing
the need for choice." Id.
429. Clarke v. White, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 178, 193 (1838). Cf Keystone Driller Co. v.
Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 246 (1933) (advocating the "free and just" exercise

of discretion); Deweese v. Reinhard, 165 U.S. 386, 390 (1897) ("[T]he conduct of

the plaintiff be offensive to the dictates of natural justice.").
430.

431.

(Marshall, C.J.).
30, 35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.the
Court explained that discretionary choices

In AlbemarlePaperCo. v. Moody,

are not "unfettered by meaningful standards." 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975). Again in
Martin v. Franklin Capital ,Corp., the Supreme Court reinforced the notion that

'[dl iscretion is not a w(him.
432.

546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005).

32 (2008)
555 serious
U.S. 7,attention
Def. Council,
See, e.g, Winter v. Natural Res.
to
to give
court failedInc.,
district

(reversing an injunction because the
the balance of equities and public interest).
433. See Fischer, supra note 18, at 575 (noting that the Supreme Court remains
committed to the traditional approach to equitable remedies, even in the face of
statutory rights).
434. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see also
Cravens, supra note 17, at 982 (characterizing the eBay decision as underscoring "the
need for the exercise of true judgment"). As discussed above, supa Part, the Federal
Circuit created a presumption in favor of an injunction and reversed district courts
that applied the opposite presumption against it. The Supreme Court then
determined that both courts erred because equitable remedies entail discretion.
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provided a four-part test for permanent injunctions.4 35 Although
scholars have criticized the Supreme Court for going too far in its
attempt to clarify remedial law, the Supreme Court's decision in eBay
retained and reinforced lower court discretion to determine the facts
and circumstances in light of enumerated factors.436 The existing
elements of the unclean-hands doctrine, while discretionary, similarly
provide mandatory reasoning requirements.
Such procedural bounds are prevalent not only in equitable
remedies and the defenses of unclean hands and laches, but also in
other discretionary defenses such as fraud on the court,437 illegality,438
and the various estoppels. 439 These bonds delimit discretion while
simultaneously appreciating its necessity in both equity and in law.44 °
A proper methodology, plausibly explained, will equally provide the
requisite degree of reliability for inequitable-conduct law.441
2.

Other defenses

A more restrictive inequitable-conduct defense may additionally be
achieved by segregating some of the factual circumstances that would
amount to inequitable conduct to other narrower, or at least
different, equitable or common law defenses. While courts do not
435. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1293 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc).
436. See, e.g.,
Laycock, supra note 16, at 4 & n.5 (citing Rendleman, supra note 17)
(calling the eBay decision "startling" and asserting that the Court should have treated
the reasons for injunctive relief as affirmative defenses); Rendleman, supra note 17,
at 85-90 (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in eBay for creating the equitable
"tradition" for the first time).
437. Fraud on the court is one such defense derived from the Supreme Court's
inequitable-conduct decision in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S.
238, 239 (1943). Accord Stern, supra note 119, at 1253 (summarizing the multi-factor
analysis to exercise discretion).
438. Treatise authors often include cases that involve illegality within the concept
of unclean hands. A recurring issue in illegality cases is the competence of the court
in finding a violation. Furthermore, a common question that cuts against the
application of the defense is whether a civil case is the proper forum for determining
criminal guilt. See Chafee I, supra note 11, at 905. In patent litigation, however,
the Federal Circuit initially lowered the standard for materiality and intent
because a court can more easily determine an inequitable-conduct defense than
it can the more technical patent issues involved in invalidity. See O'Connor, supra
note 27, at 344.
439. Various estoppels are related equitable defenses that are similarly defined by
elements. See infra Part III.B.2.
440. See Cravens, supra note 17, at 983 (reviewing remedial discretion and
concluding that procedural rather than substantive bounds are the most practically
useful to constrain both the original discretion determinations and the appellate
review of those determinations); see also id. at 975 (commenting that injunctive relief
procedural factors are vague, or "loose," with the judge who makes normative
decisions about competing values).
441. Cf id. at 994-95 (recommending mandatory methodology and reasoning
requirements for discretion to create a robust and reliable meaning).
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have a great track record for distinguishing equitable defenses, most
have not been studied systematically in the last fifty years.442 Renewed
discussion and awareness should improve judicial reasoning. The
equitable defense of estoppel is, perhaps, the closest analog to the
doctrines of unclean hands and inequitable conduct. 443
The
liberalization of estoppel by way of a relaxed intent and the removal
444
of reliance in certain jurisdictions move it closer still.
445
A narrower version of equitable estoppel is judicial estoppel.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a litigant from taking a
position inconsistent with one she successfully and unequivocally
asserted in a prior judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. 446 As an
equitable doctrine, the Supreme Court has cautioned against
inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula." 7 Nevertheless, a
successful claim for judicial estoppel typically has two parts: 1) a
showing that the adverse party took a contrary position under oath in
another proceeding and 2) that the court accepted that earlier
position. 44 ' The purposes of judicial estoppel, like those of the
442. The concepts of estoppel and unclean hands are distinct, although they can
coalesce and are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., Tangwall v. Looby, 109 Fed.
Appx. 12, 15 (6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal for judicial estoppel
and noting that "[o]ne of the fundamental principles of equity jurisprudence is that
a plaintiff "must come into court with clean hands" and "must be frank and fair with
the court" (quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244
(1933))); In re Estate of Richardson, 903 So. 2d 51, 55-56 (Miss. 2005) (finding that
the doctrines of unclean hands, equitable estoppel, and judicial estoppel

alternatively apply to preclude inconsistent positions during litigation).
443. The doctrine of unclean hands is broader than that of estoppel. See R. H.
Steams Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1934) (explaining that "the
disability has its roots in a principle more nearly ultimate than either waiver or
estoppel, the principle that no one shall be permitted to found any claim upon his
own inequity or take advantage of their own wrong").

444. See Anenson, Role of Equity, supra note 14, at 28-29; T. Leigh Anenson, The
Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 377, 398-401
(2008) [hereinafter Anenson, Triumph of Equity]; see also Simmons v. Burlington, 159
U.S. 278, 291 (1895) (finding that while the facts were not actionable as an estoppel
on the rights of property or contract, they produced a quasi-estoppel on the remedy
justifying its decision on the ground of unclean hands).
445. Anenson, Triumph of Equity, supra note 444, at 402-03; see New Hampshire v.
Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) (recognizing both types of estoppel). Additionally,
courts regularly apply equitable and judicial estoppel to both legal and equitable
relief. See Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 78 (1880) (adopting equitable estoppel into
the common law and declaring that "there would seem no reason why its application
should be restricted in courts of law").
446. Teledyne Indus., v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1217 (6th Cir. 1990). For a
summary of the application of judicial estoppel premised on prior administrative
decisions, see T. Scott Belden, Judicial Estoppel in Civil Actions Arising from
Representationor Conduct in PriorAdministrative Proceeding,99 A.L.R.5th 65 (2002).
447. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750-51; see Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S.
Ct. 1237, 1249 (2010) (noting inconsistencies to the parties' submissions yet
declining to applyjudicial estoppel).
448. See Reynolds v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1988) (analyzing the
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unclean-hands doctrine, are to prevent a private advantage and to
protect judicial integrity.449 Unlike the doctrine of unclean hands,
however, both estoppel theories require an inconsistency.450
Therefore, the contradictory conduct of the patentee in
Therasens--and numerous other cases involving inconsistencies in
disclosure to the Patent Office that violated its administrative rule of
disclosure--could be reevaluated as an estoppel.45 1
3.

The value of precedent
The district courts' discretion will not only be contained by the
dual-purposes analysis, but also moderated by precedent. Once the
discretionary standards are established, a body of past decisions will
develop on similar questions to provide consensus in particularized
settings or on certain discrete issues.45 2 Chafee examined a total of
eighteen different groups of cases that consider the doctrine of
unclean hands, and he concluded that each case should be decided
within the orbit of the transaction and the surrounding facts.453 In
his studies of the defense, Chafee determined that "this vague single
principle gets most of its qualities in a given group of cases from the
As a result, the
substantive law of the particular subject." 454
accumulated legacy of court work will provide guidance in the nature
effect of inconsistent positions regarding tax liability in a bankruptcy proceeding).
449. See Teledyne Indus., 911 F.2d at 1218 (observing that the requirement of prior
judicial acceptance protects the truth-seeking function of the court, while preserving
the court's integrity" to prevent "a party from abusing the judicial process through
cynical gamesmanship, achieving success on one position, then arguing the opposite
to suit an exigency of the moment").
450. See Anenson, Beyond Chafee, supra note 14, at 511 nn.260-63 (comparing the
doctrines of unclean hands, judicial estoppel, and equitable estoppel); Anenson, Role
of Equity, supra note 14, at 51-52; Anenson, Triumph of Equity, supra note 444, at
402-03.
451. See Monica A. De La Paz, Inequitable Conduct: Overview and Current Concepts,
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Feb. 2010, at 12, 13-16 (outlining cases of inequitable
conduct premised on inconsistent conduct); see also Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. HartfordEmpire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944) (estopping the patentee from arguing
withheld information was irrelevant given his attorney's belief that the information
was material).
452. See GLOVER, supra note 161, § 1.6 ("Factual analogies and resemblances play a
large part in equitable method."); Anenson, From Theory to Practice,supra note 124, at
643-51 (illustrating the phenomena of standards moving to rules in cases
considering the equitable defense of estoppel); Cravens, supra note 17, at 956
(discussing how decisions on equitable remedies may be habit forming in terms of
the kind of judgment a court exercises); see also Emily Sherwin, Judges As Rulemakers,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 919 (2006) (proposing that the use of precedent and
analogical reasoning broadens perspective and leads to better assessments of
potential consequences).
453. See Chafee I, supranote 11, at 887.
454. Chafee II, supra note 11, at 1092; see Chafee I, supra note 11, at 878
(concluding that unclean hands "is really a bundle of rules relating to quite diverse
subjects").
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of Llewellyn's "situation sense" for the district courts to conduct a
contextual normative inquiry.4 55 In its inequitable-conduct decisions,
for instance, the Supreme Court used factually analogous uncleanhands cases dealing with the acquisition of a right rather than its
misuse.456
Moreover, whether the Supreme Court in eBay misunderstood the
historical operation of equitable remedies,4 57 the decision does
evidence the Court's concern that like cases should be treated
alike.4 58 Equitable issues have been subject to precedent since the
eighteenth century.459 While federal and state courts have intimated
455.

See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 167 (1960) (describing

the common law process of creating law through the groupings of transaction-types
or situation-sense). A series of early cases that the Supreme Court decided also
indicates that a showing of unclean hands does not prevent a litigant from
challenging the constitutionality of a law, even if the party allegedly violates that law.
See Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485, 487 (1956); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 391
(1948) McFarland v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916) (denying a grant of
equitable relief); Peoria Gas & Elec. Co. v. Peoria, 200 U.S. 48, 57 (1906). California
courts have also induced a case-derived paradigm to resolve subsequent cases that
involve the doctrine of unclean hands, extending the doctrine to lawsuits where
parties seek legal and equitable relief. See Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743, 749 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Whether the particular
misconduct is a bar to the alleged claim for relief depends on (1) analogous case law,
(2) the nature of the misconduct, and (3) the relationship of the misconduct to the
claimed injuries." (citing Blain v. Doctor's Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256 (Ct. App.
1990))).
456. See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-45 (1933)
(citing contract and property cases). A contract perspective is appropriate because
courts often recognize a patent grant as a contract between the inventor and the
government. See Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592, 597-98 (3d Cir.
1972) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 816 (1945)) (recognizing that a part of the quid pro quo for the acquisition of a
patent monopoly is an insistence that the circumstances surrounding the application
be "free from fraud or other inequitable conduct"); Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent
Law in the AdministrativeState, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 134 (2000) (using contract
paradigm to explain patent privilege); Khan, supra note 219, at 491 (equating patent
grants with patent contracts).
457. See Gergen et al., supra note 16, at 204, 207-14 (lambasting eBay as a
"brusque" decision in which the Court inadvertently "revolutionized" the law of
equitable remedies).
458. In eBay, the Chief Justice and two associate justices concurred in limiting
district court discretion by legal standards to promote the principle of justice that
like cases be treated alike. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395
(2006) (Roberts, CJ., concurring) (citing Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S.
132, 139 (2005)); see also HUHN, supra note 425, at 43 (arguing that precedent
supports the stability and predictability of law as a guide to future action); Barrett,
supra note 249, at 815, 827-29 (placing precedent within federal procedural
common law).
459. See Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 F. Cas. 652, 658 (D. Mass. 1846) ("Precedents are to
govern conscience in chancery as well as at law."); 1 STORY, supra note 46, § 18, at 18
(asserting that the system of equity is bound by precedent); W.H.D. Winder, Precedent
in Equity, 57 L.Q. REV. 245, 247 (1941) ("Before the opening of the eighteenth
century precedent was rapidly superseding conscience as the foundation of practical
equity.").
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otherwise on certain occasions,46 it is axiomatic that the principle of
stare decisis is alive and well in the tradition of equity in America.4 6'
Therefore, despite the Federal Circuit arresting the natural
development of inequitable conduct to date, what constitutes a
showing of unclean hands in the prosecution of a patent is not so
vague as to negate the further development of meaningful standards
of decision making.462
Relatedly, the traditional equitable approach tracks Supreme Court
jurisprudence by squaring the remedial defense of unclean hands
across subject areas. 463 These transubstantive principles should, in
turn, restrain judicial decision making.4 " From modest beginnings in
ancient equity cases,465 the defense now applies in modern state and
federal court litigation.46 6 The defense's coverage extends to entire
categories of private law and to an ever-broadening range of statutory
actions.46 7 In fact, relying primarily on the Supreme Court's decision
in Precision, a number of courts no longer restrict the doctrine of
unclean hands to equitable remedies or preserve the substantive
version of the defense.4 6
460. See Anenson, From Theory to Practice,supra note 124, at 660 (noting that "there
is precedent paradoxically pronouncing there is no precedent"); see also NEWMAN,
supra note 30, at 28 ("[R]elief in the court of the Chancellor was granted according
to criteria which were not confined by rules of strict logic or by analogy to prior
decisions.").
461. See, e.g.,
Gergen et al., supra note 16, at 205 (noting that the eBay test is "the
test" for determining when a permanent injunction should issue in patent law).
462. See Smith, supra note 160, at 24-25 (discussing equity's "liability
conclusion[s]"). In response to the objection concerning equity's vague standards,
Smith observes that many equitable ideas, such as conscionability, are not tests, but
liability conclusions. Id. Such conclusions do not create unacceptable uncertainty
because they are not usually applied directly to the facts. See id. Rather, more
detailed precepts mediate between the facts and the generally worded liability
conclusion. Id. at 25. Understanding both establishes liability and also explains why.
Chafee made the same observation about the unclean-hands doctrine. See Chafee I,
supra note 11, at 892.
463. See Gergen et al., supra note 16, at 205 (noting the eBay decision's
"cataclysmic effect" in transforming equitable remedies across federal government
regulation, constitutional law, and even state tort and contract law); see also supra Part
L.A (discussing the historical approach to applying equitable relief).
464. See David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle To Replace
Balancingthe Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REv. 627, 631-32 (1988).
465. See Chafee I, supra note 11, at 878 (noting the maxim's "humble beginnings
in suits about contracts made under the influence of liquor or amorous
philandering").
466. SeeAnenson, Beyond Chafee, supranote 14, at 529-31.
467. See id. The doctrine of unclean hands even pertains to international human
rights. See, e.g., Aleksandr Shapovalov, Should a Requirement of "Clean Hands" Be a
Prerequisite to the Exercise of Diplomatic Protection? Human Rights Implications of the
InternationalLaw Commission's Debate, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 829, 830-831 (2005)
(discussing the doctrine of unclean hands as a general principle of international law
and the doctrine's applicability in cases of diplomatic protection).
468. See Anenson, Beyond Chafee, supra note 14, at 543-48 (analyzing cases that
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Concentrating on the equitable origin of the rule of law allows the
doctrine's meaning to be derived from a deeper, as well as a wider,
theoretical frame. Thus, an equitable perspective permits a weightier
analysis, drawing meaning from equity's five-hundred-year history in
addition to its operation across multiple subjects, including
intellectual property rights. 469 Returning the principle of equity to
the framework for inequitable conduct aids judicial legitimacy while
adding normative force to better enable thoughtful decision
making. 47 ° As evidenced by its present use in a multitude of cases, the
doctrine of unclean hands continues to be legally and socially
471
significant.
C. Implicationsfor Patent Law
Choosing equity, and the discretion that accompanies it, inserts
some uncertainty into patent law, however narrowly the defense is
drawn. It is true that for patents to have value, there must be a
consistent and predictable system of enforcement.47 2 It is also true
that uncertainty and inconsistency are two different vices of
discretion.47 3 But not every instance of discretion yields unacceptable
474
uncertainty and ambiguity.
1.

Patent bar
For instance, returning discretion to the district judges within the
foregoing framework is acceptable despite the fact that it may not
apply the defense to protect the litigation process); Anenson, From Theory to Practice,
supra note 124, at 639 (detailing cases applying the defense against legal remedies).
469. Law is a historical institution.
See Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency,
Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L.
REv. 573, 573 (2000) ("Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most
backward-looking, the most 'past dependent,' of the professions."). Because of its
long pedigree, equity law is particularly susceptible to historical analysis. See generally
id. ("[P]ragmaticjurisprudence must come to terms with history.").
470. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America, as reprinted in 88
COLUM. L. REv. 989, 991 (1988) (discussing the public view that judges do practical
justice); Smith, supranote 160, at 19-20, 38 ("Tradition and history are normative, in
every legal system.").
471. See CHAFEE, supra note 30, at 12 (noting the "astonishing number" of cases
decided under the doctrine of unclean hands); Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law,
supra note 13, at 459 ("Despite its containment mainly to actions in equity, cases
considering the doctrine during the present century already tally in the thousands.").
472.

See, e.g.,
H. JACKSON KNIGHT, PATENT STRATEGY FOR RESEARCHERS AND RESEARCH

MANAGERS, at xv (3d ed. 2013) (noting importance of enforcement for patent rights
to have value).
473. See Smith, supra note 160, at 24; see also CARDOZO, supra note 312, at 112
("One of the most fundamental social interests is that law shall be uniform and
impartial.").
474. See Smith, supra note 160, at 38 (discussing the relationship between equity
and law, noting that discretion is not "necessarily injustice").
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provide patent counsel with a checklist to guarantee no future
inequitable-conduct charge.475 The desire to avoid malpractice and a
possible later disqualification from the litigation is understandable.4 76
Nevertheless, lawyers, like judges, must exercise judgment. In
addition, the duty lawyers owe to the Patent Office in prosecuting an
application is no different than that owed to the bench in
litigation.47 7 Patent counsel are obligated to disclose known prior art
relevant to the application just as litigators are expected to cite
contrary controlling authority.47 8 Because the advantages of the
adversarial system do not attach to the patent prosecution process,
the patent system relies upon the observance of the duty of
disclosure.479 Inequitable conduct preserves trust in the relationship
between the agency and its constituents, providing a greater degree
475. Even given the unsettled state of inequitable-conduct law pre-Therasense,
lawyers could adequately advise their clients on how to avoid an inequitable-conduct
charge in the patent-application process by examining the factual settings. See
William F. Vobach, An Update on the Law of Inequitable Conduct in Patent Prosecution,39
COLO. LAw 39, 39-44 (2010) (citing three recent Federal Circuit cases advising how
Patent Office actions can be material); see also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson
& Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (O'Malley, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting that while patent practitioners regularly call on
this court to provide clear guidelines "when dealing with the application of equitable
rinciples and remedies, the law is imprecise by design"); Thomas, supra note 302, at
94 ("Patent lawyers prefer rules.").
476.

See Sheri Qualters, Federal Circuit Panel Overturns Inequitable Conduct Summary

Judgment, [AW.cOM (June 2, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/articlejsp?id=1202459087352
&FederalCircuitPanelOverturns_InequitableConduct SummaryJudgment&slre
turn=20130707144711 (discussing Leviton Manufacturing's lawsuit against its own
lawyers for malpractice after a District of Maryland summary judgment ruling in
Leviton Manufacturing Co. v. Shanghai Meihao Elecric, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 670,
717, 729 (D. Md. 2009), which awarded more than $1 million in attorney fees and
costs to Shanghai because of the "inequitable conduct and vexatious litigation" of
lawyers who worked for Leviton and the Federal Circuit decision to vacate that ruling
(citing Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Greenberg Traurig LLP, No. 09 Civ. 8083(GBD)(THK),
2010 WL 4983183 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010)); see also Christopher A. Cotropia,
Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine,24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723,766
(2009) (discussing the personal consequences of inequitable conduct on patent
counsel). Attorneys have also expressed concern that an allegation of inequitable
conduct may deter settlement because such a charge implies turpitude and causes
removal of counsel from the case. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849
F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[C]harging inequitable conduct in almost every
major patent case ... destroy[s] the respect for one another's integrity, for being
fellow members of an honorable profession, that used to make the bar a valuable
help to the courts in making a sound disposition of their cases, and to sustain the
good name of the bar itself.").
477. See, e.g.,
Goldman, supra note 23, at 95 (lamenting conflicting duties to client
and Patent Office).
478. For instance, "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly... fail to disclose to the
tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be
directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel" or
"fail to correct a false statement of materialfact or law previously made to the tribunal
by the lawyer." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2012) (emphasis added).
479. See ADELMAN ETAL., supra note 26, at 735.
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of predictability in these interactions.4 ° Inventors satisfy their
obligations to come to the Patent Office with clean hands by
submitting information regarding patentability that is reasonable and
in good faith in the same way that directors and officers fulfill their
fiduciary duties in corporate relations.8 1
2. Rules and standards
Moreover, the Therasensemajority's new move to limit the elements
of inequitable conduct may not cure concerns with the defense. Its
requirement of a stricter intent and but-for materiality may work to
provide more certainty for patentees and their attorneys. Yet it will
likely fail to provide an enforceable duty in the patent-application
process and encourage cheating to obtain a patent monopoly by
those who have not earned it.482 As a result, to the extent that its
former standard for inequitable conduct was over-inclusive and
devalued the patent, its new rule-based precept will likely be underinclusive.4 3 Returning discretion to the district courts to discern
legitimate from frivolous pleadings of inequitable conduct will not be
hopelessly abstract and should eliminate uncertainty at the appellate
level.48 4 It should be emphasized that the majority recognized that a

480. Because patent examiners depend on patentees and their counsel to
adequately disclose prior art, the relationship between the Patent Office and the bar
is akin to a fiduciary relationship. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The
Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1045, 1048 (1991) (discussing the appropriation-incentive model as a form of
fiduciary relationship).
481. See Anenson & Mayer, supra note 215, at 969-71 (reviewing fiduciary duty
law). The abuse of fiduciary and other confidential relations is one area of equitable
intervention that historically falls under the head of constructive fraud. See id. at 963.
Moreover, breaching a fiduciary duty can amount to a finding of unclean hands. See
e.g., Jackson Law Office, P.C. v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15, 27 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
(applying the doctrine of unclean hands even in the absence of proof that the
attorney's client suffered injury).
482. See Cotter, supra note 6, at 738-39 (noting that defenders of inequitable
conduct argue that the defense "deters misconduct and thus contributes to the
integrity to patent prosecution and enforcement"); Lisa A. Dolak, Inequitable Conduct:
A Flawed Doctrine Worth Saving, 11 WAKE FoREsTJ. Bus. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 7 (2010)
(explaining that the defense of inequitable conduct can potentially mitigate
questions of patent quality); see also Benjamin Brown, Comment, Inequitable Conduct:
A Standard in Motion, 19 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 593, 616-17

(reviewing Congressional testimony favoring the retention of inequitable conduct).
483. See Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitations and the
Doctrine of Laches, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 918 (discussing potential differences in
outcomes given the form of the legal precept as a rule or standard). Legal precepts
can also vary between rules and standards. SeeJames G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of
Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 773, 773 (1995)
(describing various forms of legal commands, such as multi-factor and totality of the
circumstances tests).
484. See supraPart III.A.
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remedy "should be commensurate with the violation. 4 85 The
standards found in traditional unclean-hands analysis, and not the
Therasense rules, will better ensure that goal.486 In an English equity
opinion approved by Chief Justice Marshall, Lord Chancellor Eldon
declared, "The Rule is clear enough: but the application in each
particular case must depend on the discretion of the Judge. '487
Furthermore, scholarship that analyzes equitable remedies attests
to the impossibility of achieving absolute certainty.488 Given the
importance of particularized findings of facts and circumstances,
attempts to quantify discretion for equitable remedies have been
ineffective.48 9 Patent remedies and remedial defenses fit this model
of decision making.490 Human diversity has been equity's lock and
stock as well as its raison de etre. Guidance in application, rather than
continual re-interpretation, is more appropriate for lower court
instruction. A typical form of appellate direction is to provide for its
invocation only with prudence,49' reluctance,492 or in the exceptional
case.

493

485. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc) (citing Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979)).
486. See generally Thomas, supra note 302, at 799 (concluding that standards rather
than rules would offer courts more flexibility to best achieve the goals of the patent
system); see also MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 656-57 (7th Cir.
2000) (explaining that the choice between rules and standards depends on the
question asked).
487. Mortluck v. Buller, (1804) 32 Eng. Rep. 857, 862; see Cathcart v. Robinson, 30
U.S. (5 Pet) 264, 276 (1831) (citing Mortluck with approval in a discussion of clean
hands as a condition of equitable relief).
488. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, The Standardfor PreliminaryInjunctions, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 525, 525-26, 565-66 (1978) (explaining that authorities may apply the standard
thoughtlessly and inconsistently, without an articulated rationale).
489. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (adopting the paradigm for preliminary injunctions proffered
in Leubsdorf, supra note 488, albeit quantifying the formula); see also Smith, supra
note 160, at 38 (noting the impossibility of making the law absolutely certain in
advance).
490. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1298-99 (O'Malley, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (rejecting the majority's but-for test for materiality because of "the
Supreme Court's recognition that courts of equity 'exercise judgment in light of
prior precedent, but with awareness of the fact that specific circumstances, often
hard to predict in advance, could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case"'
(quoting Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010))); see also Fischer, supra
note 18, at 563-64 (discussing the different contexts for seeking injunctive relief in
patent litigation and how one business model does not necessary provide insight into
whether it will be granted).
491. See, e.g., Milford Power Co. v. PDC Milford Power, LLC, 866 A.2d 738, 748
(Del. Ch. 2004).
492. See, e.g., Farmer's Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. Farmers Educ. & Coop.
Union of Am., 141 F. Supp. 820, 824 (S.D. Iowa 1956), affd sub nom. Stovers v.
Farmers' Educ. & Coop. Union of Am., 250 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1958).
493. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143, 145 (1920) (finding
that unclean hands is "scrutinized with a critical eye"). Certain jurisdictions have
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In any event, restrictive elements will not necessarily eliminate
problems with clarity and consistency.494 The Federal Circuit's
experience with inequitable conduct demonstrates that attempting to
achieve
certainty
in
an
area inherently
uncertain
is
counterproductive.49 5 Courts cannot solve social problems with a
scientific formula. Even if they could, there are corresponding values
of fairness and justice that require attention. 49 6 The majority in
Therasense understood that inequitable conduct "hinges on basic
fairness" due to its equitable origins;497 thus, there is always the risk of
over-circumscribing discretion.49 The harmful consequences extend
beyond the parties in any given case to the law itself.499 The resilience
of equity, especially within patent law, allows for legitimate legal
change.0 0 The statutory law of patents, even as amended with
additional requirements and duties since the Supreme Court's
noted that the doctrine of unclean hands is not favored. See, e.g., Schivarelli v. Chi.
Transit Auth., 823 N.E.2d 158, 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) ("The application of the
unclean doctrine has not been favored by the [Illinois] courts."); Foursquare
Tabernacle Church of God in Christ v. Dep't of Metro. Dev. of the Consol. City of
Indianapolis, 630 N.E.2d 1381, 1385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) ("The doctrine is not
favored by the courts and is applied with reluctance and scrutiny."); Butler v. Butler,
114 N.W.2d 595, 619 (Iowa 1962) (same).
494. See Camilla E. Watson, Equitable Recoupment: Revisiting An Old and Inconsistent
Remedy, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 691, 787-88 (1996) (analyzing doctrinal development in
the defense of equitable recoupment in federal tax law and showing how a narrow
construction can produce inconsistent results).
495. See supra Parts II-III.A; see also Thomas, supra note 302, at 797 (discussing the
Federal Circuit's preference for rules and concluding that "given what history
teaches about the workings of the Federal Circuit, serious doubt should remain over
whether the benefits of predictability and certainty can practically be achieved").
496. See, e.g., Edward Yorio, A Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201,
1225-26 (1990) (noting flexibility and fairness benefits of equitable defenses); see also
L.A. SHERIDAN & GEORGE W. KEETON, THE NATURE OF EQUITY 2 (3d ed. 1985)
(discussing the opposing virtues of certainty and justice).
497. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc).
498. See, e.g., KENNETH CuLP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARYJUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
107 (1969) ("Turning all discretion into law would destroy the individualizing
element of equity and of discretion."); MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 111, at 451-54
(noting that one of the reasons jurists resist the fusing equity into the law is that they
are fearful that modern equity will lose its inherent flexibility and capacity to adjust
to new situations).
499. See generally P.S. Atiyah, From Principlesto Pragmatism: Changes in the Functionof
theJudicialProcess and the Law, 65 lowAL. REv. 1249, 1251-59 (1980) (describing how
English equity and the common law lost flexibility in the nineteenth century followed
by a resurgence of discretion after the merger of law and equity in the twentieth
century); John L. Garvey, Some Aspects of the Merger of Law and Equity, 10 CATH. U. L.
REv. 59, 63 (1961) (criticizing the period when "equity became just as legal, just as
strict, as the common-law itself').
500. See Goldman, supra note 23, at 97 (stating that the rubrics of inequitable
conduct are sufficiently broad to allow growth and change over time); see also
Anenson & Mayer, supra note 215, at 978-79 ("[I]t was the flexibility and
discretionary nature of equity that allowed courts to incorporate ethical standards of
business into the law in a way that reflected prevailing social norms.").
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original equitable incursion, is not so perfect that it is no longer in
need of equitable intervention. 5 1
3.

Structuralconcerns
Literature reviewing the American patent system attributes its
success to the judicial balancing of remedial interests.5 2 Courts were
not a substitute, but a valuable and complementary part of patent
law's development.0 3
Scholarship in the patent field has recently asserted that federal
courts should continue their critical role. Professors Burk and
Lemley, in their influential article and subsequent book, argue that
more, not less, judicial discretion and judge-made doctrines are
necessary to account for the pace of technological change.0 4 They
posit that the brevity of the patent statute equips courts with
discretion via a series of doctrinal "policy levers." 55 The professors
discuss a non-exhaustive list of existing doctrines used to tailor patent
law to particular industries or technologies.0 6 They show how courts
have mapped theory to industry characteristics in a way that accounts
for the differences in the economics of innovation in areas of patent
acquisition and validity, patent scope, and patent remedies.5 7 As
such, the professors' thesis is that patent law already applies different
legal regimes in different contexts, albeit implicitly, and perhaps
imperfectly, and that courts, rather than the Patent Office or
Congress, are best able to accommodate the rapid pace of
501. See Dolak, supra note 482, at 12-25 (discussing the value of the inequitableconduct doctrine); Steve Hedley, Rival Taxonomies Within Obligations: Is There a
Problem?, in EQuITY INCOMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 160, at 77, (noting that, although

flawed, the equitable method is still useful and indeed vital to the law).
502. Khan, supra note 219, at 484, 491, 495, 525-29; see alsoJames Barr Ames, Law
& Morals, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97, 108 (1908) (asserting that discretion in shaping
equitable remedies made English and American law more perfect than other
countries).
503. See Khan, supra note 219, at 484 (stating that the U.S. patent system was
distinguished by the central role of the law and courts); see also CARDOZO, supra note
312, at 62 ("[T]he great inventions that embodied the power of steam and electricity,
the railroad and the steamship, the telegraph and the telephone, have built up new
customs and new law."); Khan, supranote 219, at 527 (discussing the legislative lag in
addressing issues raised by technological change).
504. See BuRK & LEMLEY, supra note 10, at 95; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 1638-41 (2003); see also BLAIR & COTrER,
supra note 9, at 131 (commenting that the "precise way in which U.S. law operates
leaves much to be desired, in that it is both overinclusive... and underinclusive").
505. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 10, at 109 (discussing policy levers and how
they "tailor the unitary patent system to the more complex realities of the world").
506. See id. at 109-30 (providing brief descriptions for a dozen policy levers that
courts use to differentiate patent law in different industries).
507. See id. at 92, 109-30 (examining how courts treat some industries differently,
particularly the biotechnology and software fields).
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technology.5 8 Although Burk and Lemley did not address the
doctrine of inequitable conduct,5 0 9 their research and insights are
instructive. The proposed paradigm enables the same kind of careful
fine-tuning for a successfully functioning patent system that only the
judiciary can provide. 10
Patent scholars sorting out the role of remedies also agree that
flexibility is key, provided there are guidelines. Patent remedies have
emerged from obscurity to obtain celebrity status, or at least a
"prominent supporting role in the legal system." 1' Identical to the
function of remedies outside of patent law, 12 patent scholars espouse
that remedies for intellectual property law violations should support
the right.513 As a result, given the patent community's adherence to
an instrumental view of patent law,514 patent remedies should
preserve the incentive scheme embodied in the substantive law, and
courts should attempt to replicate the balance that the substantive
law strikes.515
Recognizing that it is not possible to craft a body of remedies law
that would optimally achieve many of the conflicting goals of the
patent system, Professor Golden outlines five principles of patent
remedies that account for the inevitable uncertainty of the law and

508. See id. at 99 (discussing the failure of industry-specific statutes because of the
pace of technological change and citing GUIDO CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE

AGE OF STATUTES (1982), which identified statutory obolescense); see also id. at 5, 99,
106-07, 167-68.
509. See id. at 109 (acknowledging that policy levers are not the only source of
judicial discretion and that the doctrine of inequitable conduct is "one of the largest
judicially created doctrines in patent law").
510. See generallyJohnR. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, EmpiricalEvidenceon the Validity
of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 189 (1998) (indicating that the patent
prosecution process varies by industry).
511. Cotter, supra note 10, at 135 ("As patent remedies continue to emerge from
obscurity to, if not center stage, at least a prominent supporting role in the legal
system."); see also KNIGHT, supra note 472, at xv (asserting that intellectual property
has taken "center stage around the world"); Golden, supra note 10, at 506-08
(explaining that patent remedies have gone from obscurity to prominence due in
part to Supreme Court case law).
512. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 12, at 86 ("A plaintiffs remedy should advance the
policies of the substantive law it is based on.").
513. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 10, at 131 (concluding that "the assumption that
remedies should be ancillary to substance seems more defensible than any other
alternative").
514. See BLAR & COTTER, supra note 9, at 13-23; Cotter, supra note 10, at 126
("Most patent scholars adhere to an instrumental view of patent law (patent law as a
means to an end), and there is general consensus that the ends include invention,
disclosure, and innovation (meaning generally the commercialization of an inventive
principle, as distinct from invention itself).").
515. See Cotter, supra note 10, at 126, 130-31 ("[C]ourts should preserve (but not
enhance) the incentive scheme embodied in the substantive law, even if the
incentive scheme is flawed.").
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the institutional constraints of the courts. 6 These metaprinciples do
not provide an incontestable determinative answer, but operate as
signposts by which the district court can better exercise its
discretion. 17
They include nonabsolutism, antidiscrimination,
learning, administrability, and devolution, ultimately corroborating a
traditional inequitable-conduct construct.1
As Golden explains, "nonabsolutism" means that the court should
rules.5 19
se
per
rigid,
adopting
about
cautious
be
"Antidiscrimination" is the idea that courts should not favor one
business model over another. 2 "Learning" is the view that the law
should induce
the production of useful information.52
"Administrability" is the thought that the law should facilitate
appellate review. 22 "Devolution" is the notion that the law should
leave the decision to those closest to the facts. 23
Professor Cotter calls Golden's approach to patent remedies
"practical reason" because it attempts rationality in the face of
uncertainty.5 24
Golden's practical-reason principles for patent
remedies substantiate the traditional framework for the equitable
defense of inequitable conduct. First, an adaptive equitable analysis
for inequitable conduct enables nonabsolutism, rather than dogmatic
and draconian rules. Second, the flexibility of the unclean-hands
516. See Golden, supra note 10, at 513, 527, 563-64 (asserting that the purpose of
the proposed analysis "is to provide a deliberative framework for reasoned decision
making that is attentive to the public interest"); see also Cotter, supra note 10
(praising Professor Golden's framework and commenting that it has emerged as a
source of light in the patent system debate).
517. Golden explains that "[a]lthough the metaprinciple [of utilitarianism] can
provide a background value system that can inform ultimate judgments about how to
resolve conflicts between the principles, it presumptively cannot provide a broadly
incontestable, determinate answer." Golden, supra note 10, at 571. Professor Cotter
found Golden's principles congenial to his own approach. See, e.g., Cotter,
supra note 10, at 126 (opining that while Golden lacked confidence, his
recommended principles were likely to result in "a more rational, better
functioning [patent] system").
518. See Golden, supra note 10, at 551-91 (offering three principles for the
adaptive development of patent remedies-nonabsolutism, antidiscrimination, and
learning-and two principles for implementation, administrability and devolution).
519. Seeid. at 553.
520. See id. at 555.
521. See id. at 561-63 (proposing that a regime of patent remedies should
encourage parties to produce information that will improve the regime while also
leaving important decisions and responsibilities to parties with better knowledge).
522. See id. at 563.
523. See id. at 564.
524. See Cotter, supra note 10, at 128 ("To put it concisely, to live in the hope of
attaining some absolute truth derived from unshakable first principles is a fool's
game; the rules we devise to resolve our disputes and to structure our lives are
necessarily constrained by the limitations of our knowledge, the contingency
and contestability of our goals, and the need to revise and rebuild in light of
new experience.").
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doctrine analysis and its consideration of all the circumstances, aids
antidiscrimination among business models and industries. Third, it
facilitates learning by harnessing the informational advantages of the
patentee to produce relevant information to the Patent Office.
Fourth, an unclean-hands doctrine analysis effectuates the
administration of a remedy by safeguarding district-court decisions
with an abuse-of-discretion standard. Fifth, and finally, the suggested
framework eases devolution by ensuring district-court discretion to
determine the facts and policies particular to each case. Indeed,
without an understanding of their factual context and the conflicting
policies at issue, the elements of the unclean-hands doctrine are
merely empty labels.

25

In terms of implementation, the analysis does

not legislate at the appellate level; rather, it grants the trial judge
discretion to determine how those facts facilitate the purposes of the
doctrine within the competing policies of the statute. 26
Importantly, a critical part of the district court's discretion in
determining the applicability of the unclean-hands doctrine is the
authority to deny the defense and limit its application when
appropriate. At the time of the Supreme Court's inequitable-conduct
decisions, a well-known limitation of the unclean-hands doctrine was
that courts would apply the doctrine only if it advanced, and did not
defeat, the policies at issue in the case. 27 As a result, part of a district
court's discretion involves accounting for all the circumstances,
including any mitigating factors, before deciding that the uncleanhands doctrine precludes a plaintiff's remedy. 28 The discretion to
deny application of the unclean-hands doctrine was evidenced in
Hazel-Atlas when the Supreme Court justified dismissal after noting
525. See MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 111, at 451-54 (noting it is not possible to
identify a unifying factor because the equitable doctrines are only to be understood
in the terms that provoked them); Chafee I, supra note 11, at 878.
526. See generally Chafee I, supranote 11 (discussing the various problems with the
clean hands doctrine's governance).
527. See, e.g., Lyon v. Campbell, 33 F. App'x. 659, 665 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)
("[E]ven if the district court might have been justified in applying the doctrine of
unclean hands based on Lyon's false testimony, the court was not compelled to do
so. Application of the doctrine of unclean hands is largely in the discretion of the
district court ..
"); see also Nakahara v. NS 1991 Am. Trust, 718 A.2d 518, 523 n.35
(Del. Ch. 1998) (citing cases refusing to apply the unclean-hands doctrine on public
policy grounds); NEWMAN, supra note 30, at 241-42 (same).
528. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 11, § 2.4(2), at 71-72 (cautioning that the
application of unclean hands is subject to public-policy considerations); see also Byron
v. Clay, 867 F.2d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) ("The doctrine of unclean
hands.., gives recognition to the fact that equitable decrees may have effects on
third parties-persons who are not parties to a lawsuit, including taxpayers and
members of the law-abiding public-and so should not be entered without
consideration of those effects."); YOUNG ET AL., supra note 181, at 183 (citing cases
from Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and England).
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there were no intervening equities that should change the
More recent Supreme Court practice involving
outcome.5 29
application of the unclean-hands doctrine in other federal legislation
has accounted for the discretion to deny the defense.
In McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,531 the Court explained that the

532
defense may also be relaxed because it is founded on public policy.
Lower state and federal courts are in accord and refuse the defense if
they find that the public interest outweighs
its application or that it
5 33
will otherwise work an inequitable result.
The majority in Therasense did not deviate from this equitable
approach.5 34 Retaining the district court's discretion to deny the

529. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944).
Additionally suggestive are the Court's patent misuse cases that provided for
discretion to limit the defense when the improper practice had been abandoned. See
Poll, supra note 158, at 72-75 (discussing cases denying relief under the clean-hands
doctrine once the improper practice had ceased and its consequences dissipated).
530. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988) (noting that the Supreme Court
has similarly instructed the district courts to apply the unclean-hands doctrine's legal
cousin-in paridelicto-only if barring recovery would not offend statutory policies).
531. 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
532. See id. at 360-61 (pointing out the discretion applied in judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement, or promotion).
533. See, e.g., Citizens Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d
110, 130 (3d Cir. 2004) ("We hold that the District Court's heavy reliance on the
doctrine of unclean hands to justify its denial of injunctive relief improperly
weighted that evidence to the exclusion of the merits of CNBEC's claim and the
public interest, and constituted an abuse of discretion."); EEOC v. Recruit U.S.A.,
Inc., 939 F.2d 746, 753-55 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he clean hands doctrine should not
be strictly enforced when to do so would frustrate a substantial public interest.");
Katiroll Co. v. Kati Roll and Platters, Inc., No. 10-3620 (GEB), 2011 WL 2294260, at
*2 (D.NJ. June 8, 2011) ("[I]n a trademark infringement action, 'the court must
show solicitude for the public in evaluating an unclean hands defense."' (quoting
Citizens Fin. Grp., 383 F.3d at 129)); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. First Am. Fund of Funds,
Inc., 274 F. Supp. 517, 520 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("[T]he doctrine of unclean hands
should not be applied since the central concern of the law of unfair competition is
protection of the public from confusion in the securities market."). For state cases,
see, for example, Health Maint. Network v. BlueCross of So. Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 220
(Ct. App. 1988); Burnette v. Void, 509 A.2d 606 (D.C. 1986). See also WOLFE &
PITrENGER, supra note 420, § 11.07[a] (listing cases).
534. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1305 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Bryson, J., dissenting) (noting that the court has repeatedly
held that the trial judge has discretion to decline to find inequitable conduct even if
the elements of intent and materiality are satisfied).
It is unclear whether the
majority failed to remove the remaining equitable notion in inequitable conduct due
to concern over the judicial power in refusing to enforce statutory rights or simply
through oversight. See NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887, 893 (7th Cir.
1990) (Posner, J.) ("[A] modern federal equity judge does not have the limitless
discretion of a medieval Lord Chancellor to grant or withhold a remedy."); Zygmunt
J.B. Plater, Statutoiy Violations and EquitableDiscretion, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 524, 524 (1982)
(suggesting that courts have less remedial discretion in statutory versus common law
or constitutional causes of action).
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defense on policy grounds should provide an important safety valve
to constrain the doctrine's application.5 5
4. Additional constraints
The defense is restricted even further through its use in equity
actions. Specifically, while the doctrine of unclean hands applies to
all equitable relief, it traditionally is limited to only equitable relief, as
opposed to legal relief in the form of damages.5 6 The heightened
pleading requirement imposed by the Federal Circuit, as well as the
new safe-harbor provisions for the submission of supplemental
information and the possibility of waiver pursuant to the post-grant
proceedings under the new patent legislation, should serve as
additional checks on any unwarranted expansion.5 7
Finally, while there will always be some danger of inequitable
conduct being applied too broadly in certain cases, the Supreme
Court seems willing to take the risk. 8 At the turn of the twentieth
535. See Lee Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An
Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1302 (2011) (noting there is "no
substantive jurisprudence around the balancing component").
536. See Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies, supra note 13, at 74-115 (detailing cases
evidencing the extension of unclean hands to legal remedies); O'Connor, supra note
27, at 331 (asserting that inequitable conduct should be limited to equitable
remedies).
537. See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (holding that FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b)'s particularity requirement applies to a
pleading of inequitable conduct, so that "the pleading must identify the specific who,
what, when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission comitted"
before the Patent Office, and "must include sufficient allegations of underlying facts
from which a court may reasonably infer that a specific individual" had knowledge
and intent to deceive the Patent Office); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
Section 12 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)may have an impact on the
inequitable-conduct defense. See 124 Stat. at 325. Codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257(a)
(Supp. V 2012), it gives patent owners the option to request supplemental
examination of a patent to consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to
be relevant to a patent following its issuance. Because such information would be
unavailable as a basis for rendering the patent unenforceable if the patentee's
request for supplemental review is made before the inequitable-conduct defense is
raised, section 12 provides patent owners an additional avenue to satisfy their duty of
disclosure after a patent has issued. SeeJason Rantanen, et al., America Invents, More
or Less?, 160 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 229, 244 (2012) (discussing section 12 as
creating "a patent amnesty program").
There are also new post-grant proceedings where the claims are waived if not pled.
See David H. Herrington, et al., Congress Makes Substantial Changes to Patent Law with
the America Invents Act, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Dec. 2011, at 3, 3-7 (explaining
that even the AIA's change to the first-to-file system for determining patent priority
may curtail inequitable conduct by eliminating a factual scenario providing the basis
for the defense); see also David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoningthe Next Apple?
The America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REv. 517, 517 (2013)
(purporting that although the AIA is "the most significant patent law reform in two
generations, [it] may have a dark side").
538. See Goldman, supra note 23, at 51 (concluding the policy balance had shifted

20131

INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IN RETROSPECTIVE

1523

century, the Supreme Court invoked the doctrine of unclean hands
in an intellectual property case, explaining that the doctrine was "the
doctrine of the highest court of England, and [that] no court ha[d]
laid it down with any greater stringency than the Supreme Court of
the United States." 5 9 Federal courts well understood the rich
equitable tradition of the unclean-hands doctrine at the time of the
early inequitable-conduct decisions. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Keystone announced that "the [unclean-hands] maxim
is of so ancient an origin that extended analysis of its scope and effect
would seem unnecessary. "540
Since its inequitable-conduct decisions in patent law, the Supreme
Court's dealings with the doctrine of unclean hands have remained
true to the doctrine's remedial and discretionary character. Four
justices in a concurring opinion in eBay acknowledged that "equitable
discretion... is well suited to allow courts to adapt to rapid
'
Equity
technological and legal developments in the patent system."541
is considered one of the most important contributions to English
legal thought because its discretionary nature enhances analytic
power by providing additional normative dimensions to improve the
law.5 4' Facilitating social and economic progress was, and still is,
from the late 1800's when the Supreme Court was protecting the patentee from
vexatious lawsuits to protecting the public from the anticompetitive effect of a patent
monopoly). The Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue explained that '[alithough
recognizing the patent system's desirable stimulus to invention, we have also viewed
the patent as a monopoly which, although sanctioned by law, has the economic
consequences attending other monopolies." 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971). The Court
noted the competitive disadvantage of the alleged infringer given that the patentee is
favored with a presumption of validity and "'the expense of defending a patent suit is
often staggering to the small businessman."' Id. at 334-35 (quoting Picard v. United
Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 641 (2d Cir. 1942) (FrankJ, concurring)).
539. Worden v. Cal. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 535 (1903). Since the Supreme
Court adopted the unclean-hands doctrine in 1795, it has addressed the defense in
every decade but one. There are roughly one hundred Supreme Court cases
concerning unclean hands. Moreover, Precision and Hazel-Atlas have been given
precedential value by the Supreme Court in subsequent unclean-hands cases. See,
e.g., S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). State courts
likewise rely on these early patent decisions in understanding and expanding
unclean hands and related doctrines. See Anenson, Beyond Chafee, supra note 14, at
530-32 (noting that Hazel-Atlas has been the basis for the development of the fraud
on the court doctrine and that Precision has been used in extending the defense to
legal remedies).
540. Gen. Excavator Co.v. Keystone Driller Co., 62 F.2d 48, 50 (6th Cir. 1932),
affd, 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
541. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy,
Stevens, Souter & BreyerJJ., concurring).
542. See Pound, supra note 406, at 350 (concluding that "the rise of the court of
chancery preserved [our legal system] from medieval dry rot"); see also NEWMAN,
supra note 30, at 255 ("The evolution of law is to a large extent the history of its
absorption of equity."); Burbank, supranote 424, at 1296 (commenting that our legal
culture is "accustomed to claims for the triumph of equity' and to thinking about
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critical to the development of intellectual property law in the United
States.543
In conclusion, this Article has attempted to explain and justify the
role of equity within the environment of patent law and the defense
of inequitable conduct, whose precepts derive from a mixture of
legislation, judicial doctrine, and administrative regulations. The
traditional paradigm may not alleviate all the ills associated with
inequitable conduct.5" Nevertheless, the doctrine is an equitable
remedy and should be understood as such. Holmes' famous quip
that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic" 54 5 has been
repeatedly reaffirmed in Supreme Court equity opinions, including a
concurring opinion addressing patent remedies in eBay.546
Consequently, while tradition is not the only principle of
interpretation, 54 7 the foregoing analysis has attempted to establish
54
that it is still relevant to inequitable conduct.
equity as an engine of legal development"); Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years of
American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REV. 171, 179-81 (1936) (predicting that the future of
equity is certain because it is a flexible tradition for allowing growth in the law).
543. See generally Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U.S. 308, 337 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("A dynamic equityjurisprudence
is of special importance in the commercial law context."); Union Pac. Ry. v. Chi.,
Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 163 U.S. 564, 600-01 (1896) ("It must not be forgotten that
in the increasing complexities of modern business relations equitable remedies have
necessarily and steadily been expanded, and no inflexible rule has been permitted to
circumscribe them."); BLAIR & COTrER, supranote 9.

544. Even if inequitable conduct, the so-called "patent-killing virus," can be cured
by resort to its history or otherwise, healing it will not treat the other ills of patent law
that affect patent quality and remain obstacles to an effectively-functioning patent
system. Narrowing the defense that has expanded as the main medication to restore
patent health will highlight the insufficiency of Patent Office resources and
capabilities. In this sense, relying on inequitable conduct for the complete
fulfillment of statutory (and constitutional) purposes is asking too much of the
defense and, for that matter, the judiciary. Alleviating the infection of inequitable
conduct will relocate the disease it was attempting to address and return it to
Congress, where it was created. Congress has made an attempt to improve the
quality of the exam process in the AIA with supplemental examination procedures
and post grant review proceedings. See Robert C. Bird, The America Invents Act, Patent
Priority, and Supplemental Examination, in THE CHANGING FACE OF U.S. PATENT LAw AND
ITS IMPACT ON BuSINESS STRATEGY 63, 66-68 (Daniel R. Cahoy & LyndaJ. Oswald eds.,

2013).
545. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (HolmesJ.).
546. eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring)
(quoting Eisner, 256 U.S. at 349).
547. See CARDOZO, supra note 312, at 26 (commenting that there is "not a received
tradition which does not threaten to dissolve"). Similarly, Holmes said:
History must be part of the study, because without it we cannot know the
precise scope of rules which it is our business to know. It is a part of the
rational study, because it is the first step toward an enlightened scepticism,
that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules.
Holmes, supra note 1, at 469.
548. In assessing the continued value of ancient equity in modem law, Professor
Lionel Smith explains that resort to history recognizes the limits of our wisdom and
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For better or for worse, the choice between continuity and change
has largely remained in the judicial method.5 49 Neither the Patent
Act of 1952, nor the newly enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
of 2011, has altered the status quo.550 As in many other areas of law,
what courts once regulated solely by precedent is now bounded by
legislation. 51 It is within this framework that the federal courts must
undertake the difficult task of creating the contours of inequitable
conduct and ascertaining its applicability to patent remedies.
The Federal Circuit's exclusion of the history of equity has not
yielded a coherent and acceptable rule of inequitable conduct. To
date, "the Federal Circuit has drawn criticism for straying too far
from generally accepted legal principles and mainstream American
jurisprudence."552 Its recent decision in Therasense demonstrates that

the defense of inequitable conduct is, unfortunately, no exception.
After the procedural merger in the early twentieth century, Roscoe
Pound, a distinguished American educator and one of the most cited
legal scholars of the twentieth century, feared the loss of equity in
The majority opinion in Therasense
American jurisprudence.5 "
illustrates that what has actually happened is, perhaps, even worse.
Equity is not lost, for it continues in a steady stream of precedents,
but it has ceased being understood.55 4 It is no wonder the Federal
Circuit avoided any attempt to recast inequitable conduct and
unclean hands, or that patent scholars are only now working to
the modesty of our perspective. See Smith, supra note 160, at 20 (discussing history
and the value of ancient equity in modem law); see alsoJ.D. Heydon, Limits to the
Powers of Ultimate Appellate Courts, 93 L.Q.R. 399, 404 (2006) ("It is even possible that
we are not wiser than our ancestors." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
549. Mason, supra note 423, at 41 ("Over the centuries, judges at common law and
in equity moulded principles whereby the two 'systems' acted in aid of each other
where appropriate, recognised and applied each other's rules when necessary to do
so, and borrowed ideas from time to time." (footnote omitted)).
550. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 508, at 1. (" [W] e have gone from a legal
system dominated by common law, divined by courts, to one in which statutes,
enacted by legislatures have become the primary source of law.").
551. See id.; see also Watson, supra note 494, at 697 (discussing equitable
recoupment as a remedial defense in federal tax law which has "no statutory
underpinnings").
552. Hoffman & Kinder, supra note 22, at 228.
553. See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence ofEquity, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 20, 35 (1905).
554. See Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies, supra note 13, at 110 (noting courts'
confusion and describing the unclean-hands doctrine as "the most powerful," but
also as the "least containable defense that came from ancient courts of equity"). In
attempting to answer questions of equity, members of the Supreme Court have
disagreed over the existence or relevancy of a particular custom, been mistaken as to
what it is or means, and divided when traditional principles purportedly deviate from
practice. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 12, at 599-600; see also Burbank, supra note 424,
at 28; John Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable," 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1317,
1343 (2003).
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correct the lack of a philosophical basis for patent remedies. 55 1
Holmes advised that we must understand the past to better govern
the present and enable social progress. 55 6 Doug Rendleman, a noted
remedies expert, holds a similar opinion. In his most recent text
involving American equity law, he reminds courts that "if you want to
know where you are, it helps to know where you have been."55 7
By anchoring inequitable conduct to equity as acknowledged in the
decisions of the Supreme Court, this Article aims to provide lasting
reform through the idea of unclean hands. The foregoing analysis
provides a definitive methodology for federal courts to use in
analyzing inequitable conduct and returns discretion to district
courts to decide the defense within the ambit of the facts and the
guiding principles of equity.
CONCLUSION

There are critical challenges facing patent rights and remedies.
The defense of inequitable conduct in the patent process is a
prominent and controversial concern. It is one of the largest
judicially-created doctrines in patent jurisprudence and has been the
subject of intense interest in the patent community.
The ruling by the United States Supreme Court in eBay instructs
that patent law is not an island, but is part of the broader law of
equity and its remedies. Initially heeding that instruction, the
Federal Circuit in Therasense unanimously decided to rehear en banc
the issue of inequitable conduct in light of its origins in equity and
unclean hands. Regrettably, the majority decision then renounced
the doctrine's heritage and reinvented the defense purely on policy
grounds. Although the majority still called cheating in obtaining a
patent monopoly inequitable conduct, there is little equity left.
The Therasense majority rewrote the rules of ancient equity without
resort to history or a guiding legal theory. By revisiting the equitable
doctrine of unclean hands, this Article provides critical guidance in
the future adjudication of inequitable conduct. It evaluates what the
555. See discussion supra Introduction (showing that remedies are largely derived
from equity).
556.

See OLIVER WENDELL

HOLMES,

COLLECTED

LEGAL PAPERS

187

(1921)

(criticizing that "the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past").
557. RENDLEMAN, supra note 12, at 96 (discussing the importance of a historical
perspective in analyzing equitable principles).
Rendleman is the Robert E.R.
Huntley Professor of Law at the Washington and Lee University School of Law.
Justice Joseph Story, one of the giants of the formative period of American equity
jurisprudence and an expert in patent law, put it more simply. He advised that
"[h]istory has been said to be the philosophy of teaching by examples." 1 STORY,
supranote 162, § 55, at 52.
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defense could and should mean within the context of the principles
of equity and the policies of patent remedies. In doing so, it shows
how patent law may meaningfully join equity in substance and
procedure, in a way that is also consonant with the interests of the
legislature.
The suggestions build upon theoretical developments in patent
rights and remedies. Contrary to the majority opinion in Therasense,
the recommendations are also consistent with Supreme Court
precedent. In fact, the analysis unites a series of Supreme Court
decisions on unclean hands, remedies, and patent law. Examining
inequitable conduct from the perspective of equity jurisprudence as a
whole exposes trends and themes a narrower lens might have omitted
and traces critical lines that have been ignored. While the literature
on inequitable conduct has been extensive, no one has examined
inequitable conduct from its equitable tradition. Therefore, this
Article fills an essential gap in the scholarship on an issue of systemic
importance.
In reference to Holmes' aphorism, the Federal Circuit decision in
Therasense killed the patent dragon. This Article attempts to tame it
and make the inequitable-conduct defense a useful animal.

